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Abstract 
 
Solidarity was important in the creation and maintenance of the English NHS, which 
was the product of class compromise. Its founding principles were that it was to be 
free (at the point of access), universal, comprehensive and primarily funded from 
general taxation. In recent decades, successive governments have renewed the neo-
liberal project. This has involved new governance mechanisms (quasi-markets and 
targets) being emplaced in the NHS and private healthcare companies (which have 
influenced government policy) being afforded increasing opportunities to deliver NHS 
services. Such privatisation is antagonistic to patient needs. I undertake an ideology 
critique of the NHS reforms of the New Labour governments and of governments since 
2010. I examine the influences on, justifications for, resistance to, and potential reifying 
effects of, such reforms. Misrepresentations and mystification may legitimate and 
obscure legal changes. I identify the ideological modes and strategies that 
governments have employed to justify their reforms. I also analyse several modes of 
reification (identity thinking, instrumental rationality, depoliticisation and the 
legitimation effect of law) to assess whether the reforms produced estrangement, 
which is the opposite of solidarity.  
 
Many of the justifications for successive reforms were contested. Although such 
reforms have rendered healthcare more opaque, solidarity endures. Neo-liberal norms 
compete with residual norms (including the NHS’ founding principles) and emergent 
norms (which developed due to the problems of welfare states, such as their failure to 
empower recipients and the persistence of health inequalities). As validity has been 
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given to residual and emergent norms, which have been superficially articulated within 
government discourse, but which are undermined by neo-liberal policies, a legitimation 
crisis may arise as public experience increasingly diverges from them. I advocate 
amending legislation which has undermined residual norms, democratising the NHS 
to empower patients and the public and increased intervention in capitalism to address 
health inequalities.  
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Introduction 
 
‘‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living’’.1 
 
Introduction 
 
Karl Marx’s above contemplation indicates that altering social relations is not 
straightforward. In this dissertation, I highlight that although neo-liberalism is currently 
the dominant ideology, the translation of neo-liberal norms into health and healthcare, 
through mechanisms, such as law, has not been a seamless process. The National 
Health Service (NHS) was established in 1948 to provide universal, comprehensive 
and free at the point of access (with access based on need) health care to UK citizens 
who registered. It was the product of class compromise.2 In institutionalising solidarity 
concerning healthcare,3 it was symptomatic of what Francois Ewald described as 
social law, which recognises the interdependence of citizens.4 The Minister of Health 
who established the NHS, Aneurin Bevan, stated that it was a first fruit and that more 
                                                          
1 Marx, K. (1852) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [On-line] Available: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ [Accessed: 07 October 2014]. 
2 Wright, E. (2015) Understanding Class. London: Verso, p231. 
3 Jaeggi, R. (2001) ‘Solidarity and Indifference’ in ter Meulen, R. et al (eds) Solidarity and Health Care 
in Europe. London: Kluwer, pp287-308 at p292. 
4 Ewald, F. (1988) ‘A Concept of Social Law’ in Teubner, G. (ed) Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare 
State. New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp40-75 at p43. 
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goods and services should be delivered in ways other than the market.5 In the neo-
liberal era, numerous policy and legal changes (legislation, regulations and ministerial 
directions) have reformed the English NHS.6   
 
I primarily focus on reforms characteristic of roll-out neo-liberalism,7 which involves 
states more directly supporting capital through social policy.8 Such reforms have 
altered NHS governance through performance management, marketization (aided by 
legal forms, such as contract) and privatisation (which may be locked in by 
supranational legal regimes). In furnishing private companies with more opportunities, 
the reforms that I examine divert money away from patient needs to bureaucracies 
(required to administer quasi-markets) and the coffers of private companies and 
undermine risk pooling and cross subsidy within the NHS, which underpin a service 
provided in response to need.9 While the NHS was created on the basis that it was 
beneficial for society in improving health and moral (as it was argued that income 
should not affect access to health services),10 the distributive effects of neo-liberal 
policies have been accompanied by a moral politics emphasising individual 
responsibility for health which endeavours to justify excluding some patients. Neo-
liberal policies have reduced the comprehensiveness of the NHS. This, coupled with 
                                                          
5 Bevan, A. (1950) Democratic Values. London: Fabian Society, p14. 
6 The provision of healthcare is a devolved competence for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
7 The third neo-liberal transformation, identified by Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell. The first was roll-
back neo-liberalism and the second was a transition to more ameliorative forms. See Peck, J. and 
Tickell, A. (2002) ‘Neoliberalizing Space’. Antipode, Vol.34(3), pp380-404 at pp388-389. 
8 Veitch, K. (2013) ‘Law, Social Policy, and the Constitution of Markets and Profit Making’. Journal of 
Law and Society, Vol. 40(1), pp137-154 at p138. 
9 Doctors for the NHS (2015) ‘An NHS Beyond the Market’. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.doctorsforthenhs.org.uk/nhs-theats/privatisation/an-nhs-beyond-the-market/ [Accessed: 16 
October 2016]. 
10 Glyn, A. (2006) Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globalization and Welfare. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p158. 
3 
 
insufficient funding, has resulted in more people paying for health care. This is 
inequitable, as where health is treated ‘‘as a commodity with a price, it tends to be 
differentially distributed among members of a society’’.11 Neo-liberals are desirous of 
citizens attending to their needs through markets,12 which they idealise as essential in 
allocating resources and ensuring freedom.13 I analyse the reforms from a Marxist 
perspective. Marxists view markets as inefficient (I argue that quasi-markets have 
rendered the NHS less allocatively efficient) and opaque. Marxists desire to organise 
society according to the following principle: ‘‘from each according to his abilities, to 
each according to his needs’’.14 Marxists are thus antipathetic to reforms which 
undermine patient’s needs.  
 
In order to understand how the distributive effects of neo-liberal reforms may be 
legitimated or obscured, I undertake an ideology critique of the reforms of the New 
Labour governments (1997-2010) and governments since 2010 and analyse 
developments up to the 2017 general election. I examine the influences on (including 
neo-liberalism and private healthcare companies), the justifications for, opposition and 
resistance to, and the effects of, such reforms. I also consider the broader policies of 
the respective governments and their impact on health and healthcare. In particular, I 
note that while NHS investment increased under New Labour, it has decreased under 
subsequent governments. In this respect, the Select Committee on the Long-Term 
                                                          
11 Waitzkin, H. and Waterman, B. (1974) The Exploitation of Illness in Capitalist Society. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, p12. 
12 Offe, C. (1984) ‘Legitimacy versus Efficiency’ in Keane, J. (ed) Contradictions of the Welfare State. 
London: Hutchinson, pp130-146 at p138. 
13 Turner, R. (2008) Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, p4. 
14 Marx, K. (1875) Critique of the Gotha Program. [On-line] Available: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm [Accessed: 5 September 2017]. 
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Sustainability of the NHS recently determined that a tax funded, free at the point of 
use NHS remains the most appropriate model and requires increased funding.15 
 
I briefly examine New Labour’s extension of the private finance initiative (PFI), for the 
financing of hospital construction, which involved private profit taking precedence over 
patient need. However, I mainly focus on the increased opportunities afforded to 
private companies in delivering clinical services within the NHS. In this respect, the 
‘NHS Plan’, published in 2000, led to a concordat with the Independent Healthcare 
Association (IHA). This was an informal agreement for the NHS to increasingly use 
private facilities. It also instigated performance management in the NHS (through the 
use of targets).16 New Labour’s reforms increasingly marketized the NHS. Such 
reforms included supply side reforms, such as the creation of independent sector 
treatment centres (ISTCs) and foundation trusts (FTs), which were conferred with 
powers to borrow, generate surpluses and establish joint ventures with private 
companies. It also involved demand side reforms (such as patient choice of provider 
for some services), transactional reforms (such as the introduction of payment by 
results (PBR) for some treatments) and system management reforms. New Labour’s 
primary care reforms (ending the GP monopoly of primary care services17 and the 
creation of polyclinics) also increased opportunities for private companies.  
                                                          
15 Select Committee on the Long-Term Sustainability of the NHS (2017) The Long-Term Sustainability 
of the NHS and Adult Social Care Report of Session 2016-17. London: House of Lords, p3. 
16 Exworthy, M. et al (2010) Decentralisation and Performance: Autonomy and Incentives in Local 
Health Economies. Southampton: National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and 
Organisation, p69. 
17 National Health Service (NHS) Act (1977), S.16CC(2)(B) as amended by Health and Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) (HSC) Act (2003), S.174/National Health Service (NHS) Act 
(2006), S.83(2)(B). 
5 
 
 
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition (2010-2015) reformed the NHS via the 
Health and Social Care (HSC) Act (2012). The HSC Act (2012) undermines the NHS’ 
founding principles as it: permits FTs to derive up to forty-nine percent of their income 
from fee paying patients18 (undermining equality of access); introduces eligibility 
criteria into the NHS19 (undermining universality); facilitated the reduction of the 
comprehensiveness of the NHS (for example, by replacing Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs), which were required to provide or secure certain services, such as services 
concerning drug and alcohol misuse,20 with Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), 
which are not21); and, facilitates the further reduction of the comprehensiveness of the 
NHS through its amendment to the duty of the Secretary of State for Health (who is 
now only required to promote, not provide, a comprehensive health service22). The 
coalition sought to depoliticise healthcare by delegating power to ostensibly non-
political bodies, such as NHS England (NHSE). Although the coalition claimed that it 
wanted to decentralise power within the NHS and move away from process targets, 
the NHS has become increasingly centralised and such targets persist. I contend that 
the outcomes data that is being produced in the NHS (partly to facilitate patient choice) 
is superficial.  
 
                                                          
18 NHS Act (2006), S.43(2A) as amended by Health and Social Care (HSC) Act (2012), S.164(1). 
19 HSC Act (2012), S.103(1). 
20 National Health Service (functions of strategic health authorities and primary care trusts and 
administration arrangements) (England) Regulations, SI 2002/2548. 
21 Pollock, A. et al., ‘Health and Social Care Bill 2011: a legal basis for charging and providing fewer 
services to people in England’. British Medical Journal 2012;344:e1729. 
22 NHS Act (2006), S.1(1) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.1. 
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The coalition claimed that it wanted to empower GPs (working together in CCGs, 
which commission secondary care services) to act on behalf of patients. Although the 
discretion afforded to commissioners regarding the use of competition is contested, 
many commissioners have acted as though their discretion was curtailed and private 
providers are increasingly delivering NHS services. This has negative implications for 
equity, efficiency, accountability and quality and may fragment the NHS. Nonetheless, 
there are countervailing forces to competition, such as resource constraints and public 
opposition. Many interpret NHSE’s emphasis on integration in ‘Five Year Forward 
View’ (‘FYFV’), and subsequently, as a move away from competition. However, the 
integrated care organisations that are being developed, in some parts of England, are 
attractive to private companies, which are reportedly interested in filling projected gaps 
in funding for the sustainability and transformation plans (STPs) devised to implement 
‘FYFV’.23 
 
A consumerist view of public engagement in health services informed the reforms of 
successive governments, which have weakened mechanisms for patient and public 
involvement. The reforms encountered opposition and resistance and have been the 
subject of numerous academic critiques. The method of ideology critique was often 
unclear and is eschewed by many contemporary critical theorists.24 Nonetheless, I 
utilise it (in my own particular way) within this dissertation, to illuminate the 
contestation between dominant neo-liberal ideas and competing ideas and the 
imperfect translation of neo-liberal ideas into practice, via mechanisms, including law 
                                                          
23 Forster, K., ‘Budget 2017: Philip Hammond accused of back-door NHS privatisation by funding 
‘shady’ reform plans’, Independent, 9 March 2017. 
24 Jaeggi, R. (2009) ‘Rethinking Ideology’ in de Bruin, R. and Zurn, C. (eds) New Waves in Political 
Philosophy. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp63-86 at p63. 
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(which involves attempt, incompleteness and resistance25), which is neglected in other 
critiques of recent NHS reforms. Below, I outline the key claims advanced within my 
thesis, set out my research questions and present an overview of the chapters. 
 
Thesis Claims 
 
There are several different, but potentially compatible, ways of conceiving neo-
liberalism.26 The problem with conceiving neo-liberalism as a process, or as a set of 
policies, is that such conceptions do not identify an agent.27 Neo-liberalism is 
conceived in Foucauldian literature as a political rationality, which seeks to impose the 
logic of the market on an increasing number of spheres through mechanisms of 
governance. Foucauldian approaches neglect the translation of political rationalities 
into practice28 and de-emphasise the power and domination of capital.29 My ideology 
critique draws on Marxist conceptions of neo-liberalism, as a hegemonic class project, 
which identify the ruling bourgeois class as the agent of neo-liberal policies and 
processes and account for the often imperfect translation of political rationalities into 
practice. Although neo-liberal methods and norms of governance have been emplaced 
within the NHS, I aver that neo-liberalism has not been as successful as some scholars 
                                                          
25 Hunt, A. and Wickham, G. (1994) Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of law as Governance. 
London: Pluto, pp102-104. 
26 It has been conceived as a process, as a set of policies, as a type of governmentality and as a 
hegemonic ideological project. See Ward, K. and England, K. (2007) ‘Introduction: Reading 
Neoliberalization’ in Ward, K. and England, K. (eds) Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp1-22. 
27 Birch, K. (2015) We Have Never Been Neoliberal: A Manifesto for a Doomed Youth. Winchester: 
Zero Books 
28 Clarke, J. (2009) ‘Programmatic Statements and Dull Empiricism: Foucault’s Neo-liberalism and 
Social Policy’. Journal of Cultural Economy, Vol.2(1-2), pp227-231 at p229. 
29 Brown, W. (2015) Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. Brooklyn, NY: Zone 
Books, p13. 
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suggest. Wendy Brown argues that the space between liberal democratic ideals and 
lived realities is no longer exploitable as neo-liberalism has expunged liberal 
conceptions of the good life and its formal promises of freedom and equality.30 Brown 
contends that in the neo-liberal era, states derive their legitimacy merely from 
economic growth.31 My analysis of NHS reforms repudiates Brown’s arguments.  
 
Neo-liberals contend that welfare states undermine competitiveness32 and that public-
sector bureaucrats are self-maximising entrepreneurs (rather than motivated by a 
public service ethos) incentivised by democracy to raise budgets.33 New governance 
methods, such as targets and quasi-markets (as complete marketization has been 
deemed to be electorally unviable), have been emplaced within the NHS during the 
neo-liberal era. Both Brown and David Harvey note that corporations have an 
increased role in fashioning law and policy.34 I posit that there is a micro-ideology 
pertaining to private healthcare companies, proponents of which seek to justify their 
increased involvement in delivering clinical services, which is in the material interests 
of such companies.35 I explicate the influence that the agents of such companies have 
exerted on the reforms.  
 
                                                          
30 Ibid at p57. 
31 Ibid at p26. 
32 Gough, I. (2000) Global Capital, human needs and Social Policies. Basingstoke: Palgrave, p177. 
33 Seymour, R. (2014) Against Austerity: How we can fix the crisis they made. London: Pluto, p10. 
34 Brown, W. (2015) Undoing the Demos, op cit., n.29 at p43/ Harvey, D. (2007) A Brief History of 
Neo-liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp76-77. 
35 Profit rates have been low since the 1970s and, as John McKinley noted, healthcare is attractive for 
capitalists as demand appears to be insatiable and the state is a guarantor of profit. See McKinley, J. 
(1984) ‘Introduction’ in McKinley, J. (ed) Issues in the Political Economy of Healthcare. London: 
Tavistock, pp1-19 at p5.   
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Although neo-liberalism is dominant, my analysis of NHS reforms indicates that, it 
competes with, what Raymond Williams described as, residual and emergent cultural 
forms.36 I argue that residual norms include the liberal democratic norms of legitimacy, 
freedom and equality and the NHS’ founding principles (which are part of what E.P. 
Thompson described as a moral economy,37 as there is a popular consensus 
concerning them). I argue that emergent forms include a developing consciousness 
which, Roberto Unger noted, arose in recognition of the problems and limitations of 
welfare states.38  My analysis shows that governments continue to validate such 
residual and emergent norms, which indicates that neo-liberalism has not been as 
successful, normatively, as some have argued. It also suggests, contrary to Brown’s 
arguments, that welfare states and ideology continue to be important components of 
legitimation.  
 
Brown asserts that inequality (the medium and relation of competing capitals, which 
neo-liberalism seeks to turn subjects into) has become normative in ‘‘legislation, 
jurisprudence and the popular imaginary’’.39 However, as public support for the 
founding values of the NHS, such as formal equality of access, endures,40 successive 
governments claimed to support such values (which I characterise as residual norms) 
while implementing reforms which undermine them. In addition, New Labour and 
subsequent Conservative-led governments adopted the goal of reducing health 
                                                          
36 Williams, R. (1977) Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p122. 
37 Thompson, E. (1971) ‘The Moral Economy of the English crowd in the Eighteenth Century’. Past 
and Present, Vol.50(1), pp76-136 at p79. 
38 Unger, R. (1984) Knowledge and Politics. New York: Free Press, p20. 
39 Brown, W. (2015) Undoing the Demos, op cit., n.29 at p38. 
40 For example, eighty-nine percent of respondents to a recent survey strongly agreed with the 
government supporting a tax funded, free at the point of use NHS providing comprehensive care for 
all citizens. See Gershlick, B. et al (2015) Public Attitudes to the NHS. London: Health Foundation, 
p11.  
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inequalities (which I characterise as an emergent norm), with the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition creating statutory duties in this regard (outlined in chapter six). 
Nonetheless, the coalition’s policies (such as austerity) are likely to exacerbate health 
inequalities.41 Successive governments have sought to redefine freedom, as freedom 
of choice, by interpellating patients as consumers. However, patient choice policies 
have faced recalcitrance42 and have taken a backseat.43 The liberal norm of 
citizenship (collective decision making) has not been extinguished, but reforms have 
weakened mechanisms for patient and public involvement. Residual and emergent 
norms are undermined by dominant neo-liberal norms. For example, privatisation, 
which the neo-liberal norm of competition effectuates, may adversely affect the states 
competence ‘‘to do things which it once managed very well’’,44 such as through 
undermining risk pooling and cross subsidy within the NHS. 
 
The resonance of residual and emergent norms means that efforts to undermine the 
NHS have been covert45 as successive governments have deemed overt challenges 
to such norms to be politically unviable. Successive governments have adopted 
strategies to misrepresent and mystify healthcare. I examine the ideological modes 
(legitimation, dissimulation, unification, differentiation and reification) and their 
strategies, delineated by John B. Thompson,46 which governments have employed to 
                                                          
41 Bambra, C. (2013) ‘All in it Together? Health Inequalities, Austerity and the Great Recession’ in 
Wood, C. (ed) Health in Austerity. London: Demos, pp49-57 at p51. 
42 Clarke, J. (2007) ‘‘It’s not like Shopping’: Citizens, Consumers and the reform of public services’ in 
Bevir, M. and Trentmann, F. (eds) Governance, Consumers and Citizens: Agency and Resistance in 
Contemporary Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp97-118 at pp114-115. 
43 Ham, C. et al (2015) The NHS under the Coalition government part one: NHS Reform. London: 
Kings Fund, p18. 
44 Crouch, C. (2004) Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, p41.  
45 Colin Leys and Stewart Player argue that there has been a covert plot to undermine the NHS. See 
Leys, C. and Player, S. (2011) The Plot Against the NHS. Pontypool: Merlin, p2. 
46 Thompson, J. (2007) Ideology and Modern Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, p60. 
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justify their reforms. Theodor Adorno stated that ‘‘ideologies...become false only by 
their relationship to the existing reality’’.47 I assess whether such justifications are 
borne out in reality. Estrangement is the opposite of solidarity and is caused by 
reification.48 Law may reify social relations via a ‘‘legitimation effect’’49 (whereby law 
appears to be natural and unmediated by history and class dynamics50), via 
instrumental rationality (whereby the law, or means sanctioned by law, become ends 
in themselves) and identity thinking (in which the concepts it uses are not identical with 
the objects that they describe51). Additionally, law may reify social relations by 
facilitating depoliticisation, which can occur on the levels of politics (for example, 
through governmentalization and constitutional law, such as the new constitutionalism 
identified by Stephen Gill52), policy and polity (for example, through shifting the 
boundary between the political and the non-political and alterations to the political 
division of labour53) and may be contested. My overarching argument is that although 
strategies to misrepresent and mystify healthcare have had varying levels of success 
(concisely summarised in the following paragraphs), the solidarity that was important 
in the creation and maintenance of the NHS survives. My conclusions are contingent 
as I recognise that, as social relations develop, further research may justify altered 
conclusions. 
                                                          
47 Adorno, T. (1973) ‘Ideology’ in Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (ed) Aspects of Sociology. 
Viertal, J., Trans. London: Heinemann, pp182-205 at p198. 
48 Torrance, J. (1977) Estrangement, Alienation and Exploitation: A Sociological Approach to 
Historical Materialism. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p315. 
49 Kennedy, D. (1997) A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, p236. 
50 Hedrick, T. (2014) ‘Reification in and Through Law: Elements of a Theory in Marx, Lukacs and 
Honneth’. European Journal of Political Theory, Vol.13(2), pp178-198 at p192. 
51 Cook, D. (2001) ‘Adorno, Ideology and Ideology Critique’. Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol.27(1) 
pp1-20 at p2. 
52 Gill, S. (2008) Power and Resistance in the new world order: 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
p79. 
53 Jessop, B. (2015) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation: theoretical preliminaries on some responses to the 
American fiscal and Eurozone debt crises’ in Flinders, M. and Wood, M. (eds) Tracing the Political: 
Depoliticisation, governance and the state. Bristol: Policy Press, pp95-116 at pp96-106. 
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Successive governments presented their reforms as being in everyone’s interests 
(indicative of the universalization strategy of the ideological mode of legitimation) by 
claiming, for example, that they would enhance quality and value for money. Such 
claims were contested, as critics argued that marketization and privatisation negatively 
affect quality and efficiency. Successive governments also sought to naturalise their 
reforms (a strategy of the ideological mode of reification) by claiming that there were 
no alternatives. Such claims were contested, as critics argued that reforms were 
political choices and not necessities. Successive governments sought to interpellate 
patients as consumers (indicative of the standardization strategy of the unification 
mode of ideology, and of identity thinking, as consumerism treats people alike, thereby 
neglecting differences which may affect choices) but faced recalcitrance.54 Successive 
governments sought to differentiate (a strategy of the ideological mode of 
fragmentation) citizens by emphasising individual responsibility for health and claiming 
that an ageing population threatens the sustainability of healthcare. However, critics 
note the impact of social determinants on health and argue that there is ‘‘no 
evidence…that ageing itself will lead to a funding crisis’’.55 Successive governments 
have superficially articulated residual and emergent norms within their discourse 
(indicative of the ideological mode of dissimulation), while implementing reforms which 
undermine them. Although such norms are being undermined, they continue to enable 
and inform critiques which exploit the space between ideals and lived realities and are 
                                                          
54 Clarke, J. (2007) ‘‘It’s not like Shopping’’, op cit., n.42 at p114-115.  
55 Pollock, A. (2016) ‘The Myth of the ‘Demographic Time Bomb’’. [On-line] Available: 
https://www.sochealth.co.uk/2016/11/14/myth-demographic-time-bomb/ [Accessed: 25 June 2017].   
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a basis for conceiving alternatives. I postulate that the hindered realization of such 
norms may provoke a legitimation crisis.  
 
I identify evidence that the means adopted in NHS governance (quasi-markets and 
targets) have become ends in themselves to the detriment of patients. Identity thinking 
is evident in the extension of the exchange principle through the reduction of the 
comprehensiveness of the NHS (due to successive government’s policies) and 
through increased private activity outside of the NHS, due to pressures on the NHS 
caused by inadequate funding. Identity thinking is also evident in the increased use of 
indicators, which evince a preference for superficial knowledge.56 The use of targets 
(based on indicators) is a tactic of the self-responsibilization strategy of 
depoliticisation. However, where targets are missed, responsibility often attaches to 
ministers.57 Another tactic of this strategy is the overemphasis on individual 
responsibility for health (lifestyle drift) which has characterised the discourse of 
successive governments. If this colonises common sense, it could legitimise decisions 
to restrict access to services. However, the attempts of some CCGs to restrict access 
have faced both public and professional opposition.  
 
The strategy of institutional depoliticisation has been somewhat successful. For 
example, New Labour’s creation of Monitor to regulate FTs was partially successful, 
as many problems with such hospitals were dealt with without parliamentary or 
                                                          
56 Merry, S. (2011) ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance’. Current 
Anthropology, Vol.52(3), pp83-95 at p86. 
57 Diamond, P. (2015) ‘New Labour, Politicisation and Depoliticisation: The Delivery Agenda in public 
services 1997-2007’. British Politics, Vol.10(4), pp429-453 at p446. 
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ministerial involvement, although ministers have intervened in response to scandals, 
despite the law. The coalition created NHSE to oversee the day-to-day running of the 
NHS. The operation of NHSE, so far, indicates that it has the potential both to 
depoliticise and politicise healthcare. The creation of NHSE enables governments to 
attempt to shift blame for healthcare problems. Nonetheless, as the government 
retains important powers over the NHS, such as determining its funding, strategies to 
shift blame are unlikely to be successful. The reforms have rendered healthcare more 
opaque by making accountability more arcane and through the increased use of 
private companies, which are not subject to freedom of information requests, thereby 
reducing public oversight.  
 
The strategy of attempting to shift the boundary between the political and the economic 
(for example, through marketization and juridification)58 has been partially successful 
as business norms and legal rules increasingly govern the behaviour of NHS actors. 
In respect of the latter, my analysis of the NHS reforms corroborates Scott Veitch et 
al’s notion of a fifth epoch of juridification, characterised by increased marketization 
of, and a re-embedding of private law mechanisms in, areas once considered public.59 
However, although privatisation is increasingly determined by legal rules, it remains 
highly politicised, partly due to the activities of campaign groups, such as Keep Our 
NHS Public (KONP).60 As the NHS was increasingly marketized, European Union (EU) 
public procurement and competition laws became increasingly applicable (although 
                                                          
58 Jessop, B. (2015) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation’, op cit., n.53 at p101. 
59 Veitch, S. et al (2012) Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts 2nd edition. Abingdon: Routledge, 
p262. 
60 Krachler, N. and Greer, I. (2015) ‘When does Marketization lead to Privatisation? Profit-making in 
English health services after the 2012 Health and Social Care Act’. Social Science and Medicine, 
Vol.124, pp215-223 at p220. 
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scope exists for exceptions), which could potentially lock-in neo-liberal reforms, as per 
Gill’s notion of new constitutionalism. The UKs imminent withdrawal from the EU may 
remove the constraints it potentially imposed on NHS policymaking, but this may be 
restricted by other external constitutional constraints. I identify a heightened 
awareness of the potential of external constitutional constraints to restrict NHS 
policymaking, evident in concern regarding the impact of the prospective free trade 
deal between the US and the EU, known as the transatlantic trade and investment 
partnership (TTIP), and potential post-Brexit trade deals, on the NHS. Potential 
constraints are thus likely to be politically contested in the future. External 
constitutional constraints have been successfully resisted elsewhere. For example, a 
successful public relations campaign against Bechtel meant that it settled its claim, for 
the breach of an international agreement61 after civil unrest resulted in the termination 
of its contract to run water services in Cochabamba, Bolivia, for a token amount.62 As 
many citizens appear to be incognisant of the reforms,63 it is difficult to assess the 
potential legitimation effect of law. There is a tension between the potential legitimation 
effect of law which has undermined residual norms and the aforementioned moral 
economy whereby deviation from such norms is illegitimate. As mentioned above, I 
aver that as public experience increasingly diverges from such residual norms, a crisis 
of legitimacy may arise.      
 
                                                          
61 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia (signed 10 March 1992; entered into force 1 November 
1994). 
62 Sinclair, S. (2015) ‘Trade agreements and progressive governance’ in Gill, S. (ed) Critical 
Perspectives on the Crisis in Global Governance: Reimaging the Future. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
pp110-133 at p120. 
63 Ipsos MORI (2012) Public Perceptions of the NHS and Social Care. London: Ipsos MORI, p22. 
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The opposition to the NHS reforms has sought to prevent and reverse them. I support 
the NHS (Reinstatement) Bill64 which would amend legislation that has undermined 
the NHS’ founding principles. However, I argue that it is also necessary to effectuate 
emerging norms, such as reducing health inequalities, decentralisation and 
debureaucratisation.65 Such norms were co-opted by New Labour and subsequent 
Conservative-led governments, but health inequalities are likely to increase (due to 
austerity) and the NHS has become more centralised (although the centre is 
fragmented)66 and more bureaucratic.67 Boaventura de Sousa Santos criticised the 
utopian notion that law could be used to engineer a resolution of the contradictions of 
society.68 Although the creation of the NHS emancipated patients from the fear of 
financial hardship that ill health could augur, by decommodifying health care, its failure 
to reduce health inequalities is indicative of the limits of the formal equality regarding 
access to health care that it engendered. I reject the notion that it is wrong to treat 
health care as a commodity as it is unlike other goods and services. Rather, it is 
problematic to treat any good or service as a commodity as this mystifies social 
relations and the inequalities that capitalist production entails. I argue that the state 
must increasingly intervene in capitalist production to address inequalities (such as 
health inequalities). However, empowerment requires that areas of social life not only 
be decommodified but also democratised. 
                                                          
64 National Health Service H.C. Bill (2016-17) [51]. 
65 Unger, R. (1984) Knowledge and Politics, op cit., n.38 at p178. 
66 Jarman, H. and Greer, S. (2015) ‘The big bang: Health and Social Care reform under the coalition’ 
in Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds) The Conservative-Liberal Coalition: Examining the Cameron-Clegg 
government. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp50-67 at p50/Greer, S. and Matzke, M. (2015) ‘Health Policy in 
the European Union’ in Kuhlmann, E. et al (eds) The Palgrave International Handbook of Healthcare 
Policy and Governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp254-269 at p262. 
67 Lister, J. (2012) ‘In Defiance of the evidence: Conservatives threaten to reform away England’s 
National Health Service’. International Journal of Health Services, Vol.42(1), pp137-155 at p140. 
68 Santos, B. (1995) Toward a new common sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic 
Transition. London: Routledge, p89.  
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Thesis Questions 
 
Santos correctly identified the limitations of modern law, but I reject his oppositional 
postmodernist solution of unthinking law.69 Rather, I contend that the task of ideology 
critique, and the aim of my thesis, is to identify the contradictions, mystifications and 
limitations of law and to think of alternatives (although there are no emancipatory 
guarantees in this regard70). The key questions guiding this thesis are: What influence 
have competing ideas (dominant, residual and emergent) and interests had on 
successive (namely, reforms since the year 2000, which have afforded private 
companies more opportunities in delivering clinical services) NHS reforms?  Are the 
justifications for the reforms borne out in reality? What attempts, incompleteness and 
resistance can be identified in respect of the reforms? Have the reforms had, or might 
they have, mystifying effects? What alternatives are suggested by ideology critique? 
 
Chapter Overviews 
 
In chapter one, I examine the historical development of healthcare within England. The 
fear of social unrest and the desire of the bourgeoisie for a fit workforce meant that 
rudimentary healthcare provision developed prior to the twentieth century.71 In the 
                                                          
69 Ibid at p90. 
70 Marks, S. (2000) The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of 
Ideology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p27. 
71 Mulholland, C. (2009) A Socialist History of the NHS. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, p5. 
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twentieth century, class compromise resulted in the development of the welfare state 
and the creation of the NHS. Although the NHS was beneficial for the working class, 
an emerging consciousness arose which recognised its problems and limitations, such 
as its failure to reduce health inequalities or to empower patients. Following economic 
crises in the 1970s, neo-liberal ideology became dominant. I outline the alternative 
ways of conceiving neo-liberalism (mentioned above) and contend that they are 
potentially compatible. I examine government NHS policies within the first two neo-
liberal transformations: roll-back neo-liberalism and a transition to more ameliorative 
forms.72 
 
In chapter two, I elucidate the method of ideology critique employed within this 
dissertation. Marxist legal theory has grappled with two main problems, namely where 
the law is situated within the base/superstructure metaphor (which I reject) and how 
the law is determined. I contend that positive conceptions of ideology are helpful in 
understanding how law is made, although, as stated above, the translation of 
ideologies into practice, via mechanisms, such as law, is not straightforward. I aver 
that negative conceptions of ideology are helpful in examining how legal changes may 
be based upon misrepresentations and how law may mystify social relations. I 
examine and repudiate criticisms of the concept of ideology. I also explain the 
techniques that I employ and identify the policy documents, speeches and legislation 
that I examine.  
 
                                                          
72 Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) ‘Neoliberalizing Space’, op cit., n.7 at pp388-389. 
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I examine New Labour’s reforms in chapters three and four. New Labour’s philosophy 
has been described as ‘‘socialised neo-liberalism’’73 as, once elected in 1997, it was 
‘‘committed to working within the constraints of neo-liberalism’’,74 but invested 
substantially in health and education in a manner akin to orthodox social democratic 
governments.75 In chapter three, I briefly examine PFI, but concentrate primarily on 
the ‘NHS Plan’, the creation of ISTCs and changes to the mechanisms for patient and 
public involvement. New Labour’s NHS reforms were strongly influenced by neo-liberal 
ideas and private healthcare companies. The ‘NHS Plan’ instigated performance 
management in the NHS,76 recommended more co-operative working with the private 
sector77 (leading to a concordat with the IHA) and announced the replacement of 
Community Health Councils (CHCs) by other patient and public involvement 
mechanisms.78  
 
New Labour justified the involvement of the private sector on the basis that it would 
increase capacity, ensure quality and value for money and lead to innovation. I note, 
in chapter four, that New Labour subsequently averred that it would be beneficial for 
patients in stimulating competition and in reducing health inequalities. All of these 
claims were contested and, I argue, were not borne out. New Labour stated that it 
wanted to enhance patient voices, but it weakened mechanisms for patient and public 
                                                          
73 Wilkinson, R. (2000) ‘New Labour and the Global Economy’ in Coates, D. and Lawler, P. (eds) New 
Labour in Power. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp136-148 at p138. 
74 Gamble, A. (2009) The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, p106. 
75 Gamble, A. (2010) ‘New Labour and Political Change’. Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.63(4), pp639-652 
at p649. 
76 Exworthy, M. et al (2010) Decentralisation and Performance, op cit., n.16 at p69. 
77 Department of Health (2000) NHS Plan. A Plan for Investment. A Plan for Reform. London: HMSO, 
p96. 
78 Ibid at p95. 
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involvement. Although New Labour had been critical of their Conservative 
predecessor’s policies (while in opposition), and claimed to adhere to traditional NHS 
values, it emulated the Conservatives and undermined such values: by continuing to 
transfer services from the NHS to local authorities (undermining the 
comprehensiveness of the NHS);79 by focusing on personal responsibility for, rather 
than the socio-economic determinants of, ill health;80 and, by developing a quasi-
market in secondary care.  
 
In chapter four, I examine New Labour’s creation of FTs and a mimic-market in 
secondary care and its changes to primary care.  I repudiate New Labour’s claims that 
FTs would improve NHS performance, facilitate genuine local ownership and enable 
health inequalities to be more effectively tackled. In addition to supply side reforms 
(the creation of ISTCs and FTs), New Labour’s mimic-market involved demand side 
reforms (patient choice and commissioning), transactional reforms (PBR) and system 
management reforms. New Labour’s attempt to interpellate patients as consumers (for 
example, via its patient choice policy) was simplistic and faced recalcitrance.81 I argue 
(in chapters three and four) that the means adopted by New Labour to improve the 
NHS, such as targets and the mimic-market, became ends in themselves to the 
detriment of patients. I also note, in both chapters, that the examined reforms were 
opposed, and in some cases tempered, for example, by Labour backbenchers, 
academics and trade unions. I aver that New Labour was somewhat successful in its 
                                                          
79 Mandelstam, M. (2007) Betraying the NHS: Health Abandoned. London: Jessica Kingsley, p201. 
80 Popay, J. and Williams, G. (2009) ‘Equalizing the people’s health: A Sociological Perspective’ in 
Gabe, J. and Calnan, M. (eds) The New Sociology of the Health Service. Abingdon: Routledge, 
pp222-245 at p235. 
81 Clarke, J. (2007) ‘‘It’s not like Shopping’’, op cit., n.42 at pp114-115.  
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attempts to depoliticise healthcare, for example, by delegating power to ostensibly 
non-political bodies (such as Monitor).   
 
I examine the coalition’s NHS reforms in chapters five and six. The coalition used the 
deficit, which arose following the Great Recession (2008-2009), to argue that there 
was no alternative to its central policy of austerity, which involved spending cuts and 
welfare state retrenchment. Austerity has negative implications for public health82 and 
was influenced by discredited economic research.83 The coalition and subsequent 
Conservative governments have not adequately funded the NHS and cuts elsewhere 
(such as social care) have increased pressures on the service. The coalition’s NHS 
reforms were influenced by neo-liberal ideas and private healthcare companies and 
their representatives (for example, via lobbying). I rebut the coalition’s claims that there 
was no alternative to the HSC Act (2012) as the NHS would become unaffordable 
without reform, that it was necessary to improve productivity and health outcomes and 
that research had shown that the competition and choice it would engender would 
benefit patients. Although the legislation provoked opposition (for example, from 
professional organisations, trade unions and campaign groups), this was not sufficient 
to prevent it becoming law. Such opposition was undermined by spurious claims that 
the legislation had been substantially changed and through a legislative pause, after 
                                                          
82 Stuckler, D. and Basu, S. (2013) The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills. New York: Basic Books, 
p140. 
83 Brodie, J. (2015) ‘Income Inequality and the Future of Global Governance’ in Gill, S. (ed) Critical 
Perspectives on the Crisis in Global Governance: Reimagining the Future. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
pp45-68 at p59. 
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which the concept of integration was emphasised,84 which the competition that the 
statute engendered rendered more difficult.85   
 
In chapter six, I examine the main provisions of the HSC Act (2012) and its effects. As 
mentioned above, the statute undermined the NHS’ founding principles, for example, 
by facilitating the reduction of the NHS’ comprehensiveness through amending the 
duty of the Secretary of State for Health, who is now only required to promote, not 
provide, a comprehensive health service.86 Allyson Pollock argues that the change to 
the duty indicates that alternative funding will be pursued.87 Nonetheless, the law may 
not furnish reductions in the comprehensiveness of the NHS, or moves to alternative 
funding, with legitimacy, as such changes conflict with the aforementioned moral 
economy. The HSC Act (2012) extends the ambit of neo-liberal norms within the NHS, 
which is evident in the duties that it stipulates and the competition that it effectuates. 
The current NHS quasi-market has become an end in itself to the detriment of patients. 
Nonetheless, there are countervailing forces to competition, such as resource 
constraints and NHSE’s renewed emphasis on integration in ‘FYFV’.  
 
The HSC Act (2012) also contains emerging norms, such as the reduction of health 
inequalities and empowering patients. The former has not been implemented 
                                                          
84 Glynos, J. et al (2014) ‘Logics of Marginalisation in health and social care reform: Integration, 
Choice and Provider Blind Provision’. Critical Social Policy, Vol.35(1), pp45-68 at p46. 
85 Hudson, B. (2013) Competition and Collaboration in the new NHS. London: Centre for Health and 
the Public Interest, p13.  
86 NHS Act (2006), S.1(1) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.1. 
87 Pollock, A. (2014) ‘Submission to Health Committee Enquiry: Public Expenditure on Health and 
Social Care’. [On-line] Available: http://www.allysonpollock.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/AP_2014_Pollock_HealthCommitteePublicExpenditure.pdf [Accessed: 26 
May 2016], p8. 
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effectively88 and is undermined by austerity, which is likely to exacerbate health 
inequalities.89 Patients were to be empowered through patient choice, but this relies 
on superficial indicators and has taken a backseat.90 The coalition also established 
new voice mechanisms, but these are regarded as weak. The coalition sought to 
depoliticise healthcare by juridifying the NHS (for example, privatisation has become 
a technical legal matter91) and by delegating power to ostensibly non-political bodies, 
such as NHSE and CCGs. Nonetheless, the activities of campaign groups, such as 
KONP, suggest that it remains politicised92.     
 
In chapter seven, I outline my conclusions. I argue that my analysis of successive NHS 
reforms evidences the continued relevance of the method of ideology critique in 
revealing the gap between ideals and lived realities and in assisting researchers in 
conceiving alternatives. My thesis challenges government discourse and may inform 
political mobilization opposing neo-liberal reforms. I argue that other researchers may 
be able to employ the method of ideology critique, in a similar manner to me, to 
illuminate the ideological terrain, and challenge dominant discourses, relating to other 
policy areas. In formulating alternatives to neo-liberal policies, I consider how to realise 
residual and emergent norms. As the founding principles of the NHS have been 
undermined by recent legislative changes, I support the NHS (Reinstatement) Bill 
which proposes amending such legislation. The NHS (Reinstatement) Bill 
                                                          
88 Wenzl, M. and Mossialos, E. (2016) ‘Achieving Equity in health service commissioning’ in Exworthy, 
M. et al (eds) Dismantling the NHS? Evaluating the Impact of Health Reforms. Bristol: Policy Press, 
pp233-254 at p248. 
89 Bambra, C. (2013) ‘All in it Together?’, op cit., n.41 at p51. 
90 Ham, C. et al (2015) The NHS under the Coalition government part one, op cit., n.43 at p81. 
91 Davies, A. (2013) ‘This Time It’s for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012’. Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 76(3), pp564-588 at p587. 
92 Krachler, N. and Greer, I. (2015) ‘When does Marketization lead to Privatisation?, op cit., n.60 at 
p220.  
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recommends re-establishing CHCs.93 I contend that this is not sufficient to empower 
patients and that the NHS should be democratised. I argue that, in order to 
successfully reduce health inequalities, governments must increasingly intervene in 
capitalist production.  
                                                          
93 National Health Service H.C. Bill (2016-17) [51], cl.17. 
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Chapter One: Healthcare in England 
 
Introduction 
 
The development of healthcare within England was influenced, historically, by actual 
and potential unrest, and, in the capitalist epoch, by the desire of the bourgeoisie for 
healthy workers. Whereas classical liberals (whose views predominated in the 
nineteenth century) viewed health as an individual responsibility, Friedrich Engels and 
Karl Marx perceived that social conditions were a major cause of illness. The state 
began to intervene to improve public health for pragmatic and instrumental reasons. 
A social democratic consensus predominated in the immediate post Second World 
War (WWII) era. Class compromise led to the development of welfare states in 
Western states (such as the UK), which institutionalised solidarity. Welfare states 
stabilized capitalism, but also evince principles contrary to its logic. For example, 
access to the NHS (which was free, universal, comprehensive and primarily funded 
from general taxation) was based on need.  
 
The NHS was criticised by many from both the left and the right of the political 
spectrum. An emerging consciousness developed which recognised its problems and 
limitations, such as its failure to empower patients or to reduce health inequalities. The 
post-war consensus ended in the 1970s and neo-liberal ideology became dominant. I 
contend that Marxist views of neo-liberalism are potentially compatible with, and can 
remedy the deficiencies of, alternate views. In the neo-liberal era, new governance 
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mechanisms (such as markets and increased auditing) were introduced in public 
services to resolve their perceived problems. Three neo-liberal transformations have 
been identified (roll-back neo-liberalism, a transition to more ameliorative forms and 
roll-out neo-liberalism). I contend that the reforms examined in subsequent chapters 
are indicative of roll-out neo-liberalism and of a fifth epoch of juridification. 
  
The Historical Development of Healthcare in England 
 
Although historically health has been viewed merely as the absence of disease, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), a United Nations (UN) agency established in 1948, 
defined it as ‘‘a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing’’ and a 
fundamental human right.1 The International Covenant on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights (ICSECR) requires signatories (including the UK) to recognise the 
‘‘right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health’’.2 Ciaran Mulholland states that various forms of healthcare for the poor 
were provided, in England, over the centuries, to prevent disorder and ensure a 
healthy populace for factories and wars.3 The fear of social disorder led to the 
development of the poor law4 (administered by parishes5) which undertook medical 
and welfare provision, although this was not mentioned within the relevant legislation.6 
                                                          
1 Constitution of the World Health Organisation (Signed 22 July 1946; entered into force 7 April 1948) 
14 U.N.T.S. 185/ Declaration of Alma-Ata. International Conference on Primary Health Care. 1978. 
Alma-Ata, USSR: World Health Organisation, Article 1.  
2 ICSECR (Signed 16 December 1966; entered into force, 3 January 1976) 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
3 Mulholland, C. (2009) A Socialist History of the NHS. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, p5. 
4 Fraser, D. (2009) The Evolution of the British Welfare State: 4th Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave, p38. 
5 Lane, J. (2001) A Social History of Medicine: Health, Healing and Disease in England, 1750-1950. 
London: Routledge, p44. 
6 Ibid at p54. 
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The fear of unrest also motivated the creation of voluntary hospitals in the eighteenth 
century.7 Poor patients received treatment at voluntary hospitals and workhouses8 
(established under the poor law) while patients of middle and high income families 
paid private fees to receive care at home.9 The Poor Law Amendment Act (1834) 
established conditions at workhouses (stripping supplicants of their property as a 
precondition of minimal relief10) that only the destitute would choose.11 In dividing the 
destitute from the rest of the poor,12 it was designed to ‘‘create a national labour 
market’’.13 E.P. Thompson described the statute, and its subsequent administration, 
as ‘‘perhaps the most sustained attempt to impose an ideological dogma, in defiance 
of the evidence of human need, in English history’’.14 Following scandals of gross 
neglect at workhouses,15 the Metropolitan Poor Act (1867) and the Poor Law 
Amendment Act (1868) empowered ‘‘London and Provincial Unions to provide 
separate infirmaries [known as public hospitals] for their destitute sick’’.16 Such 
legislation was the ‘‘first explicit acknowledgement of the government’s responsibility 
to provide hospitals for the poor’’17 and ‘‘initiated a major period of hospital building’’.18 
 
                                                          
7 Ibid at p82. 
8 Administered by Boards of Guardians between 1835 and 1930. The Local Government Act (1929), 
S.1 placed local authorities in charge of workhouse infirmaries, which became known as municipal 
hospitals. 
9 Walters, V. (1980) Class Inequality and Health Care. London: Croom Helm, pp24-25. 
10 Tudor-Hart, J. (2006) The Political Economy of Healthcare: A Clinical Perspective. Bristol: Policy 
Press, p168.  
11 Jones, E. and Pickstone, J. (2008) The Quest for Public Health in Manchester: The Industrial City, 
the NHS and the recent history. Manchester: Manchester NHS Primary Care Trust, p10. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ferguson, I., et al (2002) Rethinking Welfare: A Critical Perspective. London: Sage, p29. 
14 Thompson, E. (1963) The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage Books, p267. 
15 Pinker, R. (1971) Social Theory and Social Policy. London: Heinemann, p70. 
16 Walters, V. (1980) Class Inequality and Health Care, op cit., n.9 at p31. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Pinker, R. (1971) Social Theory and Social Policy, op cit., n.15 at p72. 
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Derek Fraser contends that while there was no public health problem in pre-industrial 
England, other than the periodic visitation of the bubonic plague, the industrial 
revolution created a public health problem.19 The insanitary housing conditions within 
urban areas, where the population rose to meet the demand of industry for labour, led 
to an increase in the national death rate20 as diseases associated with such conditions 
(such as rickets and tuberculosis) became more common.21 Engels noted that 
epidemics in cities, such as Manchester and Liverpool, were ‘‘three times more fatal 
than in country districts’’.22 Fran Collyer argues that Engels and Marx provided one of 
the ‘‘first truly sociological theories of illness and disease’’.23 They challenged liberal 
theories that disease resulted from the inherently weak bodies of the poor, medical 
theories which treated disease as a fixed natural entity and Social Darwinist theories 
that disease was inevitable and necessary to improve the human species.24 Rather 
Engels and Marx perceived that social conditions were a major cause of disease. 
Lesley Doyal and Imogen Pennell state that various cholera epidemics in the 1830s 
and 1840s, the fear of working class unrest and the desire of employers for fitter 
workers led to the Public Health Act (1848).25 This required towns where the death 
rate exceeded twenty-three per 1,000 to establish local Boards of Health responsible 
for cleansing, sewerage and providing adequate water supplies.26 Further cholera 
                                                          
19 Fraser, D. (2009) The Evolution of the British Welfare State, op cit., n.4 at p70. 
20 Ibid at p74. 
21 Porter, R. (1993) Disease, Medicine and Society in England, 1550-1860: 2nd edition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p40. 
22 Engels, F. (1845) The Condition of the Working Class in England. [On-line] Available: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/condition-working-class/[Accessed: 07 December 
2014]. 
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outbreaks, and Prince Albert’s death from typhus in 1861, led to the Local Government 
Act (1872), which required all districts to provide public health services, and the Public 
Health Act (1875), which consolidated existing public health legislation and gave local 
authorities ‘‘far-reaching powers to intervene on behalf of the health of their 
populations’’.27 The consequent developments in clean water, sanitation and sewage 
reduced deaths.28 Increases in food supplies in the nineteenth century also enhanced 
health by improving nutrition.29 The industrial revolution led to illnesses due to 
industrial processes, unhealthy working conditions and accidents.30 In this respect, the 
Factory Acts, which regulated working conditions, improved workers’ ‘‘health and well-
being’’.31 Nonetheless, occupational and environmental hazards persist.32 
 
Karl Polanyi contended that ‘‘economic liberalism was the organising principle of a 
society engaged in creating a market system’’.33 John Gray states that liberal attitudes 
(influenced by economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and philosophers, 
such as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) dominated political 
practice within England, from the early nineteenth century and into the twentieth 
century.34 Classical liberals viewed the state as a necessary evil that ‘‘should interfere 
as little as possible in the sphere of action of individuals’’.35 For example, Mill stated 
that ‘‘each [individual] is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or 
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mental and spiritual’’.36 David Roberts argued that laissez faire liberal views stemmed 
from special interests (attachment to local offices, property and low taxes).37 However, 
the widening of the franchise, via successive Reform Acts, politicised ‘‘issues such as 
public health, housing, education and working conditions’’.38 Fraser contends that 
social policy developments in the nineteenth century were ‘‘practical, pragmatic, 
unplanned, ad hoc [state] response[s]’’.39 Marx’s writings concerning factory 
legislation indicate that he thought that ‘‘workers could begin to establish socialist 
values and institutions, piecemeal’’, but that little progress could be made in a market 
dominated society.40 The working class began to organise collectively, in the 
nineteenth century, to relieve suffering, for example through trade unions, friendly 
societies41 and through purchasing doctors and their premises.42 
 
Roy Porter states that the place of doctors in society was precarious until they were 
confident in their power ‘‘to conquer disease and tame death’’.43 For example, Porter 
states that they faced competition from quacks,44 although he notes the difficulty in 
demarcating orthodox from heterodox medicine in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.45 Numerous medical developments occurred in the late nineteenth century, 
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such as the use of artery clamps, anaesthesia and antisepsis in surgery,46 
vaccinations (for example, for cholera and tetanus) and the discovery of disease 
causing organisms.47 In the twentieth century, there were further developments in 
surgery (such as organ transplants), vaccinations and drugs (such as the discovery of 
penicillin in 1928). In the future, genomic sequencing may facilitate more precise 
targeted health interventions48 and technology (such as smartphones) could 
democratise medicine.49 However, there are also threats to modern medicine, such as 
increased antimicrobial resistance.50 Medical professions developed over time and are 
represented by numerous Royal Colleges.51 The British Medical Association (BMA), 
which represents all doctors, was established in 1832. Frankfurt School theorists and 
Michel Foucault critiqued reason ‘‘as an instrument of oppression’’.52 Foucault stated 
that the truth claims of modern medicine are ‘‘governed by arbitrary structures’’.53 
Herbert Marcuse argued that a new science was required to sever the link between 
science and domination.54 Michael Taussig and Howard Waitzkin note the reifying 
effects of medicine, whereby the signs and symptoms of disease are seen as natural 
and scientific facts instead of resulting from social relations.55 Waitzkin also notes that 
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many societal problems have been transformed into individual problems through 
medicalisation.56 Nonetheless, proponents of social medicine recognise that many 
social evils manifest in disease, require social and economic reform.57 
 
The Liberal government (1905-1915) created an ‘‘embryonic welfare state’’ 
characterised by limited coverage and a limited scope of state intervention and 
responsibility.58 Numerous factors influenced such intervention, including: studies (for 
example, of Charles Booth and Joseph Rowntree) which undermined the notion that 
the poor were responsible for their own condition;59 the increasing influence of a pro-
collectivist liberal creed (typified by thinkers such as Thomas Hill Green and Leonard 
Trelawny Hobhouse);60 the threat to the Liberals from the Labour party;61 concerns 
regarding the fact that forty-eight percent of potential soldiers could not be recruited 
for the second Boer War (1899-1902) due to poor health;62 and, unrest elsewhere in 
Europe (such as the 1905 October revolution in Russia) which convinced many that 
concessions were needed.63 In the last respect, Otto von Bismarck (German 
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Chancellor between 1871 and 1890) was influential as his introduction of state 
insurance in Germany had undermined support for socialism.64  
 
The Liberal government established the first state pensions and unemployment 
insurance65 and the National Insurance Act (1911) created a national health insurance 
scheme (introduced in 1913) paid for by contributions from employees, employers and 
the Treasury.66 Friendly Societies, which had been hostile to government activity, were 
enabled to administer the scheme.67 The scheme ‘‘provided primary medical care from 
GPs and sickness benefit [for up to thirteen weeks] for…workers paid £250.00 a year 
or less’’.68 However, it did not cover most women, all children, the elderly or the self-
employed69 and did not include hospital or specialist care.70 Although some people 
not covered by the scheme were members of private schemes and hospital savings 
associations, Joan Higgins notes that many vulnerable groups were excluded and 
were unable to insure themselves privately.71 In 1911, only ‘‘a small minority of the 
medical profession [such as Professor Benjamin Moore] advocated a full public health 
service’’.72 In 1912, Moore created the State Medical Services Association, a 
forerunner of the Socialist Medical Association (SMA), which was established in 1930 
and campaigned for a national health service.73  
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The Creation of the NHS 
 
Labour won its first majority in the House of Commons at the 1945 general election 
and Clement Attlee became Prime Minister. Attlee’s government adopted Keynesian 
economic policies (prioritising full employment74), nationalised some industries, such 
as coal mining and steel (which Anton Pannekoek contended ‘‘was a capitalist 
necessity’’ and did not empower workers75), and expanded the welfare state. The 
National Health Service (NHS) Act (1946) created the NHS, which became operational 
on the 5th of July 1948. John Lister notes that the NHS was ‘‘part of a much wider 
international awakening of political leaders to the need for some form of collective 
provision of health care’’.76 The NHS Act (1946) centred on the minister’s duty to 
provide rather than patient’s rights to receive care.77 Health, education and social 
services were justified on the basis that everyone should have access to such services 
irrespective of their family income and because state provision of such services was 
perceived to benefit society.78 The service was organised into three parts, with locally 
appointed Executive Councils administering general practitioners (GPs), dentists, etc., 
local authorities having responsibility for a range of personal and environmental health 
services and hospitals being administered by Boards of Governors (which 
administered teaching hospitals), Regional Hospital Boards (RHBs), appointed by the 
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Minister, and Hospital Management Committees (HMCs).79 The National Assistance 
Act (1948) also enabled local authorities to provide a subsidiary (means tested) 
system for those needing social care. Herbert Morrison (Deputy Prime Minister 
between 1945 and 1951) opposed transferring responsibility for hospitals from local 
authorities to appointed bodies, in cabinet, on democratic grounds.80 Aneurin Bevan 
subsequently conceded that ‘‘election is a better principle than selection’’81 and hoped 
that a future reform would democratise the system.82 Fred Messer (a Labour 
backbencher) lamented the ‘‘loss of faith in the elected principle’’.83 Messer 
subsequently became President of the Campaign for a Democratic Health Service 
which proposed direct election to boards or transferring NHS administration to local 
government.84 
 
Bevan argued that there should be a high degree of governmental accountability for 
the service. He stated that ‘‘if a bedpan lands on the floor in the hospital in Tredegar it 
should be clanging in Whitehall’’.85 Nonetheless, he favoured ‘‘a maximum of 
decentralisation to local bodies [and], a minimum of itemised central approval’’.86 
Christopher Newdick states that the NHS was commonly regulated through circulars 
(often issued in line with the Minister’s power to give directions87) and other policy 
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statements from the Department of Health.88 However, the centre could not simply 
dictate as entrepreneurial, judgmental and professional knowledge, which was ‘‘too 
complex to be caught in crude statistics’’, lay with the periphery.89 The Merrison report 
described ‘‘detailed ministerial accountability’’ as ‘‘largely a constitutional fiction’’.90 
The NHS was to be primarily funded from general taxation, universal, comprehensive 
and free at the point of access (decommodifying health care). Such characteristics are 
generally regarded as the NHS’ founding principles. Martin Powell notes that there 
was little explicit emphasis on equality or equity in the parliamentary debates and 
legislation on the NHS beyond the idea of equality of entitlement or eligibility.91 Powell 
avers that the NHS has been largely financed from progressive taxation92 and covered 
all groups93 (although a minority decided to go private94) but that it has never been 
entirely comprehensive, as some forms of health care were excluded, services have 
been rationed and doctors have been able to determine who to treat.95  
 
Welfare states were part of a ‘‘positive class compromise’’96 which developed due to 
several forces, including ‘‘social democratic reformism, Christian socialism, 
enlightened conservative political and economic elites and large industrial 
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unions...which fought for and conceded more and more...’’.97 In respect of the elites, 
Kenneth Hoover and Raymond Plant note that the Great Depression (1930-1931) 
appeared to show the bankruptcy of laissez faire ideas.98 Eric Hobsbawm stated that 
the successful revolution in Russia in 1917, and Russia’s immunity to the West’s 
economic problems in the 1930s, incentivised reform.99 The chief architects of, what 
Bob Jessop terms, the Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS),100 William Beveridge 
(who proposed reforms, during WWII, to eliminate the giant evils of squalor, want, 
ignorance, idleness and disease101) and John Maynard Keynes (whose economic 
ideas dominated government policy in the UK in the post-war period until the 1970s) 
were revisionary liberals who ‘‘attempted to steer a middle way between the old 
capitalist order and new socialist ideals’’.102 Claus Offe described the welfare state as 
a ‘‘peace formula’’103 and contended that there would be ‘‘exploding conflict and 
anarchy’’ (a legitimation crisis) if it was undermined.104 Similarly, Theodor Adorno 
contended that state interventionism was ‘‘the embodiment of self-defence’’ to 
‘‘damper and police the antagonisms...lest society...disintegrate’’.105 The KWNS co-
existed with capitalism in its Atlantic-Fordist form,106 characterised by standardized 
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production and mass consumption,107 to secure conditions for profitable capital 
accumulation and social harmony.108 
 
Social democrat reformists drew on the notion of solidarity, which Rahel Jaeggi states 
involves ‘‘standing up for each other because one recognises one’s own fate in the 
fate of the other’’.109 Jaeggi contends that welfare institutions are institutionalised 
solidarity.110 In healthcare this encompasses sharing health risks (risk pooling) through 
support for healthcare institutions.111 In effectuating solidarity in healthcare nationally, 
the NHS emulated the solidarity evinced by workers who, as mentioned above, often 
banded together to acquire mutual medical services. For example, Bevan’s father was 
a founder of Tredegar Working Men’s Medical Aid Society in 1890.112 The NHS was 
symptomatic of social (as opposed to liberal) law which presupposes ‘‘relationships of 
interdependence and solidarity’’.113 The creation of the NHS was also influenced by 
‘‘a new popular radicalism’’, a desire for the machinery of government, which had been 
effectively organised to fight WWII, to be used to improve social conditions.114 In 
addition, the Ministry of Health (created in 1919) and doctors became aware of the 
need for reform through the emergency medical services (EMS), operative during 
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WWII.115 John Torrance argued that estrangement (‘‘a process or condition, by which 
people become or are strangers or enemies to one another’’116), a form of alienation 
distinct from relinquishment, is the opposite of solidarity.117 Torrance stated that 
reification causes estrangement.118 Reification may undermine the solidarity which 
was important in the creation and maintenance of the NHS. Istvan Meszaros contends 
that alienation and reification produce the deceptive ‘‘appearance of the individual’s 
independence, self-sufficiency and autonomy’’.119 This is evident in lifestyle drift, the 
overemphasis on individual responsibility for health.120 
 
The BMA had advocated a national health service in the 1930s, but retreated from 
such support before 1945.121 The BMA, and the right-wing press, continued to oppose 
the service after the NHS Act (1946) was passed.122 The BMA’s principal argument 
was that ‘‘state intervention would erode professional freedom’’.123 In actuality, the 
NHS has afforded medical professionals a substantial degree of autonomy.124 The 
BMA opposed the idea of a salaried service, local authority control125 and plans to 
abolish the sale of practices.126 Vivienne Walters contends that such opposition was 
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a bargaining strategy to secure concessions.127 Virginia Berridge states that the 
medical profession was divided, as some GPs and medical officers of health already 
working within the local authority structure supported a universal free service, while 
hospital consultants and GPs in wealthier areas did not.128 The BMA’s leadership 
primarily spoke for older and wealthier GPs.129 Marvin Rintala notes that nurses and 
midwives were unrepresented in almost all debates, discussions and negotiations 
regarding the NHS hence their subordinate position in its structure is not surprising.130 
The service was opposed by ninety percent of doctors in a plebiscite in early 1948.131 
However, it was supported by the public,132 and doctors who did not participate would 
not be entitled to part of the £66 million agreed in compensation for the abolition of the 
sale of practices.133 In a subsequent plebiscite, the opposition of doctors dwindled to 
sixty-five percent,134 which the BMA deemed insufficient to continue its resistance.135 
Nonetheless, anti-NHS politics continued to be advanced, for example, by the 
Fellowship for Freedom in Medicine (FFM), which published pamphlets and articles, 
lobbied politicians and supported private health insurance.136 Brain Abel-Smith noted 
that early attacks on the welfare state as a bureaucratic waste subsequently shifted to 
arguments about freedom of choice.137 
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Although the SMA pressed Bevan not to make concessions,138 he did so to persuade 
doctors to participate in the service. GPs remained independent contractors 
remunerated via ‘‘fixed annual payments...for every patient registered with them’’ 
(capitation fees)139 and were compensated for the abolition of the sale of practices. 
Private practice was also retained.140 Although most voluntary hospitals were 
nationalised, along with the municipal hospitals, 230 were disclaimed from the 
statute’s provisions and provided ‘‘the core of private sector provision for some years 
after the war’’.141 Many pay beds were provided within NHS institutions as it was feared 
that some doctors would choose private practice over NHS work if they could not 
combine them.142 In the 1970s, Barbara Castle (Secretary of State for Health and 
Social Services between 1974 and 1976) wanted private practice to ‘‘stand on its own 
feet’’143 and established the Health Services Board144 to phase out pay beds.145 BUPA 
established the Independent Hospital Group to oppose Castle’s plans.146 This 
subsequently merged (in 1987) with the Association of Independent Hospitals and 
kindred organisations (formed in 1949), creating the Independent Healthcare 
Association.147 Castle’s policy inadvertently led to the ‘‘take off of the private sector’’ 
which was evident in increasing insurance coverage and the expansion of private 
hospitals.148 The continuing existence of private practice was criticised as it was 
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argued that NHS standards could be reduced ‘‘without affecting the health care of the 
decision makers themselves’’.149 The commercial sector supplies the NHS with drugs 
and equipment.150 Pharmaceutical companies have been accused of milking the NHS 
via excessive charges.151  
 
A month after the NHS became operational, ninety-seven percent of the population 
had registered and only ten percent of doctors remained outside.152 Doctors have 
generally benefited from the NHS which has provided them with security of tenure and 
income.153 Nicholas Timmins contends that by the 1980s a new generation of doctors 
emerged and that the BMA became the ‘‘biggest defender’’ of the NHS.154 The NHS 
enabled many (including most women) to access medical care for the first time 
(manifest in an immense backlog of untreated disease),155 assisted the decline in 
infant mortality rates,156 facilitated more concerted efforts to vaccinate against certain 
diseases157 and improved the distribution of doctors and diagnostic equipment.158 
However, financial constraints meant that, in its first decade, no new hospitals were 
built (despite many being ‘‘in a poor condition’’159) and only a few Health Centres were 
constructed.160 Many District General Hospitals were established following the 
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Hospital Plan in 1962.161 In 1951, Attlee’s government introduced charges for dental 
care and spectacles, to pay for the Korean War (1950-1953). Bevan resigned from the 
cabinet as he thought that the NHS’ principles would be eroded, analogising that 
‘‘avalanches start with the movement of a very small stone’’.162 The Conservative 
government, elected in October 1951, accommodated itself to the mixed economy and 
the welfare state.163 Nonetheless, prescription charges were introduced in 1952164 and 
the Guillebaud Committee was established to examine the cost of the NHS. Although, 
the committee was expected to justify cuts,165 it found no opportunity for 
recommending reductions in, or new sources of, revenue.166 The post-war consensus 
led to some discontent in the lower echelons of the Conservative party,167 based partly 
on a dislike of growing trade union power and the level of taxation required to fund the 
welfare state.168 Some Conservatives, such as Enoch Powell and Iain Macleod, 
favoured introducing charges and expanding the private sector in healthcare.169  
 
Criticisms of the NHS 
 
Anti-collectivists criticised the welfare state, and specifically the NHS, for several 
reasons. Firstly, anti-collectivists contended that the NHS necessarily increases costs 
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because at nil price demand is infinite.170 However, Penelope Mullen argued that the 
amount of disease is finite, that recipients may incur a cost (for example, time and 
inconvenience) and that there is no theoretical or practical support for the notion that 
patients wish to consume infinite amounts of healthcare (as demand ceases when 
marginal utility falls to zero).171 Secondly, anti-collectivists averred that welfare states 
produce alienation and complaint.172 Powell argued that dissatisfaction was ‘‘endemic 
and inherent’’ in the NHS.173 Thirdly, anti-collectivists asserted that there was 
insouciance about costs and efficiency.174 The new right argued that the NHS wasted 
resources in excessive bureaucracy,175 was inefficient (as it used its resources less 
intensively than it might),176 was ‘‘slow to innovate in methods of organisation and 
financing’’ compared to the United States (US)177 and that its rationing, via waiting 
lists, was unpleasant and unfair.178 Nick Bosanquet rejected such claims as the 
administrative overheads of insurance schemes exceeded those of the NHS,179 
studies suggesting that it used resources less intensively did not use fair 
comparisons,180 innovations in the US sought to emulate the UK NHS181 and it was 
not clear that markets would be more pleasant or fair.182  
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Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose contend that neo-liberal welfare reforms drew support 
from their consonance with other challenges to social government mechanisms, for 
example, from libertarians, feminists183 and socialists.184 Jurgen Habermas argued 
that welfare state bureaucracies had reifying effects as they ‘‘treated [people] as 
objects’’.185 Habermas characterised the rise of welfare states as signalling a fourth 
epoch of juridification.186 The preceding epochs had led to the bourgeois state (in 
which the economy and the state were differentiated and legal subjects were 
constituted), the constitutional state (in which state power became subject to the rule 
of law) and the democratic constitutional state (in which constitutionalised state power 
was democratised).187 I argue that Scott Veitch et al’s notion of a fifth epoch, 
characterised by an increased ‘‘marketisation’’ of, and a re-embedding of private law 
mechanisms (particularly contract and property law) in, areas formerly considered 
public, accounts for the reforms of the neo-liberal era.188 While Habermas and others 
view juridification as a legal problem, it is also viewed as a political problem arising 
from the legal system appropriating (juridifying) political conflicts.189 For example, the 
concept was used by Otto Kirchhiemer, to describe labour disputes which had been 
‘‘formalized juridically and thereby neutralized’’,190 and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
to describe the receding of politics as ‘‘the protection of more and more social interests 
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became a function of technically minded legal experts’’.191 Juridification is thus a mode 
of depoliticisation (which is examined in chapter two).  
 
Roberto Unger identified an emergent consciousness of the welfare corporate state 
interested ‘‘in the decentralization and debureaucratization of institutional life’’.192 
According to Miller and Rose ‘‘welfarism creates domains in which political decisions 
are dominated by technical calculations’’.193 For example, they argue that the NHS 
was established as a medical enclosure due to a profound optimism concerning ‘‘the 
ability of medical science to alleviate illness and promote health’’.194 The professional 
control over medicine was criticised by Ivan Illich, who described it as an iatrogenic 
epidemic.195 John Harrington states that Bevan and Richard Titmuss (an academic 
champion of the welfare state) characterised the NHS as a utopian enclave,196 an 
idealized zone exempted from the morals of the marketplace.197 It was believed that 
the NHS would overcome alienation as, for example, doctors would no longer compete 
for patients and clinical judgment would prevail over economic concerns.198 However, 
Harrington notes that commercial imperatives continued to limit professional 
autonomy.199 Ian Kennedy’s anti-utopian critique of the NHS described it as 
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reinforcing, rather than overcoming, alienation.200 Kennedy argued that the principles 
determining most medical decisions were moral and ethical, rather than technical,201 
and should be the product of general discussion and debate.202 Numerous patient 
groups were established in the 1960s as part of a ‘‘populist counterculture backlash 
against scientific and technological arrogance’’.203 For example, the Patients 
Association was established, in 1962, in response to patients being used in research 
without their knowledge.204 Charlotte Williamson contends that patient groups are part 
of an emancipation movement.205 Alex Mold states that demands for a greater say for 
patients were strengthened by several scandals in the 1960s.206 Mold notes that 
despite professional resistance, by the 1990s, three rights were enshrined in law:207 
the right to access medical records;208 the right to consent; and, the right to 
complain.209 
 
Many GPs established patient participation groups in the 1970s.210 Community Health 
Councils (CHCs) were created, as part of a re-organisation in the early 1970s, to 
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represent patient’s interests.211  A Health Service Ombudsman was also created,212 
but could not consider clinical matters until 1996.213 The reorganisation sought to unify 
the structure of the NHS and strengthen accountability to the centre.214 Most public 
health functions of local authorities were transferred to the NHS. RHBs and HMCs 
were replaced with Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), Area Health Authorities 
(AHAs)215 and District Management Teams (DMTs). The authorities consisted of 
professionals, lay members and local representatives. Messer noted, in his criticism 
of a white paper that influenced the legislation, that the latter were not directly elected 
but were selected because they ‘‘happened to be councillors’’.216 The Secretary of 
State appointed RHA members and AHA chairmen. AHAs were required to appoint 
Family Practitioner Committees (FPCs),217 which replaced Executive Councils.218 
Health and local authorities were required to co-operate through joint consultative 
committees.219 However, these were undermined by financial pressures.220 CHCs 
initially comprised thirty members (consisting of local authority and RHA appointees 
and members of voluntary organisations). CHCs reviewed services, made 
recommendations and inspected providers.221 Christine Hogg contends that CHCs 
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opened up the NHS to more scrutiny and politicised issues,222 changed attitudes 
towards users and pioneered activities, such as advocacy schemes and support for 
self-help groups.223 However, CHCs contained low working class representation224 
and had limited ability to effect change at a wider level.225  
 
Doyal and Pennell state that there was a ‘‘naive assumption’’ that healthcare costs 
would be stabilised ‘‘through an improvement in the general health of the 
population’’.226 In actuality, costs have increased and class inequalities in health have 
persisted,227 as has been identified by successive reports.228 Julian Le Grand argued 
that the latter demonstrated the failure of ‘‘promoting equality through public 
expenditure on the social services’’.229 Health inequalities have been explained by 
reference to material, cultural, and genetic factors.230 There is a high correlation 
between ill health and wealth inequalities.231 Thomas Piketty notes that material 
inequalities have increased since the 1970s.232 Although the WHO initially focused on 
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health determinants, it subsequently adopted a medicalised view of health.233 A 
renewed focus on health determinants was evident in its Alma-Ata declaration, in 
1978, but it became side-lined as a global leader on health policy and the World Bank 
(established in 1945 to lend to states in need of foreign investment), which favoured 
market mechanisms and disciplines, became the dominant voice.234 The World Bank 
mandated, and partially funded, managed competition reforms in Colombia, in 1994, 
which subsequently became a model for reform elsewhere.235  
 
As the NHS failed to address class inequalities in health and legitimised medical 
definitions of health, Walters contended that it ‘‘served an ideological function’’.236  She 
concluded that a ‘‘more effective attack on illness may require the state to intervene in 
the process of capital accumulation’’.237 Fredric Jameson states that there are two 
lines of descendancy from Thomas More’s ‘Utopia’:238 one intent on the realization of 
the utopian programme, the other where Utopia serves as the bait for ideology, for 
example, ‘‘social democratic and liberal reforms…allegorical of a wholesale 
transformation of the social totality’’.239 Harrington notes that many early proponents 
of the NHS invested it with allegorical meaning.240 The NHS was described by Bevan 
as a first fruit241 and by Julian Tudor Hart as the beginning ‘‘of an alternative economy, 
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driven by human needs rather than pursuit of profit’’.242 Santos described the notion 
that law could engineer a resolution of societal contradictions as utopian.243 Meszaros 
states that utopianism offers partial remedies to problems.244 In this respect, merely 
legally decommodifying healthcare is insufficient to remedy the problems of capitalism 
and its effect on health.  
 
The socialist nature of the NHS has been questioned.245 Calum Paton contended that 
it met some socialist criteria (as it is publicly financed and provided) but not others (as 
it has been inadequately funded historically and health inequalities persist).246 Doyal 
and Pennell contend that a socialist medical service would demystify medical 
knowledge and ‘‘break down barriers of authority and status both among health 
workers themselves and between workers and consumers’’.247 Nonetheless, as Mold 
states, the power imbalance with professionals may be difficult to overcome 
completely.248 Some Marxists view the welfare state as ‘‘a controlling agency of the 
ruling capitalist class’’.249 In this respect, the NHS helped ‘‘achieve social peace 
between capital and labour’’ and discharged ‘‘the responsibility of the state to maintain 
a suitably fit workforce’’.250 The NHS can be viewed as what Erik Olin Wright termed 
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a symbiotic transformation (institutional forms of social empowerment which solve a 
problem of the dominant class251) in contrast to ruptural transformations (radical 
disjunctures in institutional structures through direct confrontation and political 
struggles) and interstitial transformations (new forms of social empowerment in the 
margins of capitalist society252). Wright argues that successful symbiotic strategies 
have the potential, with interstitial strategies, to cumulatively transform the whole 
system, but may also strengthen the hegemonic capacity of capitalism.253 Some 
Marxists view the welfare state as ‘‘a Trojan horse for socialism’’,254 as it evinces a 
logic contrary to that of capitalism and may inspire alternatives.  The welfare state is 
thus contradictory as it has the potential to stabilise and undermine capitalism.255 
Consequently, Offe stated that ‘‘while capitalism cannot coexist with, neither can it 
exist without the welfare state’’.256  
 
Neo-liberalism 
 
In the 1970s, the UK experienced stagflation, which Marxist economists attribute to 
falling profit rates.257 In 1976, James Callaghan (Prime Minister between 1976 and 
1979) formally announced his government’s break with Keynesian economic policy.258 
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David Harvey states that there was a move from Fordism to flexible accumulation.259 
The UK moved to a service economy model characterised by a decline in industrial 
jobs and a ‘‘rise in service sector jobs’’.260 Jessop states that the KWNS was replaced 
by the Schumpeterian workfare state, which subordinates social policy to the demands 
of ‘‘labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness’’.261 Gray notes that ‘‘the 
disintegration of the Keynesian paradigm’’ led to increased interest in the writings of 
neo-liberal thinkers,262 such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and Ludwig von 
Mises. Laurence Cox and Alf Gunvald Nilsen describe neoliberalism as ‘‘a social 
movement from above’’ which seeks ‘‘to restore profitability through market-oriented 
economic reforms’’.263 The neo-liberal era has involved an ‘‘assault on the institutional 
foundations of class compromise’’.264 
 
Rachel Turner states that neo-liberals sought to modernise and re-conceptualise 
liberalism.265 Although there are numerous schools of neo-liberal thought, including 
German ordo-liberals, Chicago School theorists and public choice theorists,266 Turner 
identifies four generic principles uniting them. The first is the idealisation of the market 
as a ‘‘mechanism for efficiently allocating resources and safeguarding individual 
freedom’’.267 William Davies notes that ordo-liberals sought to translate liberal 
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economic concepts into legal language in order to extend economic governance 
across society.268 Chicago School economists, such as Ronald Coase and Richard 
Posner, asserted that economic rationality was applicable to law.269 In the neo-liberal 
era, new governance mechanisms (such as markets) have been introduced in public 
services and choice, rather than voice, has been the preferred means of empowering 
recipients.270 While D.S. Lees contended that medical care could be treated like ‘‘other 
goods in the market’’,271 Titmuss noted the problems of uncertainty and 
unpredictability.272 I argue that voice is preferable to choice because, as Jameson 
argued, freedom of choice is exaggerated and ‘‘is scarcely the same thing as the 
freedom of human beings to control their own destinies and to play an active part in 
shaping their collective life’’.273  
 
The second principle is a commitment to the rule of law state.274 Hayek was influenced 
by Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between a nomocracy and a teleocracy.275 
According to Oakeshott, the rule of law has independent virtue within a nomocracy, 
where the state does not seek to attain particular ends, but not within a teleocracy, 
where the state pursues a particular goal.276 Hayek wanted to subject the coercive 
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powers of democracy to the rule of law.277 Honor Brabazon states that law has been 
crucial in conceiving, constructing (for example, contract law has facilitated the 
extension of market-like relations278) and cohering neoliberalism.279 Turner argues 
that the constitutional limitations advocated by neo-liberal thinkers ‘‘are inherently 
political’’ as ‘‘they embody different views about desirable forms of social 
organisation’’.280 Christine Sypnowich argues that capitalism undermines the rule of 
law, for example, due to unequal access to legal representation, conservative bias in 
the judiciary and a distorted agenda for law enforcement.281  
 
The third principle is minimal state intervention.282 However, as Andrew Gamble 
contends, the neo-liberal state is not a laissez faire state.283 Rather the free economy 
requires a strong state, to overcome opposition and obstacles, and to legitimate the 
social order by providing non-market institutions.284 Nonetheless, neo-liberals 
characterised welfare states as drains on competitiveness and economic 
performance285 to justify retrenchment. Mark Featherstone argues that the 
contemporary neo-liberal vision of the state is a fusion of ordo-liberal theory concerned 
with state responsibility for market order and competition and an anarcho-capitalist 
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fear of big government.286 Although some early neo-liberal thinkers, such as Henry 
Simons and the ordo-liberal school, were critical of monopolies, later Chicago School 
theorists, such as Coase, argued that state regulation was dangerous287 and that 
monopolies ‘‘could be more efficient [by reducing transaction costs] than markets and 
therefore justifiable’’.288 Brett Christophers contends that their influence led to the 
weakening of competition law and rampant monopoly.289 In contrast, neo-liberals have 
criticised the NHS for being a monopoly290 and reforms have increased transaction 
costs. Although neo-liberals have advocated increasing competition in English 
healthcare, neo-liberal reforms in other states, such as Colombia and the US, have 
not always generated it.291 The fourth principle is private property.292 Colin Hay states 
that neo-liberals also desire labour market flexibility, removing welfare benefits which 
discourage market participation and a global regime of free trade and free capital 
mobility.293 Additionally, neo-liberals perceive inequality as a driver for progress.294 
 
Hayek recognised the importance of institutions, networks and organisations in 
disseminating ideas.295 He wanted liberals to learn from socialists whose ‘‘courage to 
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be utopian’’ was ‘‘daily making possible what only recently seemed utterly remote’’.296 
Hayek founded the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) in 1947297 to develop and disseminate 
neoliberal ideas. Subsequently, numerous neo-liberal think tanks were established in 
the UK, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)298 and the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS), founded by Keith Joseph.  Ben Jackson contends that the right-wing 
press broadly coalesced around neo-liberalism in the early 1970s.299 Hay states that 
public choice theory played an important role in normativising and naturalising neo-
liberalism.300 Public choice theorists narrated the crisis in the 1970s as one of political 
and bureaucratic overload, whereby voters, politicians and bureaucrats inflated state 
costs by acting self-interestedly.301 For example, public sector bureaucrats were 
portrayed as self-maximising entrepreneurs (rather than motivated by a public service 
ethos) incentivised by democracy to raise budgets.302 Hay contends that the overload 
thesis is based on unrealistic assumptions, such as the notion that voters disregard 
the state of the economy.303 Le Grand states that policymakers began to see public 
sector employees more as knaves than knights and deemed that beneficiaries should 
be treated as queens rather than pawns.304 Le Grand championed quasi-markets as 
a means of using scarce resources more efficiently.305  
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Kevin Ward and Kim England identify four main ways of understanding neo-
liberalism.306 Firstly, they aver that Marxists conceive it as an ideological hegemonic 
project.307 Gamble contends that ideology is one of four dimensions of hegemony 
along with electoral, economic and state dimensions.308 Secondly, Ward and England 
state that it is conceived as a set of policies and programs.309 Policies which are 
generally characterised as neo-liberal are those that liberalise the economy, reduce 
the state’s economic role (privatisation) and contribute to fiscal austerity and macro-
economic stabilization.310 Thirdly, Ward and England note that neo-liberalism is 
conceived as a state form, resulting from a process of restructuring, for example, by 
Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell.311 Jessop notes that neo-liberalism may refer to 
different processes in different states, such as a system transformation (for example, 
in Russia following the cold war), a regime shift from a post-war compromise to 
regulation favouring capital over labour (for example, in the UK and the US), policy 
adjustments (for example, in Nordic social democracies) and structural adjustment 
programs (conditions imposed on states in the global south).312 Fourthly, Ward and 
England note that neo-liberalism has been conceived as a type of governmentality.313 
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This perspective is adopted by Foucauldian scholars.314 Foucault argued that neo-
liberals sought to extend the model of homo economicus (the man of exchange) ‘‘to 
every social actor in general’’.315 Similarly, Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval state that 
neo-liberalism generalizes ‘‘competition as a behavioural norm and…the enterprise as 
a model of subjectivization’’.316 In respect of biopolitics (a term Foucault used to 
describe the politics of biological life), neo-liberal governmentality attempts to 
decrease state responsibility for health by converting citizens into entrepreneurs of 
their own health.317 This has been accompanied by a moral politics designed to police 
(and potentially exclude) individuals.318     
 
Simon Springer notes that ‘‘scholars typically amalgamate’’ such views.319 The 
problem with conceiving neo-liberalism as a process or set of policies is that this does 
not identify an agent.320 John Clarke argues that Foucauldian scholars have 
overlooked the translation of political rationalities into practice.321 Wendy Brown 
argues that Foucault’s writings about neo-liberalism are limited by his relative 
indifference to both democracy and capital,322 the second of which he de-emphasises 
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‘‘as a domain of power and source of domination’’.323 The Marxist conception is 
potentially compatible with, and can remedy the deficiencies of, the other perspectives. 
Harvey notes that Foucault’s writings are compatible with Marxism as they continue 
Marx’s arguments about the rise of disciplinary capitalism.324 Offe contended, similarly 
to Foucauldian scholars, that neo-liberals desire citizens attending to all their needs 
‘‘through participation in market processes’’.325 Marxists identify the ruling bourgeois 
class as the agent of neo-liberal policies and processes and recognise ‘‘the partial, 
contradictory and unstable character of dominant strategies’’.326 This is also 
recognised by Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham’s theory of law as governance, which 
was influenced by Foucault’s later writings.327 Hunt and Wickham state that all 
instances of law as governance contain elements of attempt and incompleteness.328  
 
Postmodernists, such as Foucault, replaced the concept of ideology with the concept 
of discourse.329 I utilise the method of ideology critique, inspired by Marxist scholars, 
rather than discourse analysis. Foucault’s concept of discourse330 is not an adequate 
replacement for the concept of ideology as it is unable to mediate between the ideal 
and the material (as it is purely material) in a manner akin to the concept of ideology.331 
                                                          
323 Ibid at p13. 
324 Harvey, D. (2010) A Companion to Marx’s Capital. London: Verso, pp147-149. 
325 Offe, C. (1984) ‘Legitimacy versus Efficiency’ in Keane, J. (ed) Contradictions of the Welfare State. 
London: Hutchinson, pp130-146 at p138. 
326 Clarke, J. (2004) Changing Welfare, Changing States: New Directions in Social Policy. London: 
Sage, p70. 
327 Hunt, A. and Wickham, G. (1994) Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of law as Governance. 
London: Pluto. 
328 Ibid at p102. 
329 Jameson, F. (2009) Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London: Verso, 
p263.  
330 Foucault defined discourse as ‘‘the general domain of all statements’’, an ‘‘individualizable group of 
statements’’ or ‘‘regulated practices that account for a number of statements’’. See: Foucault, M. 
(1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. Sheridan Smith, A., Trans. 
New York: Pantheon Books, p80. 
331 Hawkes, D. (2003) Ideology, op cit., n.52 at p156. 
61 
 
Although I analyse discourse within this dissertation, this technique alone is imperfect 
as it can isolate the study of language from the study of practice.332 I study both 
language and practice. Brown contends that the neo-liberal state derives its legitimacy 
merely from economic growth.333 In contrast, I argue that welfare states and ideology 
continue to be important components of legitimation. Brown asserts that neo-liberalism 
has reoriented liberal norms of legitimacy, freedom and equality and that liberal views 
of the good life have lost their salience, undermining critiques which seek to exploit 
the gap between ideals and lived realities.334 However, I contend that neo-liberalism 
has not successfully reoriented such norms and that the gap between ideals and lived 
realities continues to be exploitable.  
 
Santos identified a shift in focus ‘‘from legitimacy to governability, from governability 
to governance’’.335 Public sector governance has been characterised by marketization, 
privatisation and a ‘‘proliferation of auditing’’336 (which Marilyn Strathern described as 
an audit culture337) in the neo-liberal era. Dexter Whitfield states that marketization 
(the imposition of market forces in public services) creates the conditions (economic 
and ideological) and social relations to develop privatisation.338 Marketization is often 
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shaped by legal forms339 and accompanied by the centralization of control.340 The 
WHO defined privatisation as ‘‘a process in which non-governmental actors become 
increasingly involved in the financing and/or provision of healthcare services’’.341 
Whitfield notes that politicians and senior managers ‘‘frequently attempt to redefine 
privatisation, claiming that it is limited to the sale of assets’’.342 Harvey contends that 
privatisation is ‘‘a particular form of enclosure of the commons’’ resulting in the 
appropriation of the assets and rights of the common people.343 Harvey states that 
privatisation is an element of accumulation by dispossession, a concept influenced by 
both Marx’s and Rosa Luxembourg’s writings about primitive accumulation.344 Alex 
Callinicos and Sam Ashman contend that the boundaries of the concept of 
accumulation by dispossession are unclear and suggest restricting it to 
commodification, re-commodification and restructuring.345 The increase in auditing 
was partly driven by new public management (NPM).346 It involves arbitrary 
mechanisms for evaluating and ranking outcomes347 to facilitate comparisons between 
public bodies.348  
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Neo-liberalism in Practice 
 
Peck and Tickell conceive neo-liberalisation ‘‘as a process [which is not monolithic or 
universal in effect], not an end state’’.349 They have identified three neoliberal 
transformations. The first transformation (roll-back neo-liberalism) was the move from 
the ‘‘abstract intellectualism of Hayek and Friedman to the state authored restructuring 
projects of [Margaret] Thatcher [UK Prime Minister between 1979 and 1990] and 
[Ronald] Reagan [US President between 1981 and 1989]’’.350 Hayek’s influence on 
Thatcher is evidenced by her reportedly slamming a copy of his ‘The Constitution of 
Liberty’351 onto a table in a cabinet meeting and declaring ‘‘this is what we believe’’.352 
Naomi Klein avers that Thatcher used the popularity that she accrued from the 
Falklands war, in 1982, to launch a ‘‘corporatist revolution’’.353 Thatcher’s policies 
included deindustrialisation, deregulation, privatisation (for example, of electricity, 
water, gas and steel) and weakening trade unions. They resulted in substantial 
increases in socioeconomic and health inequalities.354 Thatcher’s government 
assiduously avoided the term inequality355 and focused on individual responsibility for, 
                                                          
349 Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) ‘Neoliberalizing Space’, op cit., n.311 at pp383-384. 
350 Ibid at p388. 
351 Hayek, F. (2006) The Constitution of Liberty. Abingdon: Routledge. 
352 Green, E. (2002) Ideologies of Conservatism, op cit., n.163 at p258. 
353 Klein, N. (2008) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan 
Books, p138. 
354 Scott-Samuel, A. et al (2014) ‘The Impact of Thatcherism on Health and Well-Being in Britain. 
International Journal of Public Health Services, Vol.44(1), pp53-71 at p54. 
355 Williams, G. (2007) ‘Health inequalities in their place’ in Cropper, S. et al (eds) Community Health 
and Well-being: Action Research on Health Inequalities. Bristol: Policy Press, pp1-22 at p2.  
64 
 
rather than the structural causes of, ill health.356 However, its attempts to suppress the 
Black report on health inequalities, published in 1980, generated a political scandal.357  
 
Various right-wing think tanks recommended NHS reforms in the 1980s. For example, 
Oliver Letwin and John Redwood recommended working slowly ‘‘from the present 
system towards a national insurance scheme’’ in a CPS pamphlet.358 Thatcher’s 
government tacitly considered various options for privatising health care in 1982, but 
public outcry was provoked when this was leaked forcing Thatcher to promise that the 
NHS was safe with the Conservatives.359 Harvey states that institutions, such as the 
NHS, could only be touched ‘‘at the margins’’.360 Similarly, Stuart Hall described the 
NHS as Thatcher’s Maginot line.361 Nonetheless, Thatcher’s government sought to 
encourage the growth of private medicine, for example, by introducing tax concessions 
on employer paid medical insurance premiums.362 The NHS was subjected to relative 
austerity during the 1980s,363 which, Gordon Brown argued, encouraged private sector 
growth.364 By 1987, over nine percent of the UK population was covered by private 
insurance.365  
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Thatcher’s government did implement several significant NHS reforms. There was a 
shift from a ‘‘professional and health logic to a management/commercial logic’’ 
between 1979 and 1990.366 Timmins argues that following the publication of Roy 
Griffiths’ report, in 1983, the NHS moved from an administered to a managed 
system.367 The government implemented Griffiths’ recommendations to introduce 
general management368 (which increased administrative spending369) and to establish 
a Supervisory Board (to make strategic decisions) and a Management Board (to plan 
the implementation of policies370). Rudolf Klein contends that the division of 
responsibility between the two boards, within the Department of Health, was 
blurred.371 In 1989, the Supervisory Board was replaced with the Policy Board (which 
was abolished in 1995) and the Management Board became the NHS Management 
Executive (renamed the NHS Executive in 1995).372 The latter was moved to Leeds, 
but day-to-day decision making remained with ministers in London.373 Sue Dopson 
argues that the Griffiths report was indicative of the efficiency drive form of NPM.374 
NPM, which consists of a ‘‘cluster of ideas borrowed from the conceptual framework 
of private sector administrative practice’’,375 became the dominant ideology in public 
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administration textbooks in the 1980s.376 NPM informed the commodification, 
marketization and incentivization of the provision of public goods and public sector 
performance.377 NPM also influenced outsourcing.378 In the NHS, ‘‘non-clinical tasks, 
such as cleaning, laundry and catering’’ were contracted out.379 NHS coverage was 
also reduced.380 For example, long-stay nursing care of the elderly was transferred to 
local authorities381 and charges for eye tests and dental check-ups were introduced.382  
 
The 1989 white paper ‘Working for Patients’, many proposals of which were 
implemented via the National Health Service and Community Care (NHSCC) Act 
(1990), announced the expansion of medical audit383 (the Clinical Services Advisory 
Group was established to this end384), that the Audit Commission would audit the 
accounts of NHS bodies385 and that an internal market (which split purchasers and 
providers) would be introduced, to improve value for money, increase responsiveness 
to patients and enhance patient choice.386 The government chose two recommended 
purchasing models:387 District Health Authorities (DHAs)388 and GPs.389 Providers 
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were able to apply to become trusts,390 which are semi-independent non-profit 
organisations.391 Simon Jenkins states that introducing trusts meant that management 
and financial functions became dominant in hospitals.392 The private sector board 
model was imported into public services,393 such as NHS trusts394 and health 
authorities.395 Senior officials became executive directors and members became non-
executive directors.396 The reforms were criticised for increasing the democratic 
deficit, as even less attention was paid to representativeness.397   
 
Accountability is an imprecise and contested concept.398 Jo Maybin et al conceptualise 
it as the requirement to report and explain.399 This may occur through scrutiny, 
regulation, election, management or contract.400 The internal market reforms were 
regarded as replacing a management hierarchy with contracting between purchasers 
and providers.401 Three types of contracts were introduced: block contracts, cost per 
case contracts and cost and volume contracts.402 Agreements between health service 
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bodies did not give rise to contractual rights or responsibilities.403 Pauline Allen states 
that the contracts were attenuated and that the hierarchical chain of relationships 
remained largely intact.404 Allen et al argue that difficulties in specifying and measuring 
complex human services explains why contractual mechanisms were initially absent 
from the public sector.405 Julia Lear et al state that it is a legal puzzle (unassessed by 
the courts) whether European Union (EU) (which the UK joined in 1973406) competition 
law became applicable once the internal market was introduced.407  
 
Paton describes the internal market as ‘‘an elite initiative’’408 which ‘‘preserved public 
provision while embracing reform enough to please the Thatcherites’’.409 Paton argues 
that market reforms have ‘‘come in with a bang and gone out with a whimper’’.410 He 
states that while Virginia Bottomley was Secretary of State for Health (between 1992 
and 1995), clinical objectives were prioritised over the market.411 Despite government 
rhetoric that the reforms would enhance choice and local autonomy, there is evidence 
that they reduced choice412 and that purchasers were strongly influenced by central 
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guidance.413 The centralising effect of the management and market reforms led 
Jenkins to argue that, by 1997, ‘‘Bevan’s desire to hear the clatter of every bedpan in 
the corridors of Westminster had been realized’’ as the NHS became ‘‘micro-managed 
from the centre to meet the needs of short-term, media-led politics’’.414 The BMA 
organised an unsuccessful national campaign against the internal market. Ian Greener 
argues that this revealed that medical influence on government policy-making was 
‘‘optional’’415 and rendered doctors ‘‘more circumspect about again attempting to 
launch a national campaign against health reform’’.416 Marianna Fotaki’s case study 
research, in Outer London, indicated that many patients (around half of the participants 
in her study) were unaware of the reforms.417  
 
Thatcherism meant that welfare discourse was penetrated with consumerist words,418 
such as ‘‘choice’’, ‘‘efficiency’’ and ‘‘quality’’, which as Clarke and Janet Newman note, 
may depoliticise social issues and ‘‘displace real political and policy choices into a 
series of managerial imperatives’’.419 The interpellation of citizens as taxpayers and 
consumers sought to legitimate the pursuit of efficiency and comparability.420 Arik 
Mordoh states that ‘‘quality is a complex multidimensional concept’’.421 Patient safety, 
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patient experience and effectiveness of care were identified as components of quality 
by a review in 2008422 and subsequently incorporated into legislation.423 Avedis 
Donabedian identified the following components: efficacy, effectiveness, efficiency, 
optimality, acceptability, legitimacy (conforming to social preferences) and equity (just 
and fair distribution of health care and its benefits).424 Efficiency in healthcare may 
refer to technical efficiency (obtaining the maximum possible improvement in outcome 
from a set of resource inputs), productive efficiency (maximising health outcomes at a 
given cost) or allocative efficiency (allocating resources to maximise welfare).425 The 
government did not evaluate the impact of the internal market on efficiency.426 Le 
Grand argued that efficiency increased, as activity rose faster than resources between 
1991 and 1997.427 In contrast, as the reforms led hospitals to focus on easily measured 
activities, Carol Propper et al contend that efficiency may have decreased.428 The 
reforms were not allocatively efficient, as an estimated £2 billion was spent on the 
required organisational changes429 which increased bureaucracy and overhead 
costs430 by ending the advantages of cost-sharing and integrated care.431 The reforms 
also detrimentally affected equity (as there is evidence that the patients of fundholders 
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were advantaged432) and lowered satisfaction for patients of fundholders.433 An 
umbrella review of systematic reviews of healthcare reforms in high-income countries, 
conducted by Katherine Footman et al, found that marketization and privatisation did 
not improve quality.434 
 
The Patient’s Charter,435 adopted in 1991, focused on individual patient rights436 and 
was criticised for conflating citizen and consumer rights.437 In 1994, the government 
agreed to liberalise hospital services under the rules of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).438 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) brought services 
under the domain of multilateral trade rules for the first time.439 My searches of 
Hansard and newspaper archives reveal that the potential constraints that GATS 
imposed on NHS policymaking did not elicit parliamentary or journalistic comment in 
the mid-1990s. Services provided in the exercise of governmental authority are 
exempt from GATS.440 Such services must be supplied ‘‘neither on a commercial 
basis, nor in competition’’.441 Kyriaki-Korina Raptopoulou contends that the exemption 
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has been narrowly construed and would not apply to health care.442 As the role of non-
NHS providers increases, it becomes more likely that parts of the NHS may fall under 
GATS rules443 which may entrench privatisation.444 Stephen Gill argues that the 
WTO’s regulatory policies are indicative of new constitutionalism.445 Gill defines this 
as ‘‘the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if possible 
liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development’’.446 Gill states 
that it involves alterations to the ‘‘supreme laws and governing frameworks of nations’’ 
and the extension of ‘pre-commitment’ mechanisms…‘‘designed to ‘lock in’ 
commitments to disciplinary neo-liberalism and to ‘lock out’…alternatives (e.g. 
socialism) partly by making many of their means (e.g. nationalisation) illegal’’.447 This 
logic is also evident in the EU, which Bastiaan van Apeldoorn avers subordinates the 
democratic governance of member states to the dictates of the single market.448 I 
examine the impact of EU law on the NHS in subsequent chapters.  
 
Peck and Tickell argue that, in the early 1990s, ‘‘the perverse economic consequences 
and profound social externalities’’ attributable to roll-back neo-liberalism, facilitated the 
second neo-liberal shift, a metamorphosis into ‘‘more socially interventionist and 
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ameliorative forms epitomised by the third way’’.449 Hans Jurgen Bieling states that 
third way approaches, exemplified by the governments of Bill Clinton (US President 
between 1993 and 2001) and Tony Blair (UK Prime Minister between 1997 and 2007), 
did not fundamentally depart from previous neo-liberal methods of capitalist 
reorganisation but that communitarian ideas supplanted conservative ones.450 Such 
ameliorative language has continued in the era of roll-out neo-liberalism (the third neo-
liberal transformation).451 Roll-out neo-liberalism is manifest in states more directly 
supporting capital through social policy.452 Colin Crouch notes that ‘‘contracts to 
provide services, demand for which is completely guaranteed for several years by 
government, give firms a highly attractive sellers-market’’ and explains the pressure 
exerted on governments to privatise services.453 Such policies covertly redistribute 
wealth to the affluent and powerful454 by enabling private companies to profit from 
publicly funded services.455 NHS reforms since 2000 have afforded private healthcare 
companies more opportunities to provide clinical services. Although there are 
numerous critiques of such reforms (which I draw on in subsequent chapters), they 
have not been subjected to a comprehensive ideology critique. I postulate that this will 
illuminate the contestation between competing norms, the imperfect translation of 
norms into practice, the possible reifying effects of the reforms and provide a basis for 
conceiving alternatives.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I contended that the development of healthcare within England has 
been influenced historically by actual and potential unrest and, in the capitalist epoch, 
by the desire of the bourgeoisie for healthy workers. The welfare state (which 
institutionalised solidarity) was the product of class compromise. Welfare states 
stabilized capitalism but also instantiate values contrary to its logic. Doctor’s interests 
influenced the organisation of the NHS, although doctors have, generally, become its 
defenders. The NHS has been beneficial for the working class, but an emerging 
consciousness recognised its problems and limitations, such as its failure to reduce 
health inequalities or to empower patients. Neo-liberal ideology became ascendant 
following the demise of the post-war consensus and new governance mechanisms 
have been introduced in the NHS. I argued that Marxist views of neo-liberalism are 
potentially compatible with, and can remedy the deficiencies of, other ways of 
conceiving neo-liberalism. Three neo-liberal transformations have been identified. The 
reforms examined in subsequent chapters are indicative of roll-out neo-liberalism and 
of a fifth epoch of juridification. 
 
75 
 
Chapter Two: Ideology Critique: Methodology and Method 
 
Introduction 
 
I employ the method of ideology critique to analyse recent NHS reforms. Alan Hunt 
notes that the concept of ideology is mainly used by Marxist legal theorists and that 
there is no equivalent concept in the mainstream sociology of law.1 Rahel Jaeggi 
states that ideology critique was embraced by the various traditions of Western 
Marxism2 up until contemporary critical theory.3 Jaeggi contends that ideology critique 
is still required, as forms of social domination persist, but laments that the method was 
often unclear.4 As neo-liberal NHS reforms provide private companies with more 
opportunities, they extend the domination of the capitalist class and detrimentally 
affect patient need by diverting money to bureaucracies (required to administer quasi-
markets) and private companies. I clarify my own particular use of the method of 
ideology critique, within this chapter, which I use to understand efforts to legitimate 
and obscure such consequences. I concisely summarise Marxism and examine two 
problems which have confronted Marxist legal theorists, namely where the law is 
situated within the base/superstructure framework (which I reject) and how the law is 
determined. Terry Eagleton notes that ‘‘no single conception of ideology…has 
commanded universal assent’’.5 Broadly, ideology can be conceived positively, for 
                                                          
1 Hunt, A. (1985) ‘The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in recent applications of the concept 
of ideology to the analysis of law’. Law & Society Review, Vol.19(1), pp11-38 at p12. 
2 This refers to Marxist theorists based in Western Europe, such as Gyorgy Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci, 
Theodor Adorno and Louis Althusser.  See Anderson, P. (1976) Considerations on Western Marxism. 
London: New Left Books, pp25-26. 
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76 
 
example, as a political tradition, a type of social cement6 or the ideas of groups or 
individuals, and negatively (or critically) as misrepresentation or mystification.7  
 
Susan Marks did not employ positive conceptions of ideology, within her ideology 
critique of democratic norm thesis in international law scholarship, on the basis that 
they are not critical.8 However, such conceptions can be critical if a link is established 
between an ideology and a group or if it is demonstrated that a set of ideas are 
characterised by inversion and idealisation. Hugh Collins and David Moxon utilised 
positive conceptions of ideology to explain how laws are determined. I contend that 
the current hegemonic ideology of neo-liberalism is linked to the ruling capitalist class 
and is based on the fetishistic illusion of the freedom of the market, which is idealised. 
I argue that neo-liberalism has influenced the examined reforms, along with a posited 
micro-ideology of private health companies. Nonetheless, I aver that it competes with 
residual and emergent forms. Marks utilised ideological modes (and their strategies), 
identified by John B. Thompson,9 within her ideology critique. I also utilise such modes 
in critiquing the justifications for NHS reforms. Marks did not use the conception of 
ideology as false consciousness. In contrast, I argue that the notion of misrecognition 
of reality may aid understanding of estrangement and I examine several modes of 
reification. I also examine and repudiate criticisms of the concept of ideology.    
 
Marxism 
                                                          
6 Marks, S. (2000) The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of 
Ideology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp9-10.  
7 Larrain, J. (1983) Marxism and Ideology. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p4. 
8 Marks, S. (2000) The Riddle of All Constitutions, op cit., n.6 at p11. 
9 Thompson, J. (2007) Ideology and Modern Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, p60. 
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Karl Marx’s theory of historical materialism is an explanatory and normative 
framework10 which posits that different epochs, characterised by the dominant mode 
of production, can be discerned within history. Marx was a dialectical thinker who, as 
Bertell Ollman notes, ‘‘attributed change to the inner contradictions of the system or 
systems in which it occurs’’.11 A fundamental aspect of Marx’s writings was the notion 
of class struggle,12 which Marx viewed as the motor of history.13 Erik Olin Wright 
contends that antagonistic relations between classes are rooted in the exploitation14 
involved in the social relations of production.15 Marx averred that, in the current 
capitalist epoch, there are two main classes: the ruling bourgeois class, who own the 
means of production, and the subordinate proletarian class, who sell their labour 
power to capitalists for wages.16 Jon Elster states that Marx charged capitalism with 
being inhuman (as it leads to alienation), unjust (as it involves exploitation) and 
‘‘inherently and needlessly irrational and wasteful’’ (as markets are an inefficient way 
of co-ordinating economic decisions and frequently lead to crises).17 Marx predicted 
that the proletariat would overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish a communist 
society, which would enable individual self-realization.18 Although Friedrich Engels 
                                                          
10 Hughes, J. (2000) Ecology and Historical Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p1. 
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Press, p18. 
12 Ste Croix, G. (1981) The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the 
Arab Conquests. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p3. 
13 Wright, E. (1998) Classes. London: Verso, p33. 
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contended that law would wither away under communism19, others argue that law is 
necessary for socialism.20  
 
Subsequent Marxists (such as Western Marxists and Analytical Marxists21) have been 
more pessimistic about the prospects for revolution. The fall of communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, in 1989, and the perceived ‘‘triumph of capitalism’’, led to the claim 
that ‘‘Marxism is dead’’.22 However, although such regimes were inspired by Marxist 
theory, they developed in ‘‘circumstances that Marx never foresaw and resorted to 
devices that Marx never recommended’’.23 Ralph Miliband therefore described them 
as ‘‘monstrous deformation[s] of socialism’’.24 Contrary to those who have proclaimed 
its death, I agree with Eagleton that, as Marxism is a ‘‘searching, rigorous, 
comprehensive critique’’ of capitalism, ‘‘as long as capitalism is still in business, 
Marxism must be as well’’.25 Eric Hobsbawm noted that by the centenary of Marx’s 
death, in 1983, Marxist theory had become increasingly heterogeneous.26 I do not 
profess fidelity to a figmental official Marxism, but utilise the ideas of many Marxist 
(and other) writers. 
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Marxist Legal Theory 
 
The subject of law has not been the primary focus of most Marxist thinkers.27 However, 
Moxon states that in the 1970s, ‘‘many of the wider debates within Marxism were 
conducted through the prism of the law’’.28 Since then scholars, such as Collins and 
Moxon, have sought to remedy the theoretical deficiencies in Marxist legal theory. 
Scholars have also applied Marxist theory to studying international law29 and human 
rights.30 In addition, Marxism has influenced critical legal theorists (such as Duncan 
Kennedy, Karl Klare and Roberto Unger) and radical feminists (such as Joanne 
Conaghan and Wendy Brown). The subject of law was largely ‘‘peripheral’’31 in Marx’s 
writings. Marx famously contended that: 
 
‘‘The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure 
of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life’’.32 
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Moxon avers that subsequent Marxists were confronted with two problems when 
theorising about law.33 The first problem concerns determination, namely explaining 
how the law is determined by the economic base of a society ‘‘without denying human 
agency’’.34 The second problem concerns where the law is situated within Marx’s 
base/superstructure framework.35 G.A. Cohen asked ‘‘if the economic structure is 
constituted of property (or ownership) relations, how can it be distinct from the legal 
superstructure which it is supposed to explain?’’36 E.P. Thompson rejected the 
framework as his research indicated that ‘‘law did not keep politely to a level but was 
at every bloody level’’.37  
 
Collins notes that two schools of thought, economism (crude materialism) and class 
instrumentalism, sought to resolve the problems.38 Proponents of economism, such 
as Evgeny Pashukanis, contended that the economic base of a society determines the 
law.39 Proponents of class instrumentalism, such as Vladimir Lenin, contended that 
the law reflects the will of the dominant class.40 Moxon argues that economism is 
reductionist and ‘‘cannot convincingly account for the role of conscious human action 
in shaping law and legal systems’’.41 Moxon contends that class instrumentalism 
merely asserts ‘‘that the ruling class use law to pursue their own ends’’ which ‘‘does 
not provide a [clear] solution’’.42 Moxon states that class instrumentalists also failed to 
                                                          
33 Moxon, D. (2008) Marxist Legal Theory in Late Modernity, op cit., n.28 at p32. 
34 Ibid at p37. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Cohen, G. (1991) Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp217-218.  
37 Thompson, E. (1995) The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors. London: Merlin Press, p130. 
38 Collins, H. (1988) Marxism and Law, op cit., n.27 at p22. 
39 Ibid at p23. 
40 Ibid at p27. 
41 Moxon, D. (2008) Marxist Legal Theory in Late Modernity, op cit., n.28 at p73. 
42 Ibid at p93. 
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solve the base/superstructure problem.43 However, he agrees with China Mieville that 
Pashukanis provided a plausible theoretical solution to the problem.44  
 
Base/Superstructure Metaphor 
 
Pashukanis stated that the legal form is part of the base and is actualised ‘‘through the 
necessary particularities of the legal superstructure’’, such as court proceedings.45 
However, Moxon notes that Pashukanis failed to explain ‘‘why certain classes, in filling 
the empty form of law with its content, are attracted to certain ideas and have an 
understanding...of their needs and interests’’.46 Cohen contended that the ‘‘relations 
of production are a momentary power relation which quickly comes under the 
governance of superstructural rules’’.47 However, Collins notes that Cohen did not 
explain ‘‘why this happens’’.48 Collins argued that ideologies are formed by the 
relations of production and determine the content of law, which is thus superstructural, 
but that law has a ‘‘metanormative quality’’ allowing it to operate within the material 
base.49 Collins has been criticised by Hunt, for unproblematically assigning ‘‘ideology 
to the superstructure’’,50 and by Moxon, for failing to provide a plausible concept of 
law.51 Moxon avers that ‘‘law [which originates superstructurally] can be distinguished 
                                                          
43 Ibid. 
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from mere norms [which comprise the material base] in terms of its legitimacy’’.52 
Moxon states that: 
 
‘‘law is a formal, rational, abstract system of rules that finds its legitimacy in the 
fact that it fosters and expresses something of the underlying nature of capitalist 
rationality, and it is internalised by at least some members of the society’’.53  
 
However, the notion that law merely derives its legitimacy from fostering and 
expressing capitalist rationality does not account for the development of welfare 
states.  
 
I reject the base/superstructure metaphor because, as Bob Jessop stated, the 
economic base cannot be plausibly designated as ‘‘the ‘cause without cause’ which 
determines other social spheres’’ as it ‘‘is neither exclusively economic in its elements 
nor absolutely autonomous’’.54 Maureen Cain and Hunt note that the metaphor did not 
constrain Marx’s or Engels’ writings concerning law.55 The use of the metaphor may 
lead to ‘‘both forcing and superficiality’’,56 as Raymond Williams noted in his literature 
studies. It may also lead to a failure to take law seriously57 which is regrettable 
because, as, for example, Boaventura de Sousa Santos,58 Klare59 and Marks60 note, 
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law has emancipatory potential. For example, the creation of the NHS emancipated 
people from the fear of financial hardship that ill health could augur. Santos averred 
that law evolves due to the political mobilization of competing social forces.61 Similarly, 
Hunt argues that the law is an arena of struggle in which different class and political 
positions engage.62 E.P. Thompson stated that while law ‘‘as an institution or as 
personnel may very easily be assimilated to those of the ruling class’’ all ‘‘that is 
entailed in law is not subsumed in these institutions’’.63 Thompson noted that law could 
also be seen as an ideology.64 Hunt states that the ideological content of law can be 
identified at three levels: concrete legal norms, legal principles and the form of law.65 
Thompson contended that law can also be seen ‘‘as particular rules and sanctions 
which stand in a definite and active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social 
norms’’ and ‘‘in terms of its own logic, rules and procedures-that is, simply as law’’.66 
In the latter respect, Annelise Riles states that the technicality of law defines and 
distinguishes it from other kinds of social knowledge.67  
 
The concept of relative autonomy was used by Engels (who argued that the economic 
sphere is the ‘‘ultimately determining factor in history’’68) and Louis Althusser (who 
stated that the economic sphere was determinative in the last instance69) to solve the 
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base/superstructure problem. However, it is unclear what ultimately determining factor 
means.70 Jack Lindsay argued that the notion of the last instance was used to defer 
the problem with the metaphor indefinitely.71 E.P. Thompson asserted that ‘‘the 
complexity of relations is not …illuminated by giving to it a reputable new name like 
relative autonomy’’.72 A preferable alternative to the metaphor has been identified by 
both Williams, who stated that ‘‘social being determines consciousness’’,73 and 
Thompson, who averred that there is a ‘‘dialogue between social being and social 
consciousness’’.74 Both Thompson and Williams defined ‘‘determine’’ as setting 
limits.75  
 
Positive Conceptions of Ideology 
 
Marx and Engels used ideology in a negative sense in ‘The German Ideology’ (see 
below). However, Marx’s conception of ideology was broader in subsequent writings.76 
For example, Marx stated that ideological forms are forms ‘‘in which men become 
conscious of this conflict [i.e. class struggle] and fight it out’’.77 Although ‘The German 
Ideology’ was written in 1845, it was not published until 1932. Its absence influenced 
a shift from a negative to a positive conception.78 Ideology was conceptualised as 
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class consciousness by Lenin.79 Lenin stated that there were two ideologies which 
represented the interests of the two main classes: bourgeois and socialist ideology.80 
However, ideologies may pertain to social relations other than class, such as between 
sexes and ethnic groups (for example, patriarchy and nationalism).81 John B. 
Thompson therefore stated that studying ideology involves examining the manner ‘‘in 
which meaning (or signification) serves to [establish and] sustain relations of 
domination’’.82 Nonetheless, the concept of class consciousness usefully describes 
how members of classes may become aware of an identity of interests ‘‘as against 
those of other classes’’.83 
 
Ideology has also been used to refer to worldviews (for example, by Karl Mannheim 
and Lucien Goldmann) and political traditions.84 Michael Freeden notes that the latter 
use bridged the Marxist and political science concepts of ideology.85 Marks did not use 
such conceptions on the basis that they are neutral rather than critical conceptions.86 
However, such conceptions can be critical if a link between a particular worldview or 
political tradition and a dominant group is identified. I reject the Post-Marxist87 notion 
that there is ‘‘no logical connection whatsoever’’ between class and ideology.88 Rather, 
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as Eagleton states, ‘‘the relations between certain social locations, and certain political 
forms, is a necessary [but not inevitable] one’’ hence it is not ‘‘wholly coincidental that 
all capitalists are not also revolutionary socialists’’.89 I agree with David Harvey that 
neo-liberalism is a ‘‘class project’’ to ‘‘restore and consolidate capitalist class power’’.90 
The use of such conceptions may also be critical if it is demonstrated that the political 
tradition involves inversion (‘‘certain false beliefs or assumptions about human 
action’’91) and idealisation (the tendency to convert ideas into ideals), two 
characteristics that John Torrance stated Marx ascribed to ideologies.92 Inversion may 
involve abstraction or projection.93 Harvey states that the inversion in neo-liberalism 
is the ‘‘fetishistic illusion’’ of the freedom of the market.94 Neo-liberals convert the 
abstract idea of the market into an ideal. In this respect, Anthony Culyer argued that 
as markets are imperfect, ‘‘the marketeers’ image of the market for health is a 
completely irrelevant description of an unattainable utopia’’.95 Similarly, Calum Paton 
averred that the necessary conditions for a successful market in the NHS, such as 
perfect competition and an unambiguous profit-making culture on the part of providers, 
have never existed or been properly sought by policymakers, as they are chimerical 
and hugely expensive.96 Paton contends that such conditions have been rationalised 
ex post facto by idealists.97  
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Marks also rejected Gramsci’s and Althusser’s conceptualisations of ideology as a 
type of social cement.98 In contrast, I contend that this conception is useful because, 
as Freeden stated, ‘‘ideologies aim at cementing the relationship between words and 
concepts’’, attaching ‘‘a single meaning to a...term’’.99 Thus, as Valentin Voloshinov 
argued, sign is an important ‘‘arena of the class struggle’’.100 Gramsci distinguished 
between organic ideologies (‘‘the necessary superstructure of a particular 
structure’’101) and ‘‘the polemics of individual ideologues’’102 (the ‘‘arbitrary 
elucubrations of individuals’’103). He viewed the former ‘‘as the cement which holds 
together the structure’’.104 Similarly, Althusser stated that ideology was required to 
reproduce ‘‘the kinds of people who will be able to participate in the process of 
production’’.105 Althusser argued that repressive state apparatuses (RSAs) functioned 
‘‘predominantly by repression’’ and that ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), such as 
churches and schools, functioned ‘‘predominantly by ideology’’.106 Althusser’s concept 
of ISAs has been criticised for simplifying social institutions, which are not purely 
ideological structures.107  
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Michelle Barrett states that the ‘‘concept of hegemony is the organising focus of 
Gramsci’s thought on politics and ideology’’.108 Harvey notes that Gramsci uses 
hegemony in two ways, firstly political power exercised through leadership and 
consent as opposed to coercion (which is how Harvey uses the concept) and secondly, 
coercion and consent.109 Perry Anderson argued that Gramsci’s use of the terms state 
and civil society and his analysis of the relationship between them was inconsistent.110 
Many interpret Gramsci as associating hegemony with civil society, ‘‘the whole range 
of institutions intermediate between state and economy’’ (including the family, schools, 
medical institutions111 and the media) which ‘‘bind individuals to the ruling power by 
consent’’ (as opposed to coercion which is used by the state).112 I contend that both 
the state and civil society are involved in constructing hegemony.  Gramsci averred 
that consent was achieved through the dissemination of ‘‘a conception of the world 
which is uncritically absorbed’’.113  
 
Althusser drew on Jacques Lacan’s notion, that the ego is formed through 
identification at the mirror stage of a child’s development,114 to propose that ideology 
interpellates individuals as subjects, hence ‘‘there is no ideology except by the subject 
and for subjects’’.115 The concept of interpellation usefully describes how subjects 
come to recognise what exists, what is good and what is possible.116 Nonetheless, as 
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Eagleton states, Althusser’s ideas are ‘‘too monistic’’, as subjects ‘‘may be 
ideologically accosted - partially, wholly or hardly at all - by discourses themselves 
which form no obvious cohesive unity’’.117 Norman Fairclough argues that although 
subjects are positioned ideologically, they can also act creatively by making their own 
connections between ideologies and practices.118  
 
Gramsci contended that ideology was a relatively autonomous ‘‘terrain on which men 
move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle’’.119 He distinguished between 
a war of position (the movement of classes to gain vantage points within civil society) 
and a war of movement (the seizure of state power).120 Gramsci argued that the task 
of the philosophy of praxis was to coincide with buon senso (good sense),121 to repel 
the overwhelming impact of ideologies within the senso commune (a composite of 
historical layers and opposite social perspectives122) ‘‘on common sense and to 
strengthen the inherent potentials of realistic experience and capacity to act’’.123 
Williams stated that ‘‘hegemony does not just passively exist as a form of dominance’’, 
rather ‘‘it has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified’’.124 For 
example, Thatcherism, Blairism and Cameronism are distinct neo-liberal hegemonic 
projects.125 Williams contended that dominant forms are ‘‘also continually resisted, 
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limited, altered, challenged’’126 by residual and emergent forms.127 I argue that the 
residual forms, which the current dominant form of neo-liberalism competes with, 
include liberal norms, such as freedom and equality. Brown contends that neo-
liberalism has successfully redefined such norms.128 In contrast, Anita Chari avers that 
neo-liberalism continues to rely on liberalism’s normative legitimation (although it 
inverts classical liberal discourses regarding the relationship between economics and 
politics).129  
 
E.P. Thompson identified a ‘‘popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what 
were illegitimate practices in marketing, milling, banking, etc.’’, in the eighteenth 
century, based on a ‘‘traditional view of social norms and obligations’’ which, he stated, 
constituted a ‘‘moral economy of the poor’’.130 Colin Barker used the moral economy 
concept to describe local opposition to the closure of Booth Hall Hospital in North 
Manchester in the early 1990s.131 Barker stated that a moral economy is characterised 
by a perceived problem or threat to people’s needs, a counter ethic (a vision of the 
common good entailing non-monetary values) and aspects of tradition or custom 
(something already known, practiced and valued) and is a kind of battle cry.132 Barker 
notes that part of a moral economy’s practical power comes from the partial validity 
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the powerful have previously granted it.133 There is overwhelming public support (a 
popular consensus) for the NHS’ founding principles (which I categorise as residual 
norms).134 The organisation of the NHS, on the basis of need, has been known, 
practiced and valued and the powerful have given validity to it. NHS reforms which 
threaten people’s needs contravene this popular consensus. Wolfgang Streeck 
highlights the tension between social justice (vested in a society’s moral economy) 
and market justice.135 Streeck argues that the existence of a non-capitalist politics 
capable of defining and enforcing general interests is necessary to prevent 
capitalism’s self-destruction.136 The erosion of socially organised mitigation has led to 
some scholars questioning whether capitalism can survive.137 Streeck argues that 
neo-liberal capitalism is dysfunctional (evident in declining growth and rising 
inequality) and that a post-capitalist interregnum is dawning,138 which, in Gramsci’s 
words, means that the ‘‘old [order] is dying but the new cannot yet be born’’.139 In 
respect of emerging norms, as mentioned in chapter one, Unger identified an 
emerging consciousness of the welfare corporate state140 which developed norms in 
recognition of the problems and limitations of welfare states.  
 
Collins drew on Gramsci’s and Althusser’s ideas to explain how the law is determined. 
Collins contended that ‘‘the ruling class share common perceptions of interest as a 
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result of similar processes of socialisation and experiences of productive activities’’ 
which establishes ‘‘a consensus of values’’.141 Collins states that the ruling class 
therefore enact "laws pursuant to that ideology".142 Olufemi Taiwo asserted that 
recourse to ideology ‘‘merely puts class instrumentalism under a thicker layer of 
verbiage’’.143 However, I contend that ideology has more explanatory value than Taiwo 
credits. Moxon states that Taiwo’s Marxist theory of natural law (that certain laws ‘‘are 
necessary to or constitutive of the mode of production’’144) is ‘‘potentially compatible 
with Collins’ notion of ideology’’.145 Nonetheless, Moxon states that Collins’ idea of an 
overarching dominant ideology is problematic as: it would need to be ‘‘implausibly 
extended’’ to explain all laws (such as ‘‘prohibitions of victimless crimes’’146); it is not 
‘‘rigorous enough to be of much use theoretically’’ or empirically;147 and, it ‘‘is 
increasingly implausible in a late modern landscape’’148 due to the increasing 
fragmentation of society149 and the fact that states are increasingly ceding powers to 
other actors (for example, through privatisation).150 Moxon proposes substituting such 
an overarching dominant ideology with micro-ideologies, formed in the same way as 
Collins suggested, to remedy such problems.151 Moxon stated that empirical analysis 
of ideologies at the micro-level could pertain to both individuals and groups.152 Some 
of the changes that Moxon states characterise late modernity, such as privatisation, 
are attributable to neo-liberal ideology. I therefore contend that both dominant and 
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micro-ideologies may aid understanding of how laws are determined. Both Brown and 
Harvey note that corporations are increasingly fashioning law and policy in the neo-
liberal era.153 I examine the influence of neo-liberalism and a posited micro-ideology 
of private healthcare companies on successive NHS reforms.  
 
Negative Conceptions of Ideology 
   
Although there are numerous interpretations of Marx’s and Engels’ writings concerning 
ideology,154 I agree with Bhikhu Parekh that the concept is used in two interrelated 
senses within ‘The German Ideology’: ‘‘first, idealism and second, an apologetic body 
of thought’’.155 In respect of the latter, Marx and Engels averred that the ‘‘the ideas of 
the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas’’ as the ruling class controls the 
means of mental production.156 Such ideas are described as being ‘‘hypocritical’’, as 
bourgeois ideology ‘‘voices their particular interests as universal interests’’.157 
Eagleton states that this is so that the sectoral nature of the ideology does not ‘‘loom 
too embarrassingly large’’ as this would ‘‘impede its general acceptance’’.158 Similarly, 
E.P. Thompson argued that law needed to be presented as being in everyone’s 
interests as if it were ‘‘evidently partial or unjust it will mask nothing, legitimise 
nothing’’.159 Apologia may be intended or otherwise.160 Brown notes that Marx argued 
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(in ‘On the Jewish Question’161) that liberal constitutionalism grants rights to abstract 
as opposed to concrete subjects.162 It thereby constructs an ‘‘illusory politics of 
equality, liberty and community in the domain of the state’’ disguising ‘‘the unequal, 
un-free and individualistic domain of civil society’’.163 This may aid groups in 
representing sectional interests as universal interests. With regards to Marxist state 
theory, Colin Hay notes that it has been characterised by a battle between 
instrumentalists (such as Miliband) and structuralists (such as Nicos Poulantzas).164 I 
favour Jessop’s strategic-relational approach which locates the state ‘‘within a 
complex dialectic of structures and strategies’’.165  
 
John B. Thompson identified five general modes of ideology (legitimation, 
dissimulation, unification, fragmentation and reification) and their common 
strategies.166  Thompson contends that universalization is a common strategy of the 
legitimation mode of ideology, along with rationalization (the construction of a chain of 
reasoning justifying social relations or institutions) and narrativization (in which claims 
are embedded in stories about the present).167 Thompson avers that dissimulation 
operates by concealing, denying or obscuring relations of domination, for example, 
through displacement and euphemization.168 Thompson states that unification 
involves ‘‘embracing individuals in a collective identity’’, while, inversely, fragmentation 
                                                          
161 Marx, K. (1844) On the Jewish Question. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/ [Accessed: 13 May 2014]. 
162 Brown, W. (1995) States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Chichester, NH: 
Princeton University Press, p106. 
163 Ibid at p114. 
164 Hay, C. (1999) ‘Marxism and the State’ in Gamble, A., Marsh, D. and Tant, T. (eds) Marxism and 
Social Science. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp152-174 at p173.  
165 Jessop, B. (1990) State Theory, op cit., n.54 at p129. 
166 Thompson, J. (2007) Ideology and Modern Culture, op cit., n.9 at p60. 
167 Ibid at p61. 
168 Ibid at pp61-62. 
95 
 
involves dividing groups which could challenge dominant groups.169 According to 
Thompson, reification involves the naturalization and eternalization of states of affairs, 
or the deletion of actors and agency via nominalization and passivization.170 Marks 
utilised Thompson’s ideas as the basis of her ideology critique.171 I also utilise the 
modes and strategies identified by Thompson to critique the justifications for NHS 
reforms. Theodor Adorno stated that ‘‘ideology is justification’’ and that the critique of 
ideology ‘‘is only possible insofar as the ideology contains a rational element with 
which the critique can deal’’.172 Thus ‘‘ideologies...become false only by their 
relationship to the existing reality’’.173 Both Max Horkheimer174 and Unger175 described 
the conflict between the existent and ideology as a spur to historical change. 
 
Adorno stated that liberal ideology could not simply be rejected as false consciousness 
of existing conditions because it also provides a foundation for critiquing such 
conditions.176 He argued that as the ‘‘emphatic concepts of liberal ideology are not 
identical with the experiences they subsume’’ they tacitly denounce existing 
conditions.177 However, in contrast to Horkheimer, Adorno thought that the alternative 
possibilities to ideology had ‘‘no emancipatory guarantees attached’’.178 Adorno 
believed that liberal ideology was losing, or may have already lost, the critical moment 
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that it possessed.179 He was critical of what he described as positivist ideology which 
‘‘hardly says more than that things are the way they are’’.180 He theorised that there 
was a convergence between reality and ideology181 which rendered ideology critique 
more difficult as there is not ‘‘a crevice in the cliff of the established order into which 
an ironist might hook a fingernail’’.182 However, Deborah Cook opines that Adorno 
erred in some passages of his work by denying ‘‘the important motivational role that 
[liberal] ideas like freedom and equality continue to play in contemporary 
consciousness’’.183 Cook views Adorno’s negative dialectics184 as ‘‘an attempt to find 
a finger-hold in the cliff of the established order’’.185  
 
Idealism is the ‘‘belief that human consciousness is autonomous, self- sufficient and 
capable of being studied and explained in its own terms’’.186 In opposition to the 
idealism of Georg Hegel (whose dialectical method they inverted), Marx and Engels 
argued that ‘‘the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first 
directly interwoven with the material activities and the material intercourse of men-the 
language of real life’’.187 David Hawkes states that ‘The German Ideology’ misled 
some Marxists into explaining ideology simply by reference to economic 
developments.188 Hawkes notes that Marx stated that ‘‘the tradition of all the dead 
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generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living’’.189 Consequently, 
Hawkes contends that Marx believed that ‘‘ideas and matter form a totality, which 
cannot be broken up into discrete elements without producing serious errors’’.190 
Marks rejected the notion of ideology as false consciousness.191  In contrast, I agree 
with Torrance that the phrase can be legitimately read back into Marx as the notion of 
‘‘misrecognition of reality due to social causes’’.192 Although Marx did not use the term 
reification, he distinguished between a collectively planned society, which would be 
understood by its members, as its essence would be their own stated intention and 
would coincide with its appearance,193 and an unplanned opaque society.194 Elster 
contends that Marx had a utopian conception of communism as ‘‘social causality will 
always to some extent remain opaque’’.195  
 
Marx argued that ‘‘ideology arises from the opacity of reality,...the fact that the forms 
in which reality ‘presents itself’ to man, or the forms of its appearance, conceal those 
real relations which themselves produce the appearances’’.196 Thus, as John Mepham 
stated, ideology involves persons ‘‘thinking in terms of categories which necessarily 
generate falsehood and illusion’’.197 For example, ‘‘to see something as a commodity 
is to view it as something which it is not’’.198 This is known as commodity fetishism, in 
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which commodities ‘‘appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their 
own’’.199 Slavoj Zizek notes that ideological illusion operates in social reality itself, 
hence individuals are fetishists in practice if not in theory.200 For example, they know 
that there is no magic behind money but nevertheless ‘‘treat it as an embodiment of 
wealth’’.201  
 
Commodity fetishism is part of Marx’s broader theory of alienation.202 Chari states that 
alienation refers to a form of depoliticisation specific to capitalism that produces two 
kinds of effects: rigidification of the political form (sedimented in the distinction 
between state and civil society) and obfuscation of the relationship between the 
political and economic spheres.203 In respect of the former, Chari contends that Marx’s 
critique of alienation, in both ‘The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’204 and 
‘On the Jewish Question’, is ‘‘a critique of the hypostatization of abstraction, which 
results in the depoliticisation of [economic and political] institutions’’.205 In respect of 
the latter, Chari contends that Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism (which was 
deepened by Gyorgy Lukacs’ theory of reification) is that it is ‘‘depoliticising in the way 
it obscures the relationship between actions and their social effects’’ resulting in the 
bracketing of certain areas of social life from political deliberation and subjective 
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experience.206 Reification produces estrangement which is the opposite of solidarity207 
(which was important in the creation and maintenance of the NHS). Hunt states that 
the relationship between social relations and law should not be prejudged.208 I identify 
various ways in which social relations may be reified (through the legitimation effect of 
law, identity thinking, instrumental rationality and depoliticisation) in the following 
paragraphs. I assess the effectiveness of such mystifying modes in subsequent 
chapters. I do not utilise Jurgen Habermas’ or Axel Honneth’s conceptualisations of 
reification, as the colonization of lifeworlds by systems and as a forgetfulness of 
recognition,209 respectively, as the former is fragmentary210 and undermined by 
contemporary neo-liberal policies211 and the latter is, as Chari argues, ahistorical (as 
it is separated from ‘‘an analysis of the social form of capitalism’’) and narrow (as it 
reduces reification to a ‘‘phenomenon of intersubjectivity’’212). 
 
As alluded to above, Lukacs expanded Marx’s ideas pertaining to commodity fetishism 
via the concept of reification. Lukacs’ conception of reification was also influenced by 
Max Weber’s theory of rationalization,213 ‘‘a process whereby traditional activities are 
reorganised in terms of efficiency, measurability and means end rationality’’.214 Lukacs 
stated that ‘‘men erect around themselves in the reality they have created and made, 
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a kind of second nature’’.215 For Lukacs, false consciousness consists in allowing this 
second nature ‘‘to exert a fetishistic dominance over our lives’’.216 For example, 
economies may be perceived to be autonomous and self-perpetuating rather than 
constituted by human practices.217 Val Burris contends that Lukacs thought that 
reification was rooted in the objectification of labour and treated broader forms of 
reification (for example, science, law and philosophy) as purely derivative.218 Todd 
Hedrick states that Lukacs recognised that ‘‘law (a) can be an institutional means for 
consolidating the results of the class struggle, which (b) subsequently obscures this 
class domination through the everyday operation of the legal system’’.219 Duncan 
Kennedy described this as the ‘‘legitimation effect’’.220 Klare argued that law makes 
the ‘‘historically contingent appear necessary’’.221  Nonetheless, as Sol Picciotto 
argued, it is ‘‘important to probe and expose the limits of law’s capacity to 
legitimise’’.222 Lukacs believed that bourgeois reified consciousness had 
contaminated the proletariat.223 He thought that ‘‘only the consciousness of the 
proletariat [which he viewed as the subject/object of history] can point to the way that 
leads out of the impasse of capitalism’’.224 Lukacs’ conception of reification was 
criticised by Adorno, as it ‘‘presupposes the reconcilement of subject and object [in the 
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form of the proletariat] and thus relapses into idealism and fails to found a truly 
materialistic dialectic’’,225 as materialist thought would recognise ‘‘that thinking is not 
identical with its objects’’.226  
 
Chari identifies three modalities of reification within Adorno’s writings:227 philosophical 
reification (identity thinking), social reification (instrumental rationality) and aesthetic 
reification. In respect of the latter, Adorno contended that the autonomy of artwork is 
a fetish but that the semblance of autonomy constitutes resistance to exchange.228 I 
utilise the former two modalities within this dissertation. Instrumental rationality refers 
to means becoming ends in themselves. I examine whether the means adopted in 
NHS governance (quasi-markets and targets) have become ends in themselves. 
Identity thinking refers to the subsumption of objects under concepts with which they 
are not identical.229 Adorno stated that, under capitalism, identity thinking ‘‘appears in 
the guise of the ubiquitous exchange principle’’,230 which equates unlike things,231 
corrupts ‘‘thought and behaviour, instincts and needs’’232 and generates alienation by 
reducing human bonds merely to commerce.233 Adorno argued that ‘‘behind the 
reduction of men to agents and bearers of exchange value lies the domination of man 
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over man’’.234 According to Adorno, the formal principle of equivalence also 
predominated in law, which treated everyone alike, thereby promoting inequality by 
neglecting differences.235 Harvey highlights the contradiction between use values and 
exchange values.236 He contends that when states open arenas to ‘‘private capital 
accumulation and exchange value considerations’’ this may prove antagonistic to 
human need.237 I assess whether NHS reforms have been, or may be, antagonistic to 
human need. Harvey notes that there is also a ‘‘gap between money and the value it 
represents’’.238 I assess whether healthcare providers are sufficiently reimbursed.  
 
Adorno and Horkheimer critiqued the logic of the enlightenment whereby ‘‘anything 
which cannot be resolved into numbers and ultimately into one, is illusion’’.239 This 
logic pervades the phenomenon in global governance of the increased use of 
indicators,240 which has derived largely from economics and business 
management.241 Sally Engle Merry defines indicators as ‘‘statistical measures that are 
used to consolidate complex data into a single number or rank that is meaningful to 
policymakers and the public’’.242 Indicators are symptomatic of identity thinking as they 
evince a preference for superficial but standardized knowledge.243 In the NHS, 
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indicators have been developed to facilitate performance measurement, target setting 
and patient choice. Michael Mandelstam describes targets and indicators as types ‘‘of 
misleading metonymy’’ as they ‘‘substitute the part of something for the whole’’.244 
Gwyn Bevan and Christopher Hood note that what is omitted is assumed not to 
matter.245 Indicators may lead to depoliticisation because, as Merry notes, they 
submerge the political under the technical.246 However, Kevin Davis avers that there 
is scope for recontestation where debates emerge regarding what is measured by, the 
weighting criteria for and the embedded social or political theories of, indicators.247 
Targets may ‘‘become ends in themselves’’248 and impede other objectives (such as 
efficiency).249 Both Charles Goodhart250 and Donald Campbell251 formulated laws that 
indicators are subject to corruption pressures. Marilyn Strathern restated such laws 
as: ‘‘when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure’’.252 Although 
some consider that Adorno favoured non-identity thinking, Cook states that he thought 
that conceptual mediation was necessary for thinking, hence he favoured rational 
identity thinking, which seeks to determine whether concepts do justice to what they 
cover.253 Adorno stated that the reduction of quality to quantity was a process of 
abstraction which ‘‘distances itself from the objects’’.254 Adorno averred that the 
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‘‘knowledge being sought in negative dialectics is qualitative’’.255 Consequently, I 
contend that voice is preferable to choice (which relies on superficial indicators) in 
efforts to empower patients. 
 
Chari states that ‘‘neo-liberal domination is at the most basic level, a form of 
depoliticisation’’.256 Emma Ann Foster et al note that there are ‘‘many meanings and 
applications’’ of depoliticisation.257 Although various conceptions of politics inform 
such definitions, I prefer Hay’s broad conception of politics as ‘‘the capacity for agency 
and deliberation in situations of genuine collective or social choice’’.258 Jessop 
contends that depoliticisation may occur on the levels of polity, politics and policy.259 
Jessop states that depolitization may involve a re-organisation of the division of 
political labour,260 for example, through the delegation of power to ostensibly non-
political bodies,261 such as NHS England, which has also been described as 
institutional depoliticisation.262 Matthew Flinders and Jim Buller note that such 
arrangements may make accountability more opaque.263 They argue that the degree 
of depoliticisation is questionable when the independent body operates within a narrow 
and prescriptive policy framework set by ministers.264 Flinders states that 
                                                          
255 Ibid at p141. 
256 Chari, A. (2015) A Political Economy of the Senses, op cit., n.129 at p22. 
257 Foster, E. et al (2014) ‘Rolling back to roll forward: Depoliticisation and the extension of 
government’. Policy and Politics, Vol.42(2), pp225-241 at p226.  
258 Hay, C. (2007) Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press, p77.  
259 Jessop, B. (2015) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation: theoretical preliminaries on some responses to 
the American fiscal and Eurozone debt crises’ in Flinders, M. and Wood, M. (eds) Tracing the 
Political: Depoliticisation, governance and the state. Bristol: Policy Press, pp95-116 at pp96-97. 
260 Ibid at p101. 
261 Burnham, P. (2000) ‘Globalisation, depoliticisation and ‘modern’ economic management’ in 
Bonefield, W. and Psychopedis, K. (eds) The Politics of Change: Globalisation, Ideology and Critique. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp9-30 at p23. 
262 Flinders, M. and Buller, J. (2005) ‘Depoliticisation, Democracy and Arena Shifting’ (Paper given at 
the SCANCOR/SOG Conference, Stanford University, 1-2 April 2005), p6. 
263 Ibid at p21. 
264 Ibid at p10. 
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depoliticisation often ‘‘involves the implicit (but rarely explicit) building of normative 
values’’ into institutional structures.265 Jessop contends that depolitization may occur 
through the redrawing of the boundary between the political and the non-political, for 
example via:  
 
‘‘sacralisation, marketization, juridification, scientization (expertise), or in 
Foucauldian terms governmentalization, and self-responsibilization through 
disciplinary or government practices’’.266  
 
Jessop notes that the ‘‘demarcation of political and non-political spheres’’ may provoke 
controversy.267 Lars Blichner and Anders Molander delineate five dimensions of 
juridification: firstly, constitutive juridification, where the legal system accrues 
competences through the establishment or alteration of norms constitutive of a political 
order; secondly, a process through which law comes to regulate an increasing number 
of different activities;268  thirdly, a process through which conflicts are increasingly 
solved by or with reference to law;269 fourthly, a process through which the legal 
system and profession acquire more power as contrasted with formal authority;270 and 
fifthly, legal framing, a process by which people increasingly tend to think of 
themselves and others as legal subjects.271 These dimensions of juridification 
                                                          
265 Flinders, M. (2004) ‘Distributed Public Governance in Britain’. Public Administration, Vol.82(4), 
pp883-909 at p902. 
266 Jessop, B. (2015) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation’, op cit., n.259 at p101/Jessop, B. (2016) The 
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correspond with what Burnham and Flinders and Buller describe as rules based 
depoliticisation.272 I assess whether reforms have juridified the NHS in subsequent 
chapters. 
  
Jessop states that depoliticalization may occur through the separation between the 
economy and the political sphere, constitutional law (such as the new constitutionalism 
identified by Stephen Gill273), the use of ostensibly non-political figures (for example, 
to provide information or make recommendations or decisions), sedimentation 
(routinization in policy formation and implementation and the thematization of issues 
as political or non-political274) and governmentalization.275 Governmentalization 
involves the creation of conditions for technocratic decision making and/or self-
responsibilization of individuals/groups, for example, through target setting276 and new 
public contracting (rendering social agents responsible through contractual 
commitments and obligations).277 The literature on depoliticisation has been criticised 
for overemphasising the novelty of the phenomenon and for demonising politicians 
and the state.278 Hay contends that the internalization of pessimistic public choice 
assumptions by policymakers about their own motivations and pessimistic 
assumptions about their capacity to act (for example, in the face of perceived external 
constraints) has unleashed ‘‘a tide of depoliticising dynamics’’.279 Hay avers that for 
                                                          
272 Flinders, M. and Buller, J. (2005) ‘Depoliticisation, Democracy and Arena Shifting’, op cit., n.262 at 
p10/Burnham, P. (2000) ‘Globalisation, depoliticisation and ‘modern’ economic management’, op cit., 
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273 Gill, S. (2008) Power and Resistance in the new world order: 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
p79. 
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the literature concerning depoliticisation to develop, it must engage with empirical 
instances of politicising-depoliticising dynamics which reveal the limitations of existing 
theory.280 Patrick Diamond identified, in his research regarding New Labour, a 
dialectical relationship between politicisation and depoliticisation as policymakers 
adopted a hybrid mix, accruing power to ‘take credit’ and giving it away (‘blame-
shifting’).281 I analyse the politicising-depoliticising dynamics of healthcare policy in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Criticisms of Ideology 
 
The concept of ideology has been subject to numerous criticisms. Firstly, some 
theorists have pronounced the end of ideology. Daniel Bell argued that ‘‘the ideological 
age has ended’’ as there is a ‘‘rough consensus among intellectuals on political 
issues’’.282 Bell has been criticised for considering only the alleged exhaustion of 
nineteenth century left-wing ideas.283 Marks argues that end of ideology arguments 
are themselves ideological as they sustain existing asymmetries of power by 
announcing ‘‘that Western political and economic institutions represent the consensus 
of nations and the culmination of historical processes’’.284 Secondly, Pragmatists 
query whether theorists can ‘‘look down upon the ideologies of those he investigates 
                                                          
280 Hay, C. (2014) ‘Depoliticisation as process, governance as practice: What did the ‘First Wave’ get 
wrong and do we need a ‘Second Wave’ to put it right’. Policy and Politics, Vol.42(2), pp293-311 at 
p308. 
281 Diamond, P. (2015) ‘New Labour, Politicisation and Depoliticisation: The Delivery Agenda in public 
services 1997-2007’. British Politics, Vol.10(4), pp429-453 at p439. 
282 Bell, D. (2001) The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, pp402-403. 
283 Larrain, J. (1983) Marxism and Ideology, op cit., n.7 at p225. 
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from a scientific vantage point’’.285 Karen Ng describes this paradox as the dialectics 
of immanence and transcendence.286 Ng contends that the solution is to seek 
intramundane transcendence.287 Adorno recognised that the problem of transcendent 
critique was that utopian ideas are easily characterised as arbitrary.288 Adorno argued 
that critique must avail itself of norms which the society being critiqued would 
recognise as its own.289 Jaeggi describes ideology critique as parasitic as it depends 
on norms that it does not generate by itself.290  
 
Thirdly, postmodernists are sceptical of narratives, such as Marxism.291 Michel 
Foucault argued that ideology is problematic as it stands in opposition to truth.292 
However, as Eagleton notes, ideologies may contain both true and false ideas.293 
Jaeggi states that ideologies ‘‘are simultaneously true and false, insofar as they 
correspond at once adequately and inadequately to reality’’.294 She notes that the 
norms which they are attached to may have unrealized truth content.295 While 
postmodernists repudiate the notion of absolute truth, I agree with Eagleton that it 
‘‘simply means that if a statement is true, then the opposite of it cannot be true at the 
same time, or true from some other point of view’’.296 Eagleton states that absolute 
truths are established by a taxing and messy business of argument, evidence, 
                                                          
285 Harris, J. (1997) Legal Philosophies: 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p271. 
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287 Ibid at p400. 
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experiment and investigation, which is always open to revision.297 Secondly, Foucault 
rejected ideology as it necessarily refers ‘‘to something of the order of a subject’’.298 I 
disagree with Foucault’s rejection of subjects because, as Adorno averred, ‘‘no matter 
how the subject is defined, existent being cannot be conjured away from it’’.299 Thirdly, 
Foucault rejected ideology ‘‘as it stands in a secondary position...to something which 
functions as its infrastructure’’.300 I repudiate this criticism as the base/superstructure 
metaphor is ‘‘now almost universally rejected by Marxists’’.301 Nonetheless, as Trevor 
Purvis and Alan Hunt contend, the concepts of ideology and discourse are potentially 
compatible.302 
 
Methods 
 
In assessing the influence of neo-liberalism on successive governments, I examine 
relevant political science literature. In assessing the influence of the proposed micro-
ideology of private healthcare companies on the NHS reforms, I examine relevant 
academic literature, newspaper articles and descriptions of such influence from the 
agents of such companies and opponents of the reforms. I also examine accounts of 
the reforms authored by politicians (such as Tony Blair’s description of New Labour’s 
reforms in his autobiography303 and the writings of various ministers304) and senior 
                                                          
297 Ibid at pp105-109. 
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NHS personnel (such as Nigel Crisp, NHS Chief Executive between 2000 and 
2006305). In examining the policies and legal changes of successive governments, 
which have marketized and privatised the NHS, I analyse relevant election 
manifestoes, policy documents (and responses, for example from trade unions and 
professional organisations), speeches, bills and legislation. My analysis of discourse 
primarily follows John B. Thompson’s depth hermeneutics approach. This involves 
determining the socio-historical conditions in which discourse is produced,306 
undertaking a discursive analysis (for example, of the narratives and the 
argumentative and syntactic structures within discourse)307 and reconnecting 
discourse to relations of domination.308 I also undertake what Williams described as 
an authentic historical analysis309 by identifying the presence of dominant, residual 
and emergent norms. 
 
I begin with Labour’s ‘NHS Plan’,310 which marked a change in direction from previous 
Labour party policy, particularly regarding the involvement of the private sector in 
healthcare. Labour subsequently instituted a mimic-market in secondary care, thereby 
diverting resources away from patient’s needs. I examine Labour’s justifications for 
                                                          
Nuffield Trust) and Health Foundation (see: Timmins, N. and Davies, E. (eds) (2015) Glaziers and 
Window Breakers: The role of the Secretary of State for Health in their own words. London: Health 
Foundation) publications. 
305 Who has written about the reforms during his tenure. See: Crisp, N. (2011) 24 hours to save the 
NHS: The Chief Executives Account of Reform 2000 to 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
306 Thompson, J. (1984) Studies in the Theory of Ideology, op cit., n.82 at p11. 
307 Ibid at pp136-137. 
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309 Williams, R. (1977) Marxism and Literature, op cit., n.124 at p121. 
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this by analysing general policy documents311 and speeches312 and numerous 
documents concerning specific policies, such as independent sector treatment centres 
(ISTCs),313 foundation trusts (FTs),314 commissioning,315 patient choice316 and 
competition.317 In respect of FTs, I also examine Alan Milburn’s speech at the second 
reading of the relevant legislation in the House of Commons. In addition, I scrutinise 
legislation which implemented such policies, such as the Health and Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) Act (2003). I also examine relevant documents 
regarding the creation of polyclinics,318 which afforded private companies increased 
opportunities within primary care, and those concerning emergent norms, such as the 
reduction of health inequalities319 and patient and public involvement.320  
                                                          
311 Such as Department of Health (2002) Delivering the NHS Plan. Next Steps on Investment, Next 
Steps on Reform. London: Stationery Office/ Department of Health (DOH) (2004) The NHS 
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Health (DOH) (2007) Health Reform in England: Update and Next Steps. London: DOH. 
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Community Services. London: DOH/Darzi, A. (2007) Healthcare for London: A Framework for Action. 
London: NHS London/Darzi, A. (2007) Our NHS, Our Future. NHS Next Stage Review: Interim 
Report. London: Department of Health/Department of Health (DOH) (2008) High Quality Care for all: 
NHS Next Stage Review Final Report. London: DOH. 
319 Such as Department of Health (DOH) (2003) Tackling Health Inequalities: A Programme for Action. 
London: DOH. 
320 Such as Department of Health (DOH) (2006) A stronger local voice: A framework for creating a 
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I investigate Conservative policy prior to the 2010 general election by examining its 
legislative proposals321 and David Cameron’s 2006 Kings Fund speech.322 I examine 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s broad approach to public services, 
which included diversifying provision (which undermines risk pooling and cross 
subsidy within the NHS), by studying its programme for government323 and the ‘Open 
Public Services White Paper’.324 I investigate the coalition’s specific NHS reform 
proposals by analysing the white paper ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’,325 
and the government’s response to consultations.326 There was a legislative pause as 
the Health and Social Care (HSC) Bill proceeded through parliament. I examine the 
reports of the NHS Future Forum (NHSFF),327 which conducted a listening exercise 
during the pause, and the coalition’s response to such reports.328 I also scrutinise 
speeches329 and articles330 defending the coalition’s reforms. In chapter six, I examine 
the main provisions of the Health and Social Care (HSC) Act (2012), which has 
strengthened neo-liberal norms and undermines residual norms within healthcare. I 
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also analyse policy documents relating to the information strategy that has been 
adopted331 and relevant publications of national NHS bodies (in particular, recent 
documents compiled by NHS England focusing on integration332).  
 
I assess whether the reforms have extended identity thinking (for example, by 
expanding the exchange principle) and instrumental rationality (by assessing relevant 
academic literature to determine whether the means adopted in NHS governance have 
become ends in themselves). In assessing the potentially depoliticising effects of the 
reforms, I examine relevant academic literature, parliamentary debates and 
newspaper articles333 to determine whether issues have been, or are, politically 
contested. I also study relevant parliamentary debates and scrutiny (for example, 
select committee reports), academic critiques and media reports to evaluate 
implementation, opposition and resistance. In gauging public opinion, I rely on relevant 
surveys and opinion polls. I agree with Vicente Navarro that although academics must 
be cautious in relying on polls (for example, as responses may be influenced by 
phrasing) ‘‘they can still help us understand what people want’’.334 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
331 For example, Department of Health (DOH) (2012) The Power of Information: Putting all of us in 
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In this chapter, I provided a concise overview of Marxist political philosophy, which 
informs the method (ideology critique) employed within this dissertation. Marxist legal 
theorists have sought to resolve problems relating to the base and superstructure 
metaphor (which I rejected) and how the law is determined. I analysed positive 
conceptions of ideology (for example, it has been conceived as a political tradition, a 
type of social cement and the ideas of a particular group) and negative conceptions 
(in which it is conceived as involving misrepresentations or mystification). Collins and 
Moxon utilised the former to explain how the law is determined. I argue that the current 
hegemonic ideology of neo-liberalism has influenced the examined reforms along with 
a posited micro-ideology of private healthcare companies. Nonetheless, neo-
liberalism competes with residual and emergent forms. I outlined the modes (and their 
strategies) which may be employed in justifying reforms, which I identify in subsequent 
chapters. I also examined several modes of reification which may generate 
estrangement. In addition, I considered and repudiated criticisms of the concept of 
ideology.   
 
In subsequent chapters, I analyse successive government reforms to the English NHS, 
since the year 2000, which have marketized the service and afforded private 
companies more opportunities to deliver clinical services. Such reforms are indicative 
of the third phase of neo-liberalism identified by Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, namely 
roll-out-neo-liberalism,335 which involves the state more actively using social policy to 
support capital.336 In facilitating profit-making from publicly funded services337 such 
                                                          
335 Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) ‘Neoliberalizing Space’. Antipode, Vol.34(3), pp380-404 at p389. 
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reforms redistribute wealth to the affluent338 and may prove antagonistic to human 
need339 as they undermine risk pooling and cross subsidy within the NHS, which have 
been important in its organisation on the basis of need.340 There are four main strands 
to the analytical framework that I employ to analyse the successive reforms in the 
following chapters. Firstly, I assess the influence of the dominant ideology of neo-
liberalism on the policies of successive governments (specifically healthcare policy 
and reform), primarily by reviewing political science literature. I also assess the 
influence of the posited micro-ideology of private healthcare companies on the 
reforms, through mechanisms such as direct advice, lobbying and the establishment 
of financial links with politicians and think tanks, by reviewing relevant literature (such 
as pertinent newspaper articles and critiques of the reforms by opponents, such as 
academics and trade unions). Secondly, I employ the ideological modes and strategies 
delineated by John B. Thompson,341 in analysing relevant policy documents, articles 
and speeches, to identify the justifications for the reforms (for example, that such 
reforms would enhance quality and efficiency) in government discourse. I assess 
whether such justifications were contested and whether they are borne out in reality 
(for example, by reviewing relevant academic literature to determine whether such 
reforms have improved quality or efficiency). I also employ the authentic historical 
analysis advocated by Williams342 to assess the presence (and potential undermining) 
of dominant, residual and emergent norms343 in government and public discourse and 
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legislation. In addition, I utilise residual and emergent norms as bases for conceiving 
alternatives to dominant neo-liberal norms. 
 
Thirdly, I assess whether the reforms have translated neo-liberal political rationality 
into practice, taking into account Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham’s insight that this 
involves attempt, incompleteness and resistance.344 Fourthly, I assess the attempts of 
successive governments to reify both health and healthcare through various 
strategies. Such reification may cause estrangement, which, as Torrance noted, is the 
opposite of solidarity,345 which was important in the creation and maintenance of the 
NHS. Such reifiying strategies include the modes identified by Adorno, of which the 
two I employ are philosophical reification (identity thinking), for example through the 
extension of the exchange principle, the use of indicators and government efforts to 
interpellate patients as consumers (which is also indicative of the standardization 
strategy of the unification mode of ideology identified by Thompson346), and social 
reification (which refers to means, such as targets and markets, becoming ends in 
themselves).347 In addition, I assess the potential for legal changes to reify social 
relations through what Kennedy described as law’s ‘‘legitimation effect’’.348 I also 
assess the success of government attempts to reify both health and healthcare 
through the strategies of depoliticization identified by Jessop, such as through efforts 
to shift the boundary between the political and non-political (for example, through 
marketization and juridification349), the re-organisation of the political division of labour 
                                                          
344 Hunt, A. and Wickham, G. (1994) Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of law as Governance. 
London: Pluto, pp102-104. 
345 Torrance, J. (1977) Estrangement, Alienation and Exploitation, op cit., n.207 at p315. 
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348 Kennedy, D. (1997) A Critique of Adjudication, op cit., n.220 at p236. 
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(which Flinders and Buller describe as institutional depoliticisation350), constitutional 
law (such as the new constitutionalism identified by Gill351), the use of ostensibly non-
political figures to make recommendations and governmentalization (such as through 
efforts to self-responsibilise citizens, for example in respect of health, and through the 
creation of conditions for technocratic decision making).352 
 
 
                                                          
350 Flinders, M. and Buller, J. (2005) ‘Depoliticisation, Democracy and Arena Shifting’, op cit., n.262 at 
p6. 
351 Gill, S. (2008) Power and Resistance in the new world order, op cit., n.273 at p79. 
352 Jessop, B. (2015) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation’, op cit., n.259 at pp101-106. 
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Chapter Three: New Labour and the NHS (Part One) 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, and the following three, I analyse the NHS reforms of successive 
governments. I assess the impact of such reforms on norms within, and the 
organisation of, the NHS. I contend that such reforms divert resources away from 
patient needs to market bureaucracies and the coffers of private companies. I evaluate 
the success of the strategies employed to legitimate and obscure such distributive 
effects.  In this chapter and the next, I evaluate the influences on, and the ideas that 
motivated and sought to legitimise the policies and legal changes of, the Labour 
governments (1997-2010) regarding the NHS. I also consider the opposition and 
resistance to, and potential reifying effects of, Labour’s reforms. In this chapter, I 
examine the influence of neo-liberalism and private healthcare companies on ‘New’ 
Labour’s policies. The reforms analysed within this chapter are the private finance 
initiative (PFI), the ‘NHS Plan’, the creation of Independent Sector Treatment Centres 
(ISTCs) and changes to the mechanisms for patient and public involvement. New 
Labour utilised numerous ideological modes (and their strategies) to justify its NHS 
reforms. It sought to portray them as being in the interests of everyone (taxpayers and 
patients) by stating they would enhance quality and value for money. New Labour 
claimed to be pragmatic, but exuded a preference for the private sector. It sought to 
decontest the meanings of terms, such as ‘quality’ and ‘efficiency’, by linking them to 
private sector involvement. However, such terms were recontested, as critics argued 
that private sector involvement in the NHS was detrimental to quality and efficiency.  
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New Labour narrativised itself, and its reforms, as modern, and the party’s previous 
policies, and its left-wing critics, as outmoded, thereby seeking to naturalise its 
conception of modernity, in which there was no alternative within public services to the 
consumerism prevalent elsewhere within capitalist society. New Labour stated that it 
supported residual norms regarding the NHS, but its reforms undermined them, for 
example by reducing the NHS’ comprehensiveness (thereby extending the exchange 
principle). New Labour’s discourse co-opted emergent norms, such as reducing health 
inequalities and empowering patients, although the neo-liberal policies it pursued 
undermined them. As New Labour’s policies failed to effectuate some of the normative 
elements of its discourse, such norms can be used to critique its reforms and to 
conceive alternatives. New Labour’s attempts to depoliticise healthcare through the 
use of targets was unsuccessful. Targets did not cover, and were argued to have a 
detrimental effect on, rising hospital infections. Nonetheless, targets became ends to 
which patient needs were subordinated. New Labour also sought to reify health 
through its emphasis on individual responsibility. 
 
New Labour 
 
At the general election in 1997, Labour won a majority of 179 in the House of 
Commons, ending eighteen years of Conservative government. It also won the general 
elections in 2001 and 2005, at which its majorities were reduced to 166 seats and then 
sixty-six seats respectively. Labour was one of several social democratic parties which 
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returned to power across Western Europe in the late 1990s, whose ideologies and 
policies had shifted from the traditional terrain of social democracy.1 Andrew Rawnsley 
states that the trauma of four successive election defeats (1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992) 
led to a small group of modernisers at the apex of the party altering its image, 
philosophy and policies.2 Alex Callinicos contends that the modernisers exploited the 
trauma, which made a ‘‘superficial and phoney’’ alternative to the Conservatives 
attractive.3 Labour’s ‘modernisation’ began under Tony Blair’s predecessors, Neil 
Kinnock (Labour leader between 1983 and 1992) and John Smith (Labour leader 
between 1992 and 1994).4 Richard Heffernan states that the term ‘modernisation’ was 
‘‘a metaphor for the politics of catch up’’5 and that ‘‘where Thatcherism has 
led,…Kinnock, Smith and Blair followed’’.6 Thus as Colin Hay states, Labour reified 
the attitudinal preferences of voters which were viewed as a fixed constraint to which 
policy appeals must be oriented.7  
 
The party was rebranded as ‘New’ Labour, to distinguish it from what Philip Gould (a 
political consultant and adviser) described as the ‘‘dogma’’8 of ‘Old’ Labour. Although 
                                                          
1 Glyn, A. and Woods, S. (2001) ‘Economic Policy under New Labour: How Social Democratic is the 
Blair Government?’ Political Quarterly, Vol.72(1), pp50--66 at p50. 
2 Rawnsley, A. (2001) Servants of the People: The Inside Story of New Labour. London: Penguin, 
pp3-4. 
3 Callinicos, A. (1996) New Labour or Socialism. [On-line]  Available: 
https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/callinicos/1996/04/newlab.html [Accessed: 14 February 
2016]. 
4 Fairclough, N. (2000) New Labour, New Language. London: Routledge, p84/ Ludlam, S. (2004) 
‘Second Term New Labour’ in Ludlam, S. and Smith, M. (eds) Governing as New Labour: Policy and 
Politics under Blair. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp1-15 at p3. 
5 Heffernan, R. (2001) New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, p178. 
6 Ibid at p66. 
7 Hay, C. (1999) The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring under False Pretences? 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, p67. 
8 Gould, P. (1998) The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party. London: 
Little Brown, p3. 
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Steven Fielding contends that the categories of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour prevent 
comprehension of the continuities and changes within the party,9 I use the term New 
Labour as it signifies Labour’s neo-liberal incarnation.10 John Clarke notes the 
significance of residualising discourses to political projects, which tell ‘‘the time in ways 
that locate critics, refusals and alternative imaginaries as belonging to the past’’.11 He 
states that this was ‘‘a recurrent motif in New Labour discourse - indeed, time is 
inscribed into its very title’’.12 Blair contended that ideology was dead,13 although 
elsewhere he argued that Labour’s ideology was outdated.14 Labour’s 1997 manifesto 
stated that New Labour was created ‘‘to meet the challenges of a different world’’.15 It 
expressed the desire to end ‘‘the bitter political struggles of left and right’’.16 Conflicts, 
such as ‘‘public versus private, bosses versus workers, middle class versus working 
class’’ were described as having ‘‘no relevance whatsoever to the modern world’’.17 
However, Callinicos notes that Labour’s own commission on social justice revealed a 
growth of poverty and inequality undermining the notion that class divisions were 
receding.18 Blair sought to weaken Labour’s traditional trade union links ‘‘by raising 
election funding from wealthy entrepreneurs’’,19 and amended clause four of Labour’s 
                                                          
9 Fielding, S. (2003) The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘new’ Labour. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, p217. 
10 Lister, J. (2008) The NHS After 60: For Patients or Profits? London: Middlesex University Press, p5. 
11 Clarke, J. (2007) ‘Citizen Consumers and Public Service Reform: At the Limits of Neo-liberalism’. 
Policy Futures in Education, Vol.5(2), pp239-248 at p248. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Freeden, M. (1999) ‘The Ideology of New Labour’. Political Quarterly, Vol.70(1), pp42-51 at p42. 
14 Ibid at p43/Blair, T. (1995) Let us Face the Future: The 1945 Anniversary Lecture. London: Fabian 
Society, p4. 
15 Labour Party., ‘Labour Party General Election Manifesto 1997 New Labour: Because Britain 
Deserves Better’ in Dale, I. (ed) (2000) Labour Party General Election Manifestoes 1900-1997. 
London: Routledge, pp343-382 at p346. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Callinicos, A. (1996) New Labour or Socialism, op cit., n.3. 
19 Callinicos, A. (2001) Against the Third Way. Cambridge: Polity Press, p103. 
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constitution,20 to ‘‘reassure big business and the financial markets that they would be 
safe under a Labour government’’.21 
  
The third way was proclaimed as New Labour’s philosophy, although Robin Cook 
(Foreign Secretary between 1997 and 2001) stated that it was dropped once it had 
outlived its novelty.22 The notion of a third or middle way had emerged numerous times 
in the twentieth century.23 Clarke et al stated that there was little acknowledgement 
from New Labour of the long history of the notion.24 Both Norman Fairclough and 
Callinicos noted that Blair’s third way, which distinguishes between the old left and the 
new right, buried other distinctions.25 Slavoj Zizek contended that ‘‘the true message’’ 
of Blair’s third way was ‘‘that there is no second way, no actual alternative to global 
capitalism’’.26 Andrew Gamble claims that New Labour was ‘‘committed to working 
within the constraints of neo-liberalism’’.27 In this respect, New Labour accepted the 
monetarist principle that the main aim of economic policy is a stable fiscal and 
                                                          
20 The original clause committing the party to the ‘‘common ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange’’ (see Labour Party (1918) Report of the Eighteenth Annual Conference. 
London: Labour Party, p141) was amended. The party voted for a new clause, committing it to work 
for a dynamic economy ‘‘with a thriving private sector and high-quality public services where those 
undertakings essential to the common good are either owned by the public or accountable to them’’ 
(see Labour Party (1995) Annual Conference 1994; Special Conference 1995: Report of Conference. 
London: Labour Party, p307). 
21 Callinicos, A. (1996) New Labour or Socialism, op cit., n.3. 
22 Cook, R. (2003) The Point of Departure. London: Simon and Schuster, p37. 
23 Arestis, P and Sawyer, M. (2001) ‘The Economic Analysis Underlying the third way’. New Political 
Economy, Vol.6(2), pp255-278 at p255/Freeden, M. (1999) ‘The Ideology of New Labour’, op cit., n.14 
at p44. 
24 Clarke, J. et al (2000) ‘Reinventing the Welfare State’ in Clarke, J, et al (eds) New Managerialism, 
New Welfare? London: Sage, p11. 
25 Ibid/Callinicos, A. (2001) Against the Third Way, op cit., n.19 at p114. 
26 Zizek, S. (2000) The Fragile Absolute Or, Why is the Christian Legacy worth Fighting For? London: 
Verso, p62. 
27 Gamble, A. (2009) The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, p106. 
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monetary policy to keep inflation low,28 and was tax averse.29 The economy grew 
under New Labour until the onset of the Great Recession (2008-09). Hay states that 
New Labour’s neo-liberalism was normalized, as it was based on a conviction that 
continued neo-liberal reform was required to sustain ‘‘economic growth and 
competitiveness’’30 and that it’s political economy rested on an ‘‘appeal to globalisation 
as an external economic constraint’’.31 Colin Leys contends that domestic policy was 
increasingly shaped by the market forces of the global political economy.32 However, 
Hay states that there is no evidence that globalisation rendered social democratic 
governance anachronistic.33  
 
Gamble states that New Labour was akin to orthodox social democratic governments 
in respect of its substantial investment in health and education.34 Labour adhered to 
Conservative spending plans in its first two years in office.35 Consequently, although 
it had pledged to save the NHS, the underinvestment in the service was not addressed 
in those years. Nigel Crisp states that it was questionable, in 1997, whether the NHS 
could survive, as standards and public support were falling.36 In 2000, Blair pledged 
‘‘to bring health spending up to the European Union average over five years’’.37 The 
                                                          
28 Callinicos, A. (1996) New Labour or Socialism, op cit., n.3. 
29 Shaw, E. (2007) Losing Labour’s Soul? New Labour and the Blair Government 1997-2007. 
Abingdon: Routledge, p157. 
30 Hay, C. (2005) ‘The Normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional embedding of 
neo-liberalism’. Economy and Society, Vol.33(4), pp500-527 at pp503-504. 
31 Ibid at p519. 
32 Leys, C. (2001) Market Driven Politics. London: Verso, p6. 
33 Hay argues that states which violated the policy strictures associated with globalisation had 
attracted more foreign direct investment. See Hay, C. (2007) Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, p131. 
34 Gamble, A. (2010) ‘New Labour and Political Change’. Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.63(4), pp639-652 
at p649. 
35 Klein, R. (2008) The New Politics of the NHS. Abingdon: Radcliffe, p189. 
36 Crisp, N. (2011) 24 hours to save the NHS: The Chief Executives Account of Reform 2000 to 2006. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p1. 
37 Rawnsley, A. (2001) Servants of the People, op cit., n.2 at p337.  
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pledge was re-affirmed within the ‘NHS Plan’ and Derek Wanless’ report for the 
Treasury.38 Consequently, Rorden Wilkinson described New Labour’s philosophy as 
‘‘a kind of socialised neo-liberalism’’.39 Similarly, Robin Gauld states that healthcare 
policy in the UK, and elsewhere, has been influenced by socialised neo-liberalism.40 
Stuart Hall described New Labour as a hybrid, consisting of a dominant neo-liberal 
strand and a subordinate social democratic strand, necessary to maintain the loyalty 
of traditional supporters.41 New Labour drew a distinction between persistent values 
and the changing means (such as markets) of enacting them in the modern world.42 
New Labour superficially articulated residual and emergent norms, which its neo-
liberal policies undermined. Catherine Needham argues that New Labour did not 
critically engage with the fundamental contradictions between the state and the 
market.43 Fairclough states that it sought ‘‘to reconcile in language what cannot be 
reconciled in reality’’.44 New Labour claimed to be pragmatic and interested in what 
works.45 Blair stated that values had to be applied to ‘‘a changing world’’ and that what 
counted was what worked.46 However, Clarke argues that far from being ‘pragmatic’, 
New Labour valorised the private, for example, by portraying the private sector as a 
site of dynamic innovation.47 
                                                          
38 Wanless, D. (2002) Securing our Future Health: Taking a Long-Term View Final Report. London: 
HM Treasury, p119. 
39 Wilkinson, R. (2000) ‘New Labour and the Global Economy’ in Coates, D. and Lawler, P. (eds) New 
Labour in Power. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp136-148 at p138. 
40 Gauld, R. (2009) The New Health Policy. Maidenhead: Open University Press, p153. 
41 Hall, S. (2005) ‘New Labour’s Double Shuffle’. Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural 
Studies, Vol.27(4), pp319-335 at p329.  
42 Clarke, J. et al (2007) ‘Creating Citizen-Consumers? Public Service Reform and (Un)willing Selves’ 
in Massen, S. and Sutter, B. (eds) On Willing Selves: Neo-liberal Politics vis-à-vis the Neuro-scientific 
Challenge. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp125-145 at p130. 
43 Needham, C. (2003) Citizen-Consumers: New Labour’s Marketplace Democracy. London: Catalyst 
Forum, p25. 
44 Fairclough, N. (2000) New Labour, New Language, op cit., n.4 at p158.  
45 Finlayson, A. (2003) Making Sense of New Labour. London: Lawrence and Wishart, p8. 
46 Blair, T., ‘In defence of Blairism, by Tony Blair’, Spectator, 09 December 2015. 
47 Clarke, J. (2004) ‘Dissolving the Public Realm? The Logics and Limits of Neo-liberalism’. Journal of 
Social Policy, Vol.33(1), pp27-48 at p42. 
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Peter Burnham described Blair’s statecraft as the politics of depoliticisation.48  
Burnham states that that this was evident in New Labour’s reassignment of tasks to 
ostensibly non-political bodies (for example, making the Bank of England operationally 
independent in respect of monetary policy49) and its attempt to restructure the public 
sector in line with new public management (NPM).50 New Labour did not remove 
NPM,51 rather, as Hall contended, its market fundamentalism became ‘‘the new 
common sense’’.52 However, Sue Dopson et al contend that there was a shift to looser 
more network based models of management typical of network governance.53 The 
terms ‘‘partnership’’54 and ‘‘collaboration’’55 were important in New Labour’s 
governance. Labour had promised to abolish the Conservative’s internal market (on 
the basis that it represented a bureaucratic waste56) but ‘‘cosmetically’’ removed some 
of its features57 (such as GP fundholding58) and retained the split between purchasers 
and providers, which was ‘‘renamed commissioning’’.59 Calum Paton contends that 
Labour retained the split to convince ‘‘the right-wing press that they were not ‘Old 
                                                          
48 Burnham, P. (2001) ‘New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation’. British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Vol.3(2), pp127-149 at p128.   
49 Ibid/Bank of England Act (1946), S.4(1) as amended by Bank of England Act (1998), S.10. 
50 Ibid at p139.  
51 Driver, S. (2008) ‘New Labour and Social Policy’ in Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds) Ten Years of New 
Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp50-67 at p57. 
52 Hall, S. (2005) ‘New Labour’s Double Shuffle’, op cit., n.41 at p328. 
53 Dopson, S. et al (2012) ‘Organisational Networks- Can they deliver improvements in health care?’ in 
Dickinson, H. and Mannion, R. (eds) The Reform of Healthcare: Adapting and Resisting Policy 
Developments. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp91-108 at p93. 
54 Dickinson, H. (2014) Performing Governance: Partnership, Culture and New Labour. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, p1. 
55 Paton, C. (2006) New Labour’s State of Health: Political Economy, Public Policy and the NHS. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, p60.  
56 Greener, I. et al (2014) Reforming Healthcare: What’s the Evidence? Bristol: Polity Press, p40. 
57 Bradshaw, P. and Bradshaw, G. (2004) Health Policy for Healthcare Professionals. London: Sage, 
p32.  
58 Health Act (1999), S.1. 
59 Timmins, N. (2012) Never Again? The Story of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. London: Kings 
Fund and Institute for Government, p21. 
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Labour’ statists’’.60 Commissioning was given to 481 Primary Care Groups (PCGs) 
which contained an inbuilt majority of doctors.61 PCGs evolved over time into Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs).62 In 2006, the number of PCTs was reduced from 303 to 152. 
The NHS Executive was dissolved and Health Authorities were reorganised into 
twenty-eight Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs)63 (reduced to ten in 2006). Jo Maybin 
et al note that top-down management from SHAs was the principal means of 
accountability for PCTs.64 There was concern about the lack of democratic control 
over PCTs. For example, Kate Hoey (Labour MP for Vauxhall since 1989) asked Alan 
Milburn (Secretary of State for Health between 1999 and 2003) why PCTs were not 
elected.65 Milburn’s response was that PCTs were ‘‘not at a suitable stage of 
development’’.66 This implied that PCTs could be elected in the future, but this never 
occurred. 
 
Private Finance Initiative 
 
The legal and financial obstacles to PFI schemes (which the Conservatives introduced 
in 1993), which were renamed public private partnerships (PPPs), were removed 
                                                          
60 Paton, C. (2016) The Politics of Health Policy Reform in the UK: England’s Permanent Revolution. 
London: Palgrave, p40. 
61 Paton, C. (1999) ‘New Labour’s Healthcare Policy: The New Healthcare State’ in Powell, M. (ed) 
New Labour, New Welfare State? The Third Way in British Social Policy. Bristol: Polity Press, pp51-76 
at p64. 
62 Paton, C. (2002) ‘Cheques and Checks: New Labour’s Record on the NHS’ in Powell, M. (ed) 
Evaluating New Labour’s Welfare Reforms. Bristol: Polity Press, pp127-144 at p128. 
63 National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions (NHSRHCP) Act (2002), S.1. 
64 Maybin, J. et al (2011) Accountability in the NHS: Implications of the government’s reform 
programme. London: Kings Fund, p13. 
65 H.C. Deb. 7 May 2003 Vol.404, Col.704. 
66 Ibid. 
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following Labour’s election67 and a Private Finance Panel, which advised the 
government, was replaced by a taskforce composed of industry representatives.68 The 
UK played a prominent role in developing PPP policy and spreading it elsewhere.69 
PPPs removed capital investment from the government account, thereby reducing the 
public sector borrowing requirement.70 Milburn’s dictum ‘‘PFI or bust’’71 reified PPPs 
as the only way to build new infrastructure. By 2007, sixty-three PPP schemes were 
completed and twenty-two were under construction, while twenty-one publicly funded 
schemes had been sanctioned.72 In primary care, 188 clinics and GP surgeries were 
built or were under construction, by 2007, through the Local Improvement Finance 
Trust (LIFT) programme which introduced private finance.73 As PPPs were generally 
classified as procurement transactions, procurement law applied.74 PPP schemes 
involve an availability fee (construction costs, interest) and facilities management 
(cleaning, lighting, etc.).75 The buildings were leased to the public sector for periods 
between twenty-five and thirty-five years, following which they would revert to public 
control.76 As mentioned in chapter two, where the state opens up arenas to private 
capital accumulation, this may prove antagonistic to human need.77 In this respect, the 
profits of private companies took precedence over local people’s needs in the 
                                                          
67 Shaw, E. (2007) Losing Labour’s Soul?, op cit., n.29 at p82. 
68 Monbiot, G. (2000) Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain. London: Pan Books, p86. 
69 Willems, T. and van Dooren, W. (2016) ‘(De)politicisation dynamics in Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP): Lessons from a Comparison between UK and Flemish PPP policy’. Public Management 
Review, Vol.18(2), pp199-220 at p210. 
70 Paton, C. (2006) New Labour’s State of Health, op cit., n.55 at p80. 
71 Brindle, D., ‘Budget 2: £1.3bn private finance for NHS hospitals’. Guardian, 4 July 1997.   
72 Thorlby, R. and Maybin, J. (2007) Health and Ten Years of Labour Government. London: Kings 
Fund, p8. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Braun, P. (2001) ‘The Practical Impact of EU Public Procurement Law on PFI Procurement in the 
United Kingdom’. [On-line] Available: 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/phdtheses/phd_peter_braun_.pdf [Accessed: 5 
December 2016].  
75 Mohan, J. (2002) Planning, Markets and Hospitals. London: Routledge, p206. 
76 Shaw, E. (2007) Losing Labour’s Soul?, op cit., n.29 at p82. 
77 Harvey, D. (2014) Seventeen Contradictions and the end of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p23. 
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development of PPPs.  For example, George Monbiot noted that a leaked report 
concerning a scheme in Coventry indicated that it was devised to facilitate profit for 
private companies rather than to meet local needs.78 The length of PPP contracts also 
constrained the government’s ability to respond flexibly to changing health needs.79 
Monbiot contended that PPP costs were inflated to attract private investors.80 For 
example, the costs of a new hospital in Worcester escalated by 188 percent during 
PFI negotiations resulting in beds being cut in nearby Kidderminster.81 At the 2001 
general election, Dr Richard Taylor (of the Health Concern party) was elected as MP 
for Wyre Forest as he promised to reverse such cuts.  
 
Although ministers rationalized that PPPs would ‘‘bring money from the private sector 
into the’’ NHS, Monbiot noted that it would ‘‘instead drain money from the health 
service into the private sector’’.82 For example, some private companies were given 
subsidies through the ability of PFI consortia to sell off surplus land.83 The government 
also rationalized that PPPs transferred risk to the private sector. Michael Meacher 
described this as a ‘mirage’, as governments would have little alternative but to bail 
out PFI contractors that went bankrupt.84 Leys and Player state that PPPs were 
lucrative ‘‘for a host of banks, private equity financiers, construction companies and 
facilities management providers’’.85 However, John Lister notes that this meant that 
less money remained ‘‘to treat patients, pay clinical staff and develop modern, 
                                                          
78 Monbiot, G. (2000) Captive State, op cit., n.68 at p70. 
79 Ibid at p86/Meacher, M., ‘Picking up the tabs for the PFI’, Times, 14 December 2004. 
80 Monbiot, G. (2000) Captive State, op cit., n.68 at p76. 
81 Pollock, A. et al (2001) Public Services and the Private Sector: A Response to the IPPR. London: 
Catalyst, p37.  
82 Monbiot, G. (2000) Captive State, op cit., n.68 at p78. 
83 Ibid at p77. 
84 Meacher, M., ‘Picking up the tabs for the PFI’, op cit., n.79.    
85 Leys, C. and Player, S. (2011) The Plot Against the NHS. Pontypool: Merlin, p72. 
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appropriate services’’.86 Allyson Pollock et al state that PPPs entailed major reductions 
‘‘in service provision, acute bed capacity, and clinical staffing’’.87 Mark Hellowell 
contends that trusts with PFI are more likely to run into financial difficulties.88 For 
example, he notes that two large PFI contracts were an important contributing factor 
to the problems at South London Healthcare NHS Trust, which was dissolved in 
2013.89 PFI schemes have cost £301 billion for capital worth £54.7 billion.90 The 
depoliticising dynamics of PPPs were that ministers lost direct control and parliament 
and citizens lost oversight and influence.91 Peter Vincent-Jones argues that PFI may 
not have been adopted if there had been more scrutiny, consultation and debate.92 
The schemes generated controversy and criticism in academia and the press93 and 
were opposed by Labour backbenchers (such as Meacher and John McDonnell94) and 
trade unions (which passed a motion criticising them at Labour’s annual conference in 
200295). However, unions engaged with schemes locally and negotiated for deals 
nationally.96  
 
                                                          
86 Lister, J. (2008) The NHS After 60, op cit., n.10 at p257. 
87 Pollock, A. et al., ‘Planning the new NHS: Downsizing for the 21st Century’. British Medical Journal 
1999; 319: 179. 
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89 Ibid at p6. 
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NHS Plan 
 
New Labour stated, in its first term, that there would be ‘‘no return to the old centralised 
command and control system in the NHS’’.97 Rudolf Klein contends that this system 
had never existed, and that, in 1997, the NHS was a ‘‘conglomerate of local services 
rather than a national one’’.98 Klein states that Labour sought to change this by 
creating ‘‘powerful instruments of central control’’.99 For example, National Service 
Frameworks (NSFs) were developed, the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) 
was created to assess the clinical performance of NHS hospitals100 and the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE)101 was established to diffuse and promote 
evidence regarding good practice to NHS bodies making decisions about 
medicines.102 Klein avers that by the end of Blair’s premiership, the NHS had moved 
to a ‘‘pluralistic mimic-market model’’.103 Gauld notes that following the year 2000, 
                                                          
97 Department of Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable. London: Department of Health. 
98 Klein, R. (2008) The New Politics of the NHS , op cit., n.35 at pp206-207. 
99 Ibid at p207. 
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competition and choice were gradually reintroduced.104 Both Blair and Crisp state that 
radical changes began with the ‘NHS Plan’.105 
 
The ‘NHS Plan’, published by the Department of Health in 2000, following 
consultations with the public and NHS staff, outlined the government’s NHS plans for 
the decade ahead. The authors included Milburn106 and Simon Stevens (a policy 
advisor).107 Much of the plan was implemented via the Health and Social Care (HSC) 
Act (2001) and the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions 
(NHSRHCP) Act (2002). The preface to the ‘NHS Plan’ contained twenty-five 
signatures of endorsement108 from the agents of numerous professional organisations 
and trade unions including the British Medical Association (BMA), Royal College of 
Nursing (RCN), Royal College of GPs (RCGP), Royal College of Midwives (RCW) and 
UNISON. Nonetheless, the plan was criticised by journalists (such as Monbiot109) and 
the Socialist Health Association (formerly the Socialist Medical Association).110 The 
concordat that it announced with the private sector provoked criticism from Labour 
backbenchers, such as Tony Benn, who stated that it represented ‘‘the privatisation of 
the NHS’’,111 and public sector trade unions, who feared that it would worsen staff 
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shortages.112 The ‘NHS Plan’ also announced the development of a new generation 
of Diagnostic and Treatment Centres (the first generation began in 1999) in 
partnership with the private sector.113 These were subsequently renamed ISTCs. 
 
The ‘NHS Plan’ re-affirmed the aforementioned commitment to increase NHS 
investment. Between 2000/01 and 2007/08 there was an average annual growth rate 
in health spending of 7.8 percent, moving the UK closer to the European average.114 
However, capacity decreased with a fall in the average daily number of available beds 
in NHS hospitals in England of over 23,000 between 1997 and 2006-07.115 The plan 
stated that there would be an increase in NHS staff but, although increases were 
achieved,116 the UK continued to have fewer doctors and nurses per head than many 
European states.117 Labour established a Royal Commission on long-term care for the 
elderly (the Sutherland Commission), which, in 1999, recommended that long-term 
care costs should be divided into personal care (which should be free), living and 
housing costs.118 The recommendation was implemented in Scotland119 but not in 
England, where health services continued to be transferred from the NHS to local 
authorities, which could charge for care.120 In 2006, it was estimated that 40,000 
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people a year had to sell their homes to afford long-term care.121 The ‘NHS Plan’ 
contained proposals for developing intermediate care.122 Michael Mandelstam 
described this as ‘‘a cover under which vulnerable people with very considerable 
needs may be denied appropriate and effective healthcare’’.123 According to 
Mandelstam, by 2005 it was clear that many intermediate care services were not 
adequately funded to meet needs124 and that the increase in intermediate care beds 
in residential homes did not match the number of NHS rehabilitation beds closed.125 
In 2001, Labour announced a policy of free nursing care. Mandelstam states that this 
was ‘‘set up deliberately as a vehicle for removing [the more extensive] free NHS 
care’’.126 Thus although New Labour stated that it was committed to persistent values, 
including the NHS’ founding principles, its reforms reduced the comprehensiveness of 
the service, thereby extending the ambit of the exchange principle (indicative of the 
identity thinking mode of reification). 
 
Performance Management 
 
Mark Exworthy et al contend that the ‘NHS Plan’ instigated performance management 
in the NHS, with performance not simply being measured, but actively managed.127 
Gwyn Bevan and Christopher Hood described New Labour’s NHS management 
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regime as one ‘‘of targets and terror’’.128 New Labour installed numerous targets, such 
as reducing waits for outpatient and inpatient appointments129 and ending long waits 
(over four hours) in accident and emergency (A&E).130 A traffic light scheme (later 
renamed a star rating system) of earned autonomy was introduced.131 Providers which 
performed well in relation to targets gained more autonomy. For example, after 2003, 
hospitals with three star ratings could apply to become Foundation Trusts (FTs), while 
many zero star hospitals (such as Good Hope Hospital in Birmingham) were 
franchised out.132 As mentioned in chapter two, indicators are indicative of identity 
thinking and have been criticised for evincing a preference for superficial 
knowledge.133 The reliability of the star rating system was questioned by the Health 
Committee, which noted the instability in its results.134 The star rating system was 
ultimately abolished and replaced by a framework of national standards overseen by 
the Healthcare Commission.135 In 2004, the quality and outcomes framework (QOF) 
for GP practices was introduced, with budgets being determined by performance.136 
Alan Maynard contended that although QOF cost over a billion pounds, there was no 
evidence of any resulting health gain.137 Carwyn Langdown and Stephen Peckham 
note that evidence is limited, due to methodological quality, but suggests that QOF led 
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to improvements in health outcomes for some conditions, such as diabetes, although 
the results were mixed for others.138 
 
Crisp states that targets were advantageous as some (such as cardiac targets) helped 
to save lives and England improved faster than devolved areas (which adopted targets 
after England).139 However, Crisp conceded that there were too many targets, that 
some were badly conceived and designed140 and that a vital target, infection control, 
was absent from the ‘NHS Plan’.141 Patrick Diamond notes that targets augment the 
core executive’s power by enabling it to increase pressure on departmental 
ministers.142 Targets may also depoliticise healthcare by transferring responsibility to 
front line agencies.143 If targets are not achieved, governments may attribute this to 
organisational failures. However, Diamond notes that where targets are missed, 
‘‘responsibility quickly reattaches itself to ministers’’.144 Similarly, Clarke argued that 
the public continued to view responsibility for service provision (and service failures) 
as located with government.145 Rises in infections, such as methicillin-
resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and clostridium difficile, within English 
hospitals, which some attributed to targets,146 politicised healthcare provision. Some 
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targets became ends in themselves, and led to gaming,147 with negative 
consequences for patients. For example, Mandelstam noted that the four hour A&E 
target ‘‘often led to chaos and substandard care’’ in other hospital departments.148 
Research indicates that targets engendered a culture of performance, in which 
‘‘clinical priorities were subsumed in the need to meet particular indicators’’,149 and 
blame, which discouraged co-operative working.150  
 
In contrast to their Conservative predecessor’s avoidance of the term inequality, New 
Labour set itself the target of reducing health inequalities.151 It commissioned the 
Acheson report into health inequalities, which recommended a multi-faceted 
approach, including reducing income inequalities.152 However, as Katherine Smith et 
al note, New Labour sought to address poverty but not reduce key material 
inequalities.153 Schemes such as Sure Start (centres offering families support) and 
Health Action Zones (HAZs) were adopted, extra resources were allocated to deprived 
areas and public service agreement (PSA) targets were set.154 Although early 
analyses indicated that health inequalities continued to widen,155 a study based on 
more recent data suggests that Labour’s strategies reduced geographical health 
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inequalities in life expectancy.156 However, despite the correlation of ‘‘health 
inequalities with income inequality’’,157 the latter became a non-issue for New 
Labour.158 Ultimately, addressing wealth inequalities would be necessary to tackle 
health inequalities.  
 
Kevin Morell states that the notion that patients have a moral duty to take responsibility 
for their own health was another normative element within New Labour’s health policy 
literature.159 For example, ‘Tackling Health Inequalities’ stated that individuals ‘‘have 
to be responsible for their own health…by making appropriate and informed lifestyle 
choices’’.160 Jennie Popay and Gareth Williams state that New Labour’s early interest 
in socio-economic determinants regressed to an emphasis on behaviour change ‘‘no 
less focused on personal responsibility than the policies of the Thatcher years’’.161 
Although New Labour did not completely abrogate its responsibilities in promoting 
healthier lifestyles (for example, it adopted public health measures, such as a smoking 
ban in public places162) it failed to tackle income and wealth inequalities.  New Labour’s 
moral rhetoric (designed to depoliticise health by portraying it as each individual’s 
responsibility), together with its attempts to interpellate patients as consumers, 
increasingly individualised health with the result that disease may become reified, its 
                                                          
156 Barr, B. et al, ‘Investigating the impact of the English health inequalities strategy: time trend 
analysis’. British Medical Journal 2017; 358:J3310.  
157 Paton, C. (1999) ‘New Labour’s Healthcare Policy’, op cit., n.61 at pp68-69. 
158 Mullard, M. and Swaray, R. (2008) ‘New Labour and Public Expenditure’ in Beech, M. and Lee, S. 
(eds) Ten Years of New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp35-49 at p49.  
159 Morrell, K. (2006) ‘Policy as Narrative: New Labour’s Reform of the National Health Service’. Public 
Administration, Vol.84(2), pp367-385 at p381. 
160 Department of Health (DOH) (2003) Tackling Health Inequalities: A Programme for Action. London: 
DOH, p45.  
161 Popay, J. and Williams, G. (2009) ‘Equalizing the people’s health: A Sociological Perspective’ in 
Gabe, J. and Calnan, M. (eds) The New Sociology of the Health Service. Abingdon: Routledge, 
pp222-245 at p235. 
162 Health Act (2006), S.2. 
138 
 
social causes neglected and support for a universal and comprehensive system 
undermined. Distinguishing between responsible and irresponsible patients is 
indicative of the differentiation strategy of the ideological mode of fragmentation. It is 
often argued that patients deemed to have been irresponsible, such as the obese, 
should be denied NHS treatment.163 Such arguments ignore the social causes of 
obesity. Ted Schrecker and Clare Bambra contend that obesity, rates of which have 
doubled in the UK in the neo-liberal era,164 is, along with stress, austerity and 
inequality, a neo-liberal epidemic.165 Deborah Prainsack and Alena Buyx note that 
references to lifestyle and personal responsibility are an ‘‘arbitrary choice among a 
myriad of risks that affect health’’ and flawed tools for priority setting.166 Although New 
Labour’s discourse focused on personal responsibility, Clarke et al’s qualitative 
research indicated that the idea that autonomy and independence necessitated 
responsibility had not ‘‘effectively colonised common sense’’ as respondents kept alive 
complex discourses about inequalities and the challenges that they posed for public 
services.167  
 
Private Sector 
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Hall stated that ‘‘nothing-however good or necessary’’ was allowed to happen under 
New Labour without ‘‘another dose of reform’’.168 The ‘NHS Plan’, stated that 
increased NHS investment ‘‘had to be accompanied by increased reform’’,169 
provoking anger among socialists and social democrats within the Labour party.170 In 
Labour’s first term, Blair wrote that ‘‘creating the NHS was the greatest act of 
modernisation ever achieved by a Labour government’’.171 However, the meanings of 
terms, such as ‘reform’ and ‘modernisation’, shifted in New Labour’s discourse to 
mean marketization and privatisation.172 Fairclough avers that the term modernisation 
presents ‘‘highly contentious changes…as if they were purely technical and value-free 
updatings’’.173 The use of such terms was thus indicative of the euphemization 
strategy of the ideological mode of dissimulation.174 The plan stated that both the 
private and voluntary sectors had ‘‘a role to play in ensuring that NHS patients get the 
full benefit from’’ extra investment.175  
 
The narrative176 justifying such reforms, in New Labour’s policy documents, was that 
society had changed177 and that the NHS was outmoded and also needed to 
change.178 Such change was presented as a self-evident necessity,179 and a moral 
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duty, as it was required to ensure that money was spent wisely.180 According to the 
‘NHS Plan’, the NHS was ‘‘too much the product of the era in which it was born’’ in 
respect of ‘‘its buildings, its ways of working, [and] its very culture’’, in contrast to ‘‘the 
rest of society [which] has moved on’’.181 The plan noted that banks afforded 
customers twenty-four hour access to services in 2000 (compared to being open 
between 10am and 3pm in 1948), that society was more multicultural and diverse and 
that women constituted nearly half of the workforce (compared to a third in 1948).182 
The facts that NHS opening hours had never been restricted and that women and 
ethnic minorities were highly represented in the healthcare sector,183 were ignored. 
The average age of NHS buildings was older than the NHS itself in 1997, but by 2005 
less than a quarter of its buildings were that old.184 The plan recognised the problems 
identified by the emerging consciousness (mentioned in chapter one) that ‘‘in 1948, 
deference and hierarchy defined the relationships between citizens and services’’.185 
The plan proposed to alter the mechanisms for patient and public involvement, but 
New Labour began to prioritise choice (as opposed to voice) to empower patients.   
 
The plan sought to naturalise186 the relationship between patients and the NHS as one 
between consumers and a service. It emphasised that ‘‘we live in a consumer age’’ 
and that ‘‘today, successful services thrive on their ability to respond to the individual 
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needs of their customers’’.187 According to the plan, in the ‘‘era of mass production, 
needs were regarded as identical and preferences were ignored’’.188 The NHS had 
‘‘been too slow’’, the plan stated, ‘‘to change its ways of working to meet modern 
patient expectations for fast, convenient, twenty-four hour, personalised care’’.189 
Clarke and Newman aver that New Labour’s discourse concerning modernisation 
attempted to ‘‘close off possible alternative forms of ‘being modern’’’ and ‘‘to enforce 
one configuration as the sole imaginable and desirable way of ‘living in the modern 
world’’’.190 Hall argued that the public sector was viewed as ‘‘inefficient and out of date, 
partly because it has social objectives beyond economic objectives and value for 
money’’.191 The plan implied that there was no alternative within public services to the 
consumerism prevalent elsewhere within capitalist society. Consumerism is indicative 
of identity thinking, and of the standardization strategy of the ideological mode of 
unification, as it homogenises people, thereby neglecting differences which may affect 
their ability to make choices.   
 
The ‘NHS Plan’ repudiated Labour’s traditional hostility to private providers192 and 
reneged on its 1997 manifesto commitment opposing the private provision of clinical 
services.193 It proclaimed that a concordat (a non-legally binding agreement) would be 
agreed between the government and the Independent Healthcare Association 
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(IHA).194 The government stated that the concordat would enable ‘‘the NHS to make 
better use of facilities in private hospitals-where this provides value for money and 
maintains standards of patient care''.195 Tim Evans (lead negotiator of the IHA) 
believed that the concordat would ultimately lead to ‘‘a time when the NHS would 
simply be a kitemark attached to the institutions and activities of a system of purely 
private providers’’.196 Blair had met Evans on the BBC programme ‘Newsnight’, in 
February 2000, and was convinced by him that the private sector could provide 
additional capacity to help solve perennial winter crises.197 Christoph Hermann notes 
that public concern with waiting lists was used to break the taboo on private companies 
providing NHS clinical care.198 A circular which Frank Dobson (Secretary of State for 
Health between 1997 and 1999) had sent to hospital trusts making them wary about 
using private hospital beds was repealed and talks at Downing Street resulted in the 
concordat.199   
 
In addition to Evans, there were various other private sector influences on New 
Labour’s NHS policies. As mentioned in chapter two, I posit that there is a micro-
ideology of private healthcare companies, proponents of which advocate increased 
opportunities for such companies, which is in their material interests. Virgin compiled 
a report for the Department of Health, in 2000, which recommended improving 
customer service by establishing polyclinics and ‘‘a number of specialist hospitals 
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concentrating solely on elective surgery’’.200 Virgin suggested that ‘‘private hospitals 
could be utilised for part of this work’’.201 It seems that Virgin used the report as an 
opportunity to recommend the expansion of openings for the private sector within the 
NHS, which it later exploited (Virgin took over several polyclinics in 2010202). Ian Smith, 
Chief Executive of General Healthcare Group (GHG) between 2004 and 2006, claims 
that he ‘‘had a role in shaping the healthcare reforms’’ of Blair’s government.203 Smith 
advocated the dismantling of the ‘‘NHS monopoly’’.204 Blair stated that, following talks 
with the agents of independent providers, he ‘‘chafed increasingly at the restrictions 
placed in’’ their way.205 Blair stated that ‘‘for public services to be equitable, and free 
at the point of use, they did not all need to be provided on a monopoly basis within the 
public sector’’.206 However, as Pollock et al noted, research in the United States (US) 
and Australia indicated that for-profit status adversely effects cost, quality and 
efficiency.207 Pollock et al stated that government claims that it is quality, not the 
provider, that matters, has a simple logic to it, discouraging scrutiny and debate.208  
 
New Labour’s health policy was also influenced by special advisers, such as Stevens 
and Julian Le Grand,209 who were given an increased role due to the expansion of the 
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Number Ten Policy Unit under Blair’s premiership.210 In addition, New Labour was 
influenced by an article, by Richard Feacham et al, comparing a Californian Health 
Maintenance Organisation (HMO),211 Kaiser Permanante, with the NHS.212 This was 
cited in both Wanless’ review and ‘Delivering the NHS Plan’.213 Feacham et al asserted 
that the benefits of competition and choice meant that Kaiser outperformed the NHS 
in many respects, such as access to specialist diagnosis and treatment and hospital 
waiting times.214 Feacham et al stated that the belief that the NHS was efficient and 
that poor performance in certain areas was largely explained by underinvestment, was 
incorrect.215 However, Alison Talbot-Smith et al argue that Feacham et al overlooked 
numerous differences between Kaiser Permanante and the NHS (such as the 
populations served by each and the co-payments of Kaiser’s patients) leading to 
methodological errors favouring the former.216  
 
The ‘NHS Plan’ stated that there had been an ‘‘uneasy truce’’217 and a ‘‘stand-off’’218 
between the NHS and the private sector since 1948. It stated that ‘‘ideological 
boundaries or institutional barriers should not stand in the way of better care for NHS 
patients’’ and that the NHS should therefore ‘‘engage more constructively with the 
                                                          
210 Richards, D. and Smith, M. (2004) ‘The ‘Hybrid State’: Labour’s Response to the Challenge of 
Governance’ in Ludlam, S. and Smith, M. (eds) Governing as New Labour: Policy and Politics under 
Blair. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp106-125 at p112.  
211 Introduced by the Health Maintenance Organisation Act (1973) to arrange health care for an 
insurance premium. 
212 Feacham, R., et al., ‘Getting more for their dollar: A Comparison of the NHS with California’s Kaiser 
Permanante’. British Medical Journal 2002; 324:135. 
213 Talbot Smith, A., et al (2004) ‘Questioning the claims from Kaiser’. British Journal of General 
Practice, Vol.64 (503), pp415-421 at p415/Wanless, D. (2002) Securing our Future Health, op cit., 
n.38 at p109/Department of Health (2002) Delivering the NHS Plan. Next Steps on Investment, Next 
Steps on Reform. London: Stationery Office, p26. 
214 Feacham, R., et al (2002) ‘Getting more for their dollar’, op cit., n.212. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Talbot Smith, A., et al (2004) ‘Questioning the claims from Kaiser’, op cit., n.213 at p419. 
217 Department of Health (2000) NHS Plan, op cit., n.113 at p29. 
218 Ibid at p96. 
145 
 
private sector’’.219 The use of military metaphors (‘‘truce’’ and ‘‘stand-off’’) and the 
concept of ideology, to connote left-wing dogma, implied that there was a self-
defeating pugnacious attitude towards the private sector and that there were no 
legitimate grounds for scepticism regarding its role and effect. Dobson’s circular had 
deterred hospital trusts from using private hospital beds,220 but the idea of a ‘‘stand-
off’’ was misleading, because, as Stephen Driver noted, ‘‘the private sector had been 
informally working with the NHS for many years’’.221 The plan ignored some 
unconstructive private sector practices, such as its use of the NHS to indemnify itself 
against a calculable risk, namely medical complications requiring intensive care.222 
The Health Committee recommended that the NHS be compensated for the intensive 
care provided,223 but no change was enacted. The areas earmarked for co-operative 
working were elective, critical and intermediate care.224  
 
The government used the subject position of the taxpayer and the notion of value for 
money, within the concordat (which stated that the relationship between the NHS, and 
private and voluntary providers ‘‘must represent good value for money for the 
taxpayer’’225), to suggest that the agreement would be in everyone’s interests 
(indicative of the universalization strategy of the legitimation mode of ideology226). The 
Health Committee determined that New Labour’s focus was initially on improving 
                                                          
219 Ibid. 
220 Hencke, D. (2000) ‘Chance chat over dinner led Blair to order u-turn on private beds’, op cit., 
n.199. 
221 Driver, S. (2008) ‘New Labour and Social Policy’, op cit., n.51 at p59. 
222 Health Committee (1999) The Regulation of Private and Other Independent Healthcare, Fifth 
Report, House of Commons Session 1998-99, Vol.I. London: Stationery Office, para. 132. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Department of Health (2000) NHS Plan, op cit., n.113 at p97. 
225 Department of Health (DOH) (2000) For the Benefit of Patients: A Concordat with the Private and 
Voluntary Health Care Provider Sector. London: DOH, para.1.2. 
226 Thompson, J. (2007) Ideology and Modern Culture, op cit., n.174 at p60. 
146 
 
access and that quality was prioritised following a national review in 2007.227 
Nonetheless, quality was alluded to in New Labour’s discourse before 2007, which 
contained the assumption that private sector involvement would necessarily deliver 
value for money and high standards.228 However, Dobson argued that the NHS was 
more efficient than the private sector229 and the Health Committee’s first report into 
private and voluntary healthcare, in 1999, highlighted additional clinical risks in the 
private sector.230 Lister described the notion of superior quality in the private sector as 
a ‘‘bizarre and baseless ideological conviction’’.231 According to Pollock et al, the 
concordat ‘‘was largely a dead letter’’ by the end of 2003 as the prices demanded by 
the private sector ‘‘proved so much higher than the cost of equivalent services 
provided by the NHS that the government could not defend accepting them’’.232 
Nonetheless, the private sector was afforded increased opportunities through the 
creation of ISTCs. 
 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres 
 
According to Crisp, it became clear that the top-down management envisaged by the 
‘NHS Plan’ ‘‘wouldn’t work by itself at sufficient scale and with sufficient 
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sustainability’’.233 Consequently, in April 2002, ‘Delivering the NHS Plan’ announced 
a wider reform programme.234 Martin Powell et al note that whereas the ‘NHS Plan’ 
focused on giving patients more choice, ‘Delivering the NHS Plan’ promoted both 
choice and diversity.235 In June 2002, the Department of Health stated that an increase 
in NHS activity would partly be achieved by ‘‘increasing productivity and by investment 
in existing NHS providers’’ but that ‘‘additional high quality, cost-effective health care 
capacity’’ was needed to reduce waiting times.236 The Department stated that the 
objective was therefore ‘‘to shift towards greater plurality and diversity’’ in delivering 
elective surgery services.237 The extra NHS investment was regarded as an 
opportunity ‘‘to bring new entrants…into the healthcare market without necessarily 
reducing budgets for existing providers’’.238 The hedge ‘‘necessarily’’ indicates that the 
Department was aware that more money for private providers would mean that less 
was available for NHS providers. Subsequently, the Department stated that a national 
capacity planning exercise indicated that additional capacity was required beyond the 
increased capacity planned by existing NHS providers, demonstrating the need ‘‘for a 
more ambitious role for the independent sector’’.239 The government therefore 
announced a procurement process for new ISTCs with the objectives that they ‘‘deliver 
value for money’’ and be ‘‘efficient, effective and fast’’.240  
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An ‘ISTC Manual’ stated that ISTCs would ‘‘complement existing NHS services’’.241 A 
policy of additionality was adopted to prevent ‘‘a draining of NHS human resource 
capacity’’,242 although NHS staff could be seconded to work for some ISTCs.243 In the 
second wave of ISTCs, the additionality policy only applied to shortage professions.244 
The first wave of the ISTC programme involved the creation of twenty-five centres 
(with Ramsay running nine and Care UK running five).245 The second wave 
(announced in 2005, before an evaluation of the first wave) involved the creation of 
ten centres.246 Although payments to ISTCs were based on the relevant national tariff, 
an additional provider specific premium was given to providers to encourage entry into 
the market.247 Consequently, on average, providers received payments that were 11.2 
percent greater than the NHS equivalent cost.248 ISTC providers were afforded 
generous five year contracts with guaranteed numbers of patients, in contrast to NHS 
trusts, which were destabilised by payment by results (PBR), which is examined in 
chapter four, which engendered uncertainty about patient numbers.249 The NHS 
agreed to buy ISTC buildings once contracts ended, if they were not renewed.250  
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Player notes that PCTs were incentivised to ensure that patients chose ISTCs to stop 
them paying for services twice,251 undermining the policy of patient choice (examined 
in chapter four).252 Some PCTs offered GPs a financial payment for every patient they 
referred successfully to an ISTC. For example, Tameside and Glossop PCT offered 
£130.00 per patient.253 Lister states that it was ‘‘clear that the private sector would 
concentrate on the most profitable and simple cases…leaving the NHS with an 
increasingly expensive caseload’’.254 Jacky Davis et al argue that there is much 
anecdotal evidence that ISTCs refused to treat unprofitable patients, such as the 
elderly and obese.255 Rosemary Mason et al state that national data suggested that 
NHS organisations were treating a more complex case mix than their private sector 
counterparts.256 Consequently, NHS hospitals were left with a residual case mix of 
more complex patients unsuitable for junior training.257 Simon Turner et al argued that 
the effect of cherry-picking would be the displacement of profitable aspects of care to 
private companies ‘‘undermining how NHS trusts currently finance a more universal 
system of care’’.258 In this respect, the Royal College of Ophthalmologists warned, in 
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2006, that the diversion of funds away from NHS hospital eye services to ISTCs was 
threatening the provision of comprehensive ophthalmic care.259   
 
The government narrativized ISTCs as a ‘‘significant part’’ of the waiting list reductions 
which had occurred by 2005.260 However, the Health Committee (which investigated 
ISTCs in 2006) stated that it was ‘‘unclear’’ whether ISTCs had contributed, or whether 
‘‘additional NHS spending and the intense focus placed on waiting list targets’’ were 
responsible.261 The government rationalized that ISTCs were necessary to increase 
capacity. However, the Health Committee concluded that ISTCs had ‘‘not made a 
major direct contribution to increasing capacity’’.262 In addition, the Committee stated 
that it was not obvious that phase one ISTCs were required in every area in which they 
were built.263 Jane Hanna (a former non-executive board member of South West 
Oxfordshire PCT) stated that non-executive board members had had their positions 
threatened unless they reversed their decision that an ISTC was not needed.264 The 
Committee was also informed that a number of ISTCs were operating significantly 
below capacity and, according to NHS Elect (a network organisation), the ISTC 
programme led to an underutilisation of NHS treatment centres.265 The Department of 
Health sought to portray ISTCs as being in everyone’s interests by claiming that they 
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‘‘drive the adoption of good practice and innovation in the NHS’’.266 However, the 
Committee determined that it had ‘‘received no convincing evidence…that NHS 
facilities are adopting in any systematic way techniques pioneered in ISTCs’’.267 The 
private sector had thus been extolled without evidence. 
 
The Health Committee noted that ISTCs had reduced the spot purchase price in the 
private sector and increased patient choice, but that ‘‘without information relating to 
clinical quality, patients’’ were ‘‘not offered an informed choice’’.268 The Healthcare 
Commission’s ISTC report, in 2007, noted that information about them was of poor 
quality and incomplete.269 A follow up report, in 2008, noted that although there had 
been improvements in the quality of the data supplied by ISTCs, it remained 
insufficient for a comparative analysis with NHS providers.270  There have been both 
favourable and unfavourable assessments of ISTC quality. It was reported that there 
were high revision rates in ISTCs compared to the NHS.271 A special edition of the 
BBC’s ‘Panorama’ programme, in 2009, investigated the death of Dr John Hubley, 
from multiple organ failure, at an ISTC (Eccleshill Treatment Centre in Bradford) 
resulting from a delayed blood transfusion (as there was no blood on site, a porter had 
to acquire it from a nearby NHS hospital).272 This indicated that such facilities were 
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not as adequately resourced as NHS facilities.273 In 2013, the NHS paid Clinicenta 
(part of Carillion) £53 million to end a contract to run an ISTC in Stevenage after 
various clinical failings and the deaths of three patients following routine surgery.274  
 
John Browne et al’s pilot study found that, after adjusting for pre-operative 
characteristics, patients who underwent cataract surgery or hip replacement in ISTCs 
achieved a slightly greater improvement in functional status and quality of life (the 
opposite was true of patients undergoing hernia repair) than NHS patients.275 In 
addition, patients treated in ISTCs were less likely to report post-operative problems 
for cataract surgery, hernia repair and knee replacement.276 Following on from the pilot 
study, Jiri Chard et al found that patients who underwent hip or knee replacements in 
ISTCs had better outcomes than NHS patients in terms of severity of symptoms, health 
related quality of life and postoperative complications.277 However, Chard et al stated 
that the differences ‘‘were small, their clinical relevance is slight and…could be 
attributable to differences in case mix that were not fully taken into account’’.278 The 
Browne study has been cited as evidence that quality of care in ISTCs ‘‘is at least as 
good as’’,279 ‘‘if not better’’ than,280 the NHS. However, such conclusions did not 
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consider Chard et al’s subsequent study, and its proviso, or the other literature (cited 
above). Although there is ambiguity, in some instances quality in ISTCs may have 
been slightly better than in the NHS, whereas in others it was much worse (as indicated 
by Dr Hubley’s death and the high revision rates). In addition, ISTCs did not perform 
as well as the NHS on the efficiency (examined below) and equity (as they appear to 
have refused to treat unprofitable patients) components of quality, identified by Avedis 
Donabedian.281   
 
The Health Committee had stated, in 2002, that ‘‘it remains to be demonstrated that 
greater use of the independent sector poses no direct threat to resources in the public 
sector’’.282 The Committee’s ISTC report noted that the Department of Health had 
analysed the potential effect of ISTCs on NHS facilities but had failed to disclose the 
results.283 Both UNISON284 and the BMA285 expressed concerns about the 
redistribution of resources from the NHS to ISTCs. The Committee stated that 
evidence regarding the threat of competition from ISTCs on the NHS was ‘‘largely 
anecdotal’’286 and expressed surprise that the Department of Health had not attempted 
to systematically ‘‘assess and quantify the effect of competition from ISTCs on the 
NHS’’.287 The Committee recommended that the National Audit Office evaluate this, 
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but this was not heeded.288 The Committee noted that there was ‘‘considerable 
scepticism about whether the ISTC programme represented value for money’’ (for 
example, both UNISON289 and RCN290 doubted this) but ‘‘found it difficult to make an 
assessment’’ as the Department did not provide it with detailed figures on the grounds 
of commercial confidentiality.291 The involvement of the private sector therefore limited 
public oversight. Nonetheless, Pollock and Kirkwood analysed information pertaining 
to an ISTC in Angus, Scotland, run by Netcare, which was put into the public domain, 
and determined that as payment was based on referrals (rather than actual treatment) 
it may have been over-paid approximately £3 million in the first ten months of the 
contract.292 If English ISTCs had performed similarly, £927 million may have been paid 
for patients who did not receive treatment.293 This revelation generated public criticism 
of ISTCs and led to Nicola Sturgeon (Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Health and 
Wellbeing between 2007 and 2012) returning the services in question to the NHS.294 
It was subsequently determined that £462.4 million was squandered through 
‘‘needless payments’’ written into ISTC contracts.295  
 
Clarke et al note the difference between government rhetoric and the reality of 
government policies which may be due either to an implementation gap or because 
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government rhetoric acts as a smokescreen ‘‘concealing the ‘real intentions’ of the 
political project’’.296 In this respect, the Health Committee noted that many witnesses 
believed that Milburn ‘‘decided on an experiment to introduce private sector providers 
largely irrespective of any cost benefit analysis’’.297 New Labour appear to have 
intended to pursue the ISTC policy whether quality or value for money were achieved 
or not, hence their decision to announce a second wave before evaluation of the first 
wave. With regards to value for money, Player and Leys note that the Health 
Committee did not consider the opportunity cost of the £5.6bn diverted to ISTCs.298 
 
Player and Leys contend that the Health Committee ‘‘failed to confront evidence’’ 
pointing ‘‘to the real aim of the ISTC programme’’.299 They argue that while it was 
presented as a means to shorten waiting times, it was, in reality, a critical step in 
converting the NHS into a market in which for-profit providers would compete with 
NHS providers.300 Similarly, UNISON stated that ‘‘the future of ISTCs is about a 
sustainable market for the private sector’’.301 Player and Leys contended that the 
existing private sector could not provide the desired competition.302 In this regard, Paul 
Corrigan (an adviser to Milburn) reportedly averred that the state had to actively create 
a market.303 Although Milburn stated, during the 2001 general election, that Labour 
were not seeking ‘‘a mixed economy of healthcare’’,304 Shaw noted that it soon 
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became apparent that this was desired.305 The government therefore engineered ‘‘the 
formation of a new kind of private healthcare provider, offering low-cost, high-volume 
treatments at prices competitive with those of NHS trusts’’.306 According to Player and 
Leys, UK based private providers (such as BUPA and Nuffield) missed out on the 
lucrative early ISTC contracts prompting them to restructure their businesses.307 
ISTCs acted as a ‘‘bridgehead’’ to increase private sector involvement within the 
NHS.308 ISTCs were a precursor for a wider range of clinical activity under the 
Extended Choice Network (ECN), which comprised 149 privately run facilities by 
2009,309 and undertook £1 billion worth of NHS treatments.310 
 
Patient and Public Involvement 
 
Sherry Arnstein’s model of citizen participation distinguished between non-
participation (therapy and manipulation), tokenism (placation, consultation and 
informing) and citizen power (citizen control, delegated power and partnership).311 
Arnstein’s model has been criticised for not accounting for the comprehensiveness or 
depth of participation.312 New Labour’s discourse contained the emerging norm of 
empowering patients and the public. However, Vincent-Jones argues that although 
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voice was on the policy agenda, it was ‘‘narrowly conceived and restricted in scope’’.313 
New Labour was ‘‘more interested in fostering consumerism than in strengthening civil 
society’’314 and had a ‘‘supermarketized vision of service user involvement’’,315 
exemplified by its patient choice reforms (examined in chapter four). New Labour had 
pledged to strengthen Community Health Councils (CHCs).316 However, the ‘NHS 
Plan’ announced their abolition and replacement by various other bodies.317 Christine 
Hogg notes that this was not in the draft ‘NHS Plan’, hence many signatories were 
unaware they were endorsing it.318 CHCs and the Association of Community Health 
Councils for England and Wales (ACHCEW) ‘‘campaigned vigorously against their 
abolition’’319 and many Labour backbenchers threatened to rebel.320 Donna Covey 
(ACHCEW Director between 1998 and 2001) noted that there were worries about the 
independence of the new bodies and warned that separating scrutiny from monitoring 
and complaints could prevent the detection of broader patterns in healthcare.321 Such 
opposition meant that CHC abolition was dropped from the bill which became the HSC 
Act (2001). Nonetheless, subsequent legislation facilitated the abolition of CHCs322 
which ceased operating in England in 2003 (they persist in Wales). Milburn contended 
that CHCs were ‘‘out of date’’323 and should be abolished as they had no role in primary 
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care, could not inspect GP premises and had no rights of representation on NHS 
organisations.324 Many MPs, including David Hinchliffe,325 Sandra Gidley326 and Paul 
Burstow,327 noted that CHCs could simply have been given the powers mentioned by 
Milburn.  
 
The changes required the Secretary of State to provide an Independent Complaints 
Advocacy Service (ICAS).328 ICAS provides support to patients wishing to complain.329 
Initially, Citizens Advice had the contract to provide such services in six out of nine 
regions.330 The advisory role of CHCs was rechannelled to Patient Advocate and 
Liaison Services (PALS) without legislation.331 PALS have no statutory powers and 
are not independent (as they are accountable to the Chief Executive of the trust or 
PCT where they are provided).332 Whereas CHCs had undertaken an annual casualty 
watch to assess casualty and emergency services, Charles Webster argued that PALS 
were ‘‘purposely designed to preclude any kind of co-ordinated effort liable to 
disconcert provider interests’’.333 Patients Forums, later renamed Patient and Public 
Involvement Forums (PPIFs), were established, for each NHS Trust334 and PCT,335 to 
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monitor and review services,336 obtain patients views337 and provide advice, reports 
and recommendations.338 The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in 
Health (CPPIH)339 was established to advise the Secretary of State about 
arrangements for public involvement340 and the views of PPIFs341 and provide staff342 
and set quality standards for PPIFs.343 Angela Coulter contends that PPIFs had 
weaker powers and less independence than CHCs.344 Anna Coote states that the 
quality of PPIFs ‘‘varied considerably’’, with some being ‘‘vigorous advocates and 
watchdogs’’ and others being ‘‘unrepresentative local cabals, destructively critical, or 
just weak and ineffectual’’.345   
 
The role of Overview and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs) in local authorities was 
extended enabling them to review, scrutinise and make recommendations regarding 
health services.346 NHS bodies must consult OSCs regarding ‘‘substantial changes in 
services’’, which, Day and Klein note, is a ‘‘contested and malleable’’ concept.347 Their 
research indicated that, in practice, OSCs based challenges on evidence rather than 
on ‘‘knee jerk opposition to change in principle’’.348 Jane Martin found that over one 
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third of NHS bodies changed policies, procedures and services due to their scrutiny.349 
Sally Ruane stated that OSCs had teeth as they enabled citizens, in certain 
circumstances, to shape important decisions (such as halting plans to downgrade 
Horton General in Banbury in 2008).350 However, the Francis Report (published 
following the public inquiry into Mid Staffordshire NHS FT351) concluded that OSCs 
scrutiny was ‘‘an unreliable detector of concerns’’352 and recommended that they be 
empowered to inspect providers.353 The Independent Reconfiguration Panel (IRP) was 
established, in 2003, to advise the Secretary of State regarding contested proposals 
for changes to services. While the ‘NHS Plan’ intimated that OSCs could refer to the 
IRP,354 this power was ultimately given to the Secretary of State.355 In many cases, 
the Secretary of State decided to support local NHS proposals.356 By 2007, the IRP 
had only made three adjudications.357 The Health Committee determined that the 
failure of successive Secretaries of State to refer cases to IRP, along with their 
overturning of decisions and the timing of their interventions, had ‘‘undermined public 
confidence in the consultation process’’.358 
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In 2006 an expert panel, reviewing patient and public involvement, criticised the over 
prescriptive and centralised model that had been adopted.359 It recommended the 
creation of Local Involvement Networks (LINKs).360 The Department of Health 
subsequently announced that CPPIH and PPIFs would be abolished and that LINKs 
would replace the latter.361 CPPIH was not replaced hence patients were no longer 
represented at a national level362. Although there were also concerns with PALS and 
ICAS, neither was reformed.363 LINKs were established by the Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health (LGPIH) Act (2007). The Francis report contained a 
damning indictment of Labour’s reforms.364 It concluded that PPIFs and LINKs failed 
to deliver ‘‘an improved voice for patients and the public’’ in Stafford.365 Hogg 
contended that by fragmenting arrangements for patient and public involvement, New 
Labour made introducing its market reforms easier.366 
 
The HSC Act (2001), S.11,367 required NHS bodies to consult on the planning of, and 
changes to, services. Perceived failures to do so could result in requests for judicial 
review. Mandelstam avers that ‘‘judicial review against the NHS is generally a blunt, 
                                                          
359 Department of Health (DOH) (2006) Concluding the Review of Patient and Public Involvement 
Recommendations to Ministers from an Expert Panel. London: DOH, p3.  
360 Ibid at p5. 
361 Department of Health (DOH) (2006) A stronger local voice: A framework for creating a stronger 
local voice in the development of health and social care services A document for information and 
comment. London: DOH, p7.  
362 Mold, A. (2015) Making the Patient Consumer: Patient Organisations and Health Consumerism in 
Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p161. 
363 Vincent-Jones, P. et al (2009) ‘New Labour’s PPI reforms’, op cit., n.331 at p254. 
364 Newbigging, K. (2016) ‘Blowin’ in the wind: The Involvement of People who use services, carers 
and the public in health and social care’ in Exworthy, M. et al (eds) Dismantling the NHS? Evaluating 
the Impact of Health Reforms. Bristol: Policy Press, pp301-322 at p306. 
365 Francis, R. (2013) Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, op cit., 
n.352 at p46. 
366 Hogg, C. (2009) Citizens, Consumers and the NHS, op cit., n.318 at p124.  
367 Subsequently consolidated into the National Health Service (NHS) Act (2006), S.242. 
162 
 
crude and unreliable tool’’.368 Nonetheless, threats to services, due to deficits in 
2005/06, led many to seek judicial review.369 Both Mandelstam and the Health 
Committee noted that NHS bodies often attempt to avoid obligations to consult, for 
example, by making small service cuts over time.370 In Smith v North East Derbyshire 
PCT,371 the duty to consult applied where a PCT proposed to run GP services through 
a private company.372 Mandelstam contends that the duty was watered down by 
LGPIH Act (2007), S.233.373 This provided that the duty may ‘‘be discharged simply 
by the provision of information’’ and only applies if it would impact the manner of 
delivery (at the point they are received by users) of, or the range of, services.374 Both 
Mandelstam and the Health Committee concluded that the legislative change sought 
to remove case law relating to S.11.375 The Health Committee determined that patient 
and public involvement had been conflated leading to ‘‘muddled initiatives and 
uncertainty’’.376 The former is a response to medical paternalism, while the latter draws 
on democratic theory.377 Wanless noted that the national patient survey (introduced in 
1997) indicated that there continued to be a lack of patient involvement in their own 
care.378 Consequently, New Labour’s policies did not match the normative elements 
of its discourse in terms of enhancing patient and public voices. Such norms are 
therefore means of critiquing such policies and bases for conceiving alternatives.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I noted the influence of private healthcare companies and neo-
liberalism on New Labour’s NHS reforms. New Labour sought to portray its reforms as 
being in everyone’s interests by claiming that they would increase quality and 
efficiency, terms which it sought to decontest by linking them to private sector 
involvement. However, such terms were recontested as critics averred that private 
sector involvement was detrimental to efficiency and quality. New Labour used 
residualizing discourse to differentiate its policies, characterised as modern, from 
previous Labour party policy and their opponents (including Labour backbenchers and 
trade unions), which were characterised as outmoded. It sought to naturalise its 
conception of modernity, in which there was no alternative within public services to the 
consumerism elsewhere within capitalist societies. New Labour’s discourse included 
residual and emergent norms (such as reducing health inequalities and empowering 
patients). Such norms were undermined by New Labour’s neo-liberal policies but 
provide a basis for critiquing New Labour’s policies and conceiving alternatives. New 
Labour sought to depoliticise healthcare through the use of targets. Such targets did 
not cover, and were argued to have a detrimental effect on, rising infections, which 
repoliticised healthcare. New Labour’s reforms reified healthcare by extending the 
exchange principle and through instrumental rationality, as means, such as targets, 
became ends in themselves to the detriment of patients.  
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Chapter Four: New Labour and the NHS (Part Two) 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I examine New Labour’s creation of foundation trusts (FTs) and a 
mimic-market in secondary care and its creation of polyclinics in primary care. New 
Labour contended that FTs would lead to high standards, enable health inequalities to 
be tackled more effectively and facilitate genuine local ownership. However, FTs do 
not appear to outperform NHS trusts, the relationship between FTs and health 
inequalities were not clear to clinicians and managers1 and scope for public influence 
over FTs is limited. New accountability mechanisms were introduced for FTs. FTs 
were somewhat successful in depoliticising healthcare, as many of their problems 
were dealt with without parliamentary or ministerial interference, although ministers 
often intervened, despite the law, in response to scandals.  
 
The mimic-market in secondary care was effectuated by polices such as patient 
choice. However, Labour’s attempts to interpellate patients as consumers faced 
recalcitrance (passive dissent).2 There is evidence that the mimic-market became an 
end in itself to the detriment of patients. As the NHS became increasingly marketized, 
European Union (EU) competition and public procurement law (which may have 
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locked in such reforms) became increasingly applicable, although scope existed for 
exceptions. The use of an ostensibly non-political figure, Lord Ara Darzi, to 
recommend polyclinics, did not successfully depoliticise the policy, which generated 
controversy as they threatened access to, and continuity of, care. New Labour 
asserted that it expected many polyclinic contracts to go to GP-led consortiums. 
However, the government liaised with the private sector about their procurement3 and 
advised PCTs to set up bulk deals with private providers.4 New Labour’s policies were 
opposed by Labour backbenchers and increased marketization led to groups of 
citizens forming to protest against the changes.  
 
Foundation Trusts 
 
New Labour created FTs5 and Monitor, to regulate them,6 via the Health and Social 
Care (Community Health and Standards) (HSC) Act (2003), which was subsequently 
consolidated into the National Health Service (NHS) Act (2006). According to Patricia 
Day and Rudolf Klein, ministers became convinced that the command and control 
model, adopted in Labour’s first term, was managerially counterproductive as it stifled 
innovation, and politically counterproductive, as it centralised blame.7 Ministers 
therefore decided to decentralise to insulate themselves from political exposure to day-
                                                          
3 Nowottny, S., ‘Revealed: NHS Secretly wooed Private firms over Polyclinics’, Pulse, 7 October 2009. 
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to-day NHS problems.8 Patrick Diamond contends that ministers wanted to reduce 
culpability for delivery9 but were also desirous of restoring Labour’s governing 
reputation.10 The government stated that power ‘‘must be shifted towards frontline staff 
who understand patient’s needs and concerns’’11 and to local communities to give 
them ‘‘real influence over their development’’.12 The strategy of decentralising power 
was linked to the objective of reducing health inequalities. For example, Blair argued 
that uniform national services had ‘‘failed to combat’’ such inequalities and that 
communities and frontline staff should be empowered ‘‘to redesign, refocus and 
reprioritise programmes to tackle local need’’.13  
 
The increased interest in decentralisation led to an ‘‘advisory group of academics and 
others with an interest in, or experience of, mutualism’’ being established.14 Hazel 
Blears (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department of Health between 
2001 and 2003) argued that ‘‘key parts of the public services should be made into 
mutual organisations owned and controlled by local people and by their users’’.15 Day 
and Klein noted that mutualism ‘‘appeared to be an ideologically attractive formula’’ as 
it drew on the government’s new emphasis of localism and traditional ‘‘left-wing 
advocacy of co-operative models’’.16 However, unlike mutuals, FTs ‘‘are not owned by 
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their members’’.17 Ultimately, likening FTs to mutuals did not make ‘‘the notion of 
giving independence to providers acceptable to Labour party traditionalists’’.18 The FT 
policy was influenced by Milburn’s visit, in 2001, to the Fundacion Hospital in Alcorcon, 
Madrid, which was state owned but privately run.19 The Fundacion Hospital had 
received the highest number of complaints for a hospital in Spain, in 2000, and the 
cheaper medical equipment at the hospital was blamed for an outbreak of hepatitis C, 
in September 2004.20 According to Allyson Pollock, policy advisors, including Kaiser 
Permanante’s Chief Executive, and representatives of healthcare corporations, also 
helped to formulate the FT proposals.21  
 
Milburn employed similar arguments for FTs as those utilised to justify the changes 
announced by the ‘NHS Plan’. The narrative was that FTs would modernise an 
outdated NHS. Milburn stated that: 
 
‘‘For the first time since 1948 the NHS will begin to move away from a monolithic 
centralised system towards greater local accountability and greater local control. 
Reform cannot be achieved by holding on to the monolithic centralised structures 
of the 1940s’’.22  
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John Mohan noted the startling similarity between Conservative and New Labour 
arguments for NHS reform.23 The NHS was portrayed as ‘‘monolithic’’ in Thatcherite 
discourse. For example, Oliver Letwin and John Redwood described it ‘‘as a 
bureaucratic monster’’.24 Milburn’s description of the NHS as a ‘‘monolithic centralised 
system’’ accepted the Thatcherite narrative, which Mohan argues was based on a 
mythical past.25 Mohan contends that it was New Labour which had adopted highly 
centralist policies, such as targets.26 Milburn sought to naturalise a consumer 
relationship between patients and the NHS, to which, he argued, there was no 
alternative. Milburn averred that the NHS was ‘‘formed in the era of the ration book’’ 
when ‘‘people expected little say and had precious little choice’’.27 He claimed that 
‘‘today, we live in a different world’’.28 According to Milburn, ‘‘whether we like it or not, 
this is a consumer age’’ in which ‘‘people demand services that are tailored to their 
individual needs’’.29  
 
Milburn portrayed FTs as being in everyone’s interests (indicative of the 
universalization strategy of the ideological mode of legitimation) as he stated they 
would lead to ‘‘high standards, greater local accountability, genuine public ownership, 
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[and] greater emphasis on local service provision to tackle health inequalities’’.30 FTs 
were in the interests of private companies which were afforded new opportunities 
(examined below). Milburn’s claims that FTs were in everyone’s interests have not 
been borne out. Milburn’s claim that FTs would lead to high standards is belied by 
studies which indicate that FTs did not significantly affect financial management or 
performance31 and did not affect the quality of care (as measured by methicillin-
resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) rates).32 Rosella Verzulli et al found that 
although both FTs and non-FTs experienced better performance in terms of shorter 
waiting times, this reduction was higher for the latter than the former.33 Alisa Cameron 
et al found that while the autonomy afforded by FT status was valued, there is no 
evidence that it improves performance.34 The claim by Milburn, and others, that FTs 
would enable health inequalities to be more effectively tackled is undermined by Martin 
Powell et al’s case study research which indicates that the links the government made 
between mechanisms, such as FTs, and outcomes, such as reducing health 
inequalities, were not clear to clinicians and managers.35 Rather than reducing health 
inequalities, Pollock argued that the ability of FTs to generate surpluses threatened to 
destabilise health service provision and widen inequalities of access.36 I argue below 
that scope for public influence over FTs is limited. FTs were part of New Labour’s 
purported desire to decentralise power. However, Scott Greer and Margitta Matzke 
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state that, by 2010, the NHS had weak territorial levels and strong nationwide 
regulators accountable to ministers.37  
 
Milburn claimed that the FT reform was ‘‘every bit as radical and progressive as that 
which created the NHS’’.38 This exemplifies the euphemization strategy of the 
ideological mode of dissimulation. Stuart Hall noted that New Labour utilised spin to 
mobilize the positive resonances of concepts to mask the consistent shift from public 
to private, as concepts such as ‘change’ and ‘radical’ can point in any direction.39 
Milburn stated that the principles of the NHS were right,40 but that it needed to change 
‘‘how it works in practice’’.41 New Labour claimed to retain the traditional values of the 
NHS in an effort to obscure the fact that, as critics argued, its reforms overlooked42 
and squeezed out43 its public service ethos. In this respect, Allen et al’s case study 
indicated that once trusts were elevated to FT status they became ‘‘more business 
focused’’.44  
 
FTs are public benefit corporations45 authorised to provide goods and services for the 
provision of health care,46 with a general duty to exercise their ‘‘functions effectively, 
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efficiently and economically’’.47 This is indicative of depoliticisation through embedding 
normative values into the institutional structure of organisations.48 Initially, only three 
star NHS trusts could apply for FT status.49 This requirement was relaxed in November 
2005.50 Private companies could also apply for FT status.51 However, in 2010, it was 
determined that no non-NHS organisations had applied.52 FTs are permitted greater 
financial freedoms than NHS trusts, such as the power to borrow money53 and to invest 
money,54 for example, by forming a subsidiary or by entering into a joint venture.55 For 
example, the Christie Clinic LLP is a joint venture between the Christie NHS FT and 
Healthcare America (HCA). Joint ventures are able to charge fees and make profits.56 
The statute enabled FTs to generate income from private patients, limited to the 
proportion of income derived from charges in the base financial year57 (the first year it 
was an NHS trust, or the financial year ending 2003, if it was an NHS trust in that 
year).58 FTs cannot dispose of protected property without Monitor’s approval.59 
However, the Health Committee noted that the distinction between regulated and 
unregulated assets allowed ‘‘scope for considerable discretion in’’ specifying essential 
services.60 The creation of Monitor is indicative of institutional depoliticisation. Monitor 
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authorised FT applications61 and determined what NHS services an area needed.62 
Monitor also had the power to intervene where FTs were deemed to be failing.63 
Monitor was independent of government regarding its regulatory decisions, but 
accountable to parliament for its performance and value for money.64  
 
The HSC Act (2003) established a dual governance structure for FTs.65 This consists 
of a board of governors (comprising elected and appointed members66) and a board 
of directors (comprising executive and non-executive directors67). Individuals can 
become FT members if they live locally, are employed by it, or use its services.68 FTs 
draw the geographical boundaries of their constituencies, unlike other democratic 
organisations whose boundaries are determined by the Boundaries Commission.69 
According to Mohan, Labour was suggesting that community control could work ‘‘much 
as it did in the pre-NHS era’’.70 However, Mohan noted that large-scale community 
participation in raising funds within that era was accompanied by tokenistic 
representation on governing bodies.71 There were ‘‘no minimum standards for 
involvement’’.72 Day and Klein state that this was because ministers ‘‘did not have high 
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expectations’’.73 According to Pollock et al, ‘‘the problem of recruiting members from 
among the frail, less articulate or those who have to travel large distances for specialist 
services’’ was not recognised.74 FT members are not required to be representative of 
the local population or answerable to it.75 Many FTs have few members. For example, 
the membership of Milton Keynes Hospital FT consists of only 2.4 percent of the 
population that it serves.76 The average turnout at FT elections is twenty percent.77 
One in five elections was uncontested in 2008/09, rising to thirty-one percent of those 
for staff governors.78 Labour’s manifesto for the 2010 general election pledged to 
increase FT membership to over three million, but did not explain how this was to be 
achieved.79 Pauline Allen et al determined that FTs enabled ‘‘variable and limited’’ 
patient and public involvement.80 John Wright et al found evidence that governors 
were at risk of becoming owned by the management culture of FTs and suggested 
that policymakers train governors as ‘‘owls, rather than sheep and donkeys’’.81 
Similarly, Josephine Ocloo et al determined that governors needed training, support 
and guidance regarding patient safety.82 
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The traditional accountability of NHS hospitals to the Department of Health was 
replaced by FT’s accountability to their members, elected governors, Monitor,83 PCTs 
and the Healthcare Commission.84 John Reid (Secretary of State for Health between 
2003 and 2005) confirmed that FTs ‘‘are independent of the department, and directly 
accountable to their local populations and to parliament’’.85 Richard Lewis noted that 
this meant, in theory, no minister would have to defend healthcare professionals and 
managers in parliament.86 Rachael Addicott and Francesca Frosini state that a deep 
clean directive issued by the Department of Health, following a scandal at Maidstone 
NHS Trust, in which ninety people died from clostridium difficile,87 indicates that it had 
not fully loosened the reins of central control.88 In response, William Moyes (Executive 
Chairman of Monitor between 2004 and 2010) complained, in a letter to David 
Nicholson (NHS Chief Executive between 2006 and 2011), that such instructions were 
not ‘‘consistent with the legislative framework’’.89 Nonetheless, the strategy of 
depoliticisation appears to have been relatively successful because, as Moyes et al 
note, frequently cases of failure or potential failure of FTs ‘‘were managed without 
ministerial intervention or formal parliamentary interest’’.90 However, Moyes et al state 
that major policy failures often lead to a return of top-down accountability.91 For 
example, they argue that the case of Mid Staffordshire NHS FT shows that a Secretary 
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of State may consider themselves accountable and intervene, irrespective of the legal 
position, where a failing body threatens patient health or safety.92 Alan Johnson 
(Secretary of State for Health between 2007 and 2009) was advised by Moyes that he 
was not responsible for dealing with the Mid Staffordshire scandal.93 In reply, Johnson 
told Moyes to ‘‘piss off’’ as he would handle it.94 Nicholas Timmins avers that 
ministerial behaviour trumps legislation.95 The law may therefore be used to 
consolidate changes to public services, such as reducing ministerial responsibility, but 
it may not legitimise such changes where politicians and the public consider that 
ministers could or should intervene.  
 
FTs provoked much opposition. In the cabinet, a dispute arose between Blair and 
Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1997 and 2007).96 Brown was 
suspicious of giving greater autonomy to public agencies.97 Eric Shaw states that 
Brown would not countenance granting FTs freedom to accumulate liabilities for which 
the Treasury would ultimately be responsible and was worried that FTs had an 
incentive to maximise private patient income and could financially destabilise PFI.98 
Andrew Rawnsley contends that the dispute was partly ideological, but also motivated 
by Brown’s desire ‘‘to make himself more popular within the Labour party at Blair’s 
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expense’’.99  Ultimately, a compromise was reached, with Blair and Milburn winning 
on the principle that the best performing hospitals should be given more 
independence, while Blair caved into Brown regarding the central control of 
budgets.100 Blair subsequently lamented that each NHS reform he pursued ‘‘was 
amended and adjusted; and occasionally-and each time to my chagrin-watered 
down’’.101  
 
At Labour’s conference in 2003, a union motion demanding that FTs be scrapped was 
carried, while a motion backing the government’s proposals for more choice in the 
NHS was defeated.102 In parliament, FTs provoked the largest health policy rebellion 
ever by Labour MPs against their own government.103 The government won the FT 
vote in November 2003 by seventeen votes.104 Controversially, in votes on the FT 
legislation in both July and November 2003, Scottish Labour MPs helped to defeat 
rebellions, despite the fact that FTs were not being adopted in Scotland.105 Some 
Labour backbenchers feared that if successful hospitals were awarded FT status and 
increased funding, it could accelerate the gap between them and the rest,106 creating 
a two-tier health service.107 Blair argued that two-tierism already existed, as the middle 
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class could afford to exit the NHS.108 Mohan notes that New Labour politicians 
believed that increases in insurance coverage could engender a growing ‘‘reluctance 
to support public services’’.109 However, demand for private healthcare was relatively 
flat during the 2000s.110 The incentive to go private was diminished because many 
believed that increased investment would lead to ‘‘great improvements’’.111 Some 
Parliamentarians112 argued that FTs were necessary as NHS productivity had 
declined. The notion of declining NHS productivity in the 2000s became a ‘‘widely 
accepted fact’’.113 However, productivity actually increased.114 Consonant with the 
above argument that FTs have not outperformed NHS trusts, Adriana Castelli et al’s 
research indicates that the latter tend to be more productive than the former.115  
 
Mimic-Market 
 
In its second term, New Labour gradually introduced market-like mechanisms into the 
NHS.116 Calum Paton identified four conflicting streams of policy steering within the 
NHS: the purchaser/provider split; targets; the new market; and, collaboration.117 
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Paton explains New Labour’s ever changing and accumulating policy with reference 
to the garbage-can model.118 This views problems, politics and policies as separate 
streams.119 Paton avers that the factors bringing the streams together leading to policy 
decisions are non-rational and contained within ‘‘ideological tramlines which are 
reinforced over time’’.120 Paton states that the conditions for garbage-can policy-
making were enabled by factors such as Labour’s susceptibility to policy solutions 
indicating that it was not left-wing and the captivation of an insider policy community 
‘‘with the ‘reform’ agenda in general and ‘the market’ in particular’’.121 The Department 
of Health set out a coherent framework for the piecemeal reforms in ‘Health Reform in 
England: Update and Next Steps’: demand side reforms (more choice and stronger 
voice); supply side reforms (more diverse providers); transactional reforms (money 
following patients); and, system management reforms concerning quality and 
safety.122 Crisp stated that such reforms were ‘‘heavily influenced by economists’’.123  
 
Alan Cribb contends that Labour were able to go further than their Conservative 
predecessors as they were perceived as ideological friends of the NHS.124 However, 
as Sally Ruane notes, ‘‘one of the consequences of marketization and growing 
privatisation was the emergence of groups of citizens organising to resist further 
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developments’’.125 In 2005/06, numerous trusts reported deficits. Their finances had 
been detrimentally affected by PFIs, ISTCs and payment by results (PBR).126 In 
response, Patricia Hewitt (Secretary of State for Health between 2005 and 2007) 
demanded that financial management override clinical objectives.127 Michael 
Mandelstam and Colin Leys contend that the government’s concern to balance the 
books was due to its desire to facilitate competition.128 PCTs were informed that they 
should, generally, not be employing staff or providing services directly129 and many 
closed and diminished their community hospitals.130 This provoked opposition from 
Community Hospitals Acting Nationally Together (CHANT), established by 
Conservative MP Graham Stuart in 2005, which ‘‘campaigned vigorously’’ against 
such closures.131 Ruane noted that many services were centralised (for example, 
maternity services in Greater Manchester) despite the absence of clear evidence that 
this would benefit patients.132 The financial strategies had apparently brought the NHS 
back into balance by 2008.133 Keep Our NHS Public (KONP) was founded, in 2005, 
by the NHS Consultants Association,134 the NHS Support Federation135 and Health 
Emergency.136 KONP co-ordinated campaigns across England,137 including a rally 
                                                          
125 Ruane, S. (2016) ‘Market reforms and privatisation in the English National Health Service’. 
Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales, Vol.34(2), pp263-291 at p280.  
126 Health Committee (2006) NHS Deficits, First Report, House of Commons Session 2006-07, Vol.I. 
London: Stationery Office, p30 and p38. 
127 Carvel, J., ‘NHS Told: Put Money before Medicine’. Guardian, 23 January 2006. 
128 Mandelstam, M. (2007) Betraying the NHS: Health Abandoned. London: Jessica Kingsley, p88/ 
Leys, C. (2006) ‘The Great NHS ‘Deficits Con’’. Red Pepper, 1 May 2006. 
129 Mandelstam, M. (2007) Betraying the NHS, op cit., n.128 at p76. 
130 Ibid at p91. 
131 Ibid at p106.  
132 Ruane, S. (2007) ‘Can we Safely Ditch the District General Hospital?’ Radical Statistics, Vol.95, 
pp26-30 at p29. 
133 Exworthy, M. et al (2010) Decentralisation and Performance: Autonomy and Incentives in Local 
Health Economies. Southampton: National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and 
Organisation, p143. 
134 Which changed its name to Doctors for the NHS in 2014. 
135 Founded by Harry Keen in 1990. 
136 Established in 1984. 
137 BBC., ‘Rally plan for NHS reform meeting’, 29 November 2006.  
180 
 
outside parliament, in November 2006, to oppose cuts and privatisation.138 KONP 
argued that the government was transforming the NHS into a tax-funded insurer 
through patchwork privatisation.139 By 2010, 1,000 people had joined KONP and thirty-
three local groups had been established.140  
 
Transactional Reforms and System Management 
 
PBR, through which providers are paid according to a tariff, based on the applicable 
healthcare resource group (HRG), was gradually introduced from 2002.141 Although 
PBR was adopted to increase efficiency, Pollock et al state that policymakers did not 
recognise that costs are also affected by ‘‘historical factors such as the cost of 
buildings and equipment and the mix of specialities and types of care provided’’.142 
PBR (now known as the national tariff) has continued since 2010, but is not used for 
some services, such as community and mental health services, which proved difficult 
to create HRGs for.143 A national study in 2016 found that the tariff was not appropriate 
for all the circumstances that it had been designed for (hence many providers may 
have been inadequately reimbursed) and that the allocation of financial risk was often 
dealt with outside the formal rules.144 PBR created perverse incentives (for example, 
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to discharge patients more swiftly145) and is estimated to have increased costs by 
around £100k to £180k in hospital trusts and from £90k to £190k in PCTs.146  
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) was adopted (to overlay PBR),147 
in 2008, along with Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMS)148 and quality 
accounts (QAs),149 in an effort to improve quality.150 Additionally, a never events 
framework was adopted.151 The Health Committee expressed concern that such 
initiatives were not piloted or rigorously evaluated.152 Such measures are indicative of 
identity thinking as the quality of the data produced is questionable. For example, 
Catherine Foot et al found that there was significant room for improving coding for 
QAs.153  
 
Commissioning 
 
New Labour sought to improve commissioning through policies, such as practice 
based commissioning (PBC) and world class commissioning (WCC), and by 
encouraging PCTs to purchase expertise from outside agencies, via the Framework 
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for External Support for Commissioners (FESC).154 PBC was a voluntary scheme in 
which GPs were allocated indicative budgets to commission services for their patients. 
PCTs continued to contract the services.155 Ian Greener and Russell Mannion 
contended that policymakers had not learned lessons from GP fundholding and that 
PBC would increase transaction costs and inequities in access and reduce patient 
satisfaction.156 Most practices were involved in PBC, although nominally in some 
cases.157 Many stakeholders believed that the signals from central government were 
that PBC was less important than other goals (such as targets).158 Natasha Curry et 
al state that the lack of reliable quantified data means it is unclear whether PBC was 
cost-effective.159 The belief that PCTs were too passive and had failed to improve 
service quality or the pattern of service provision led to WCC being introduced in 
2007.160 WCC was intended to lead to better health and well-being (including reduced 
health inequalities), better care and better value.161 Eleven organisational 
competencies for commissioners were established (including stimulating the market 
and promoting improvements and innovations162), an assurance system was 
emplaced and support and development tools were provided.163 Chris Naylor and Nick 
Goodwin found that PCTs deemed the competency framework to be useful but saw 
the assurance process as top-down and bureaucratic.164 
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In October 2007, Johnson approved a list of fourteen companies, including United 
Health and Humana, that would advise on and take over the commissioning of NHS 
services.165  Lister likened this to putting Count Dracula in charge of a blood bank, as 
it involved a clear conflict of interest.166 In 2010, seventy-six percent of PCTs 
confirmed that they were using external support.167 Although competition was not 
compulsory, an EU public procurement directive,168 (implemented into UK law via the 
Public Contract Regulations169) applied where external support was procured.170 
Naylor and Goodwin noted that external support was provided by various 
organisations and involved short-term consultancy, long-term joint delivery, 
outsourcing of discrete elements of the commissioning process or full outsourcing of 
most or all of the commissioning function.171 The Health Committee stated that FESC 
was an expensive way of addressing PCT’s shortcomings172 and doubted the ability 
of PCTs to use external consultants effectively.173 It estimated that the 
purchaser/provider split had increased transaction costs by fourteen percent and 
suspected that the Department of Health did ‘‘not want the full story to be revealed’’ 
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as it did not provide clear and consistent information.174 It concluded that if 
improvements in commissioning did not occur, the split should be abolished.175  
 
The second dimension of juridification identified by Lars Blichner and Anders 
Molander, whereby law comes to regulate an increasing number of activities,176 
describes the effect of Labour’s market reforms which meant that EU public 
procurement and competition laws became increasingly applicable to the English 
NHS. It has been argued, for example by Kyriaki-Korina Raptopoulou177 and Tamara 
Hervey and Jean McHale,178 that following privatisation an EU member cannot 
renationalise health services. Consequently, such laws could potentially constrain 
healthcare policymaking consonant with Stephen Gill’s notion of new 
constitutionalism.179 The EU has competencies relating to pharmaceutical regulation, 
recognition of professional qualifications180 and public health.181 Greer states that, 
consistent with neo-functional theory, the European Commission and decisions of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), created, without demand, other EU 
health policies.182 The CJEU extended the EU’s authority through decisions on patient 
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mobility, the working time directive183 and the applicability of competition, public 
procurement and other internal market law.184 Guglielmo Carchedi contends that 
spillover and spillback effects within the EU are influenced by class interests.185 
Commercial insurance companies and pharmaceutical corporations have exerted 
pressure for health services to be included within the single market186 but many private 
health companies have preferred to lobby member states rather than the EU.187 It was 
confirmed, in Watts v Bedford PCT,188 that patient mobility case law applied to NHS 
systems.189 English patients could therefore receive treatment in another member 
state and the UK government would be required to pay, if there had been undue 
delay.190 The case law crystallized into the patient rights directive (PRD).191 
Raptopoulou states that PRD may harmonize the operation of healthcare services as 
it imposes responsibilities on the member state of treatment and gives the commission 
the (equivocal) competence to regulate the quality and safety of health services 
through European Reference Networks (ERNs).192  
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The Watts case and the PRD are indicative of the first (constitutive juridification) and 
third (whereby conflicts are increasingly solved by or with reference to law) dimensions 
of juridification identified by Blichner and Molander.193 In respect of the former, 
Kenneth Veitch contended that the expansion of EU law, through the creation of 
patient rights, threatened the community ethos on which the NHS was founded.194 
Similarly, John Harrington stated that health tourism poses a threat to the solidaristic 
basis of national healthcare systems.195 In respect of the latter, Veitch contends that 
fundamental political issues, questions and conflicts pertaining to the liberalisation of 
hospital services were distorted, as the question of whether money should be diverted 
to providers abroad, and its consequent impact on government finances and 
healthcare planning, was converted into a question of the particular clinical needs of 
individual patients.196 Veitch states that the rights created by Watts and the PRD are 
a means of increasing demand for cross-border services and the role of commercial 
providers.197 Nonetheless, McHale notes that few patients seek treatment in other EU 
jurisdictions.198  
 
EU member states can deliver public services through the public sector but, as Ben 
Collins notes, EU public procurement law and competition law become applicable 
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once markets are used.199 EU public procurement law was formulated to prevent 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality.200 The aforementioned procurement 
directive distinguished between part A services (including management and 
procurement consultancy services) and part B services (including health and social 
care services).201 Contracts relating to part B services were only subject to Article 23 
(concerning technical specifications) and Article 35(4) (concerning notices) of the 
directive (as per Article 21). Nonetheless, contracting authorities were required to 
comply with the principles of the treaties202 including the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital,203 the right of establishment,204 the freedom to provide 
services205 and the principles deriving therefrom (transparency, equal treatment, non-
discrimination, proportionality and mutual recognition).206  
 
The procurement rules are not applicable if an authority decides to provide services 
in-house or if, as per the Teckal207 case, it exercises control over the provider similar 
to its control over its own internal departments and the provider undertakes the 
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essential part of its activities with the authority.208 NHS contracts (which are not legally 
enforceable) between PCTs and NHS Trusts (not FTs) would therefore be exempt.209 
However, Timmins states that EU public procurement law was becoming more 
applicable as more care began to bought through legally binding contracts.210  The re-
embedding of private law mechanisms, indicative of Scott Veitch et al’s notion of a fifth 
epoch of juridification,211 engaged EU law. Timmins stated that the more the private 
sector invested, the more likely they were to challenge non-compliance.212 Greer 
contends that policymakers therefore engaged in Europe proofing, erecting defences 
against challenge by reducing the discretion of NHS actors by forcing them to comply 
with EU public procurement law.213 Greer and Simone Rauscher state that Labour 
opted to force such law into health services, as it was a logical consequence of, and 
a means to lock in, a clinical services market.214 The Co-operation and Competition 
Panel (CCP) was established, in 2009, to judge potential breaches215 of guidance 
published in 2007,216 which contained EU legal positions.217  
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EU competition law is designed to ensure that competition, where it exists, benefits 
consumers.218 Elias Mossialos and Julia Lear aver that it is often unclear, from the 
complex case law, to what extent EU competition law is engaged when elements of 
competition are introduced.219 A service is subject to the competition rules if it is 
economic and the provider is an undertaking.220 Okeoghene Odudu states that 
activities are economic firstly, if an entity supplies goods or services to the market.221 
Secondly, an activity is economic if, absent legislative intervention, there is the 
potential to make profit,222 as per the Bettercare Group Limited223 case. Odudu states 
that this is a technical question (not normative or ideological) concerning whether a 
service could be provided merely to those that pay.224 Odudu distinguished between 
smallpox immunisation,225 which he contends would have to be provided to all, as 
eighty to eighty-five percent of a population would need to be immunised to achieve 
herd immunity, and hip replacements, which could, hypothetically, be provided only to 
fee-payers.226  
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The EU treaties do not define what constitutes an undertaking.227 Odudu states that 
an entity may be considered an undertaking regarding some activities but not others, 
even if it is not for profit.228 Odudu concluded that although English NHS hospitals are 
state owned and funded and provide universal coverage, free at the point of delivery, 
they ‘‘fall within the scope of EU competition law’’.229 In contrast, Simon Taylor states 
that it could be credibly argued that NHS providers are only economic operators 
concerning activities that have been exposed to competition.230 There are exemptions 
to competition law. For example, Mossialos and Lear state that the service of general 
economic interest (SGEI) exception in Article 106(2) of the TFEU can be seen as a 
defence.231 The courts will assess whether the measure relating to the SGEI is 
proportional.232  
 
SGEI is part of a broader family of related and overlapping EU concepts. The other 
concepts include services of general interest (SGI), which is not part of any binding 
legal text, and social services of general interest (SSGI) and non-economic services 
of general interest (NESGI), which are mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty.233 NESGIs 
‘‘are, in principle, completely out of reach of the competition rules’’.234 Such concepts 
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are not integrated into the law of member states or common in national 
vocabularies.235 Consequently, their applicability is unclear. Ulla Neergaard notes that 
the concept of solidarity (internal to member states) has also become increasingly 
significant in EU law, but that the degree of immunity it affords is unclear.236 In 2006, 
the government commissioned, but did not publish, a legal opinion on the effect of EU 
law on the NHS.237 Ken Anderson (Commercial Director at the Department of Health 
between 2003 and 2007) stated that once services are opened to competition ‘‘at 
some point European law will take over and prevail’’.238 Anderson averred that 
England had passed that point.239 There appears to have been a lack of awareness 
of the potentially constraining effect of EU laws on NHS policymaking as it was not 
discussed in parliament prior to 2010. Nonetheless, some politicians were aware. For 
example, Frank Dobson advised Blair to seek an exemption for the NHS in the Lisbon 
Treaty,240 but this did not materialise. I examine EU public procurement and 
competition law further in chapter six.   
 
Patient Choice 
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Catherine Needham found that the word ‘consumer’ appeared more frequently in New 
Labour’s policy texts for health than other policy areas.241 As mentioned in chapter 
three, consumerism is indicative of identity thinking and the standardization strategy 
of the ideological mode of unification. Nonetheless, New Labour’s interpellation of 
patients as consumers faced recalcitrance.242 NHS patients have always had choices, 
for example of their GP and to go private.243 However, Marianna Fotaki notes that 
choice was not on the NHS policy agenda until the 1990s.244 Alex Mold contends that 
since the 1990s, successive governments have prioritised choice above other patient 
rights.245 Patient choice is indicative of the self-responsibilization tactic of 
depoliticisation because, as Veitch noted, it deflects possible criticism from the 
government’s management of public expenditure by passing responsibility onto 
patients.246 Consumerism has reifying effects in rendering the collective consumption 
of services invisible and constructing ‘‘the public interest as a series of specific and 
individualised encounters’’.247 Labour’s 2001 manifesto promised to ‘‘give patients 
more choice’’.248 ‘Delivering the NHS Plan’ announced that patients who had waited 
six months for a heart operation could choose from various alternative providers 
(public or private) capable of offering earlier treatment.249 Numerous pilot schemes 
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were established,250 such as the London Patient Choice Project (LPCP).251 LPCP 
indicated that although reputation influenced patient’s choices,252 there was 
insufficient information on clinical quality and health outcomes.253 The Department of 
Health concluded that choice was beneficial, before undertaking a national 
consultation in 2003, stating that it could improve access and reduce health 
inequalities.254 Clarke et al note that New Labour sought ‘‘to disarm critics’’ by claiming 
that ‘‘choice could drive equality/equity’’.255  
 
Simon Stevens and Zack Cooper and Julian Le Grand argued that choice could 
promote equity by putting pressure on low quality providers and furnishing poorer 
people with options only available to the middle class.256 Le Grand averred that the 
models favoured by social democrats (trust and voice) would not generally deliver high 
quality, responsive, efficient or equitable services, but that ‘‘properly designed’’ choice 
and competition policies could.257 Ian Greener and Martin Powell note that Le Grand 
portrayed patients as more willing to travel and use information than in his earlier work 
and had jettisoned his previous caveats (such as using agents to act on behalf of 
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patients).258 John Spiers (a visiting fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs) argued 
that choice was moral (as taking it away ‘‘undermines an individual’s dignity as a free, 
human person’’) and instrumental (as it was ‘‘central to the power of change’’).259 
Spiers lamented that New Labour’s NHS reforms did ‘‘not give the individual financially 
empowered choice’’.260 However, he thought that patient choice initiatives could open 
the door to patient fundholding.261 Many argued that choice would widen 
inequalities.262 Klein argued that ‘‘maximising individual patient choice is incompatible, 
given constrained budgets, with maximising the welfare of the patient population as a 
whole’’.263 Fotaki noted that patient choice would not reduce existing inequalities in 
geography or socio-economics affecting access.264 Fotaki stated that policy narratives 
assumed that choice was a ‘‘highly rational process’’265 but that this had been 
challenged by theoretical developments and empirical evidence.266 Paul Dorfman 
stated that the flight of ‘choosers’ could exacerbate inequalities for those not wishing, 
or unable, to travel, such as the sick and elderly.267 Clarke et al concluded, from their 
qualitative research, that the notion that choice could drive equity had not ‘‘effectively 
colonised common sense’’.268 Blair also claimed that choice facilitates higher 
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standards, but as Appleby et al noted, there is no inevitable link between choice and 
quality.269 Mandelstam contends that nursing homes do not support the notion that 
markets operate to ensure the provision of good quality services.270  
 
Blair argued, in a speech in 2006, that all developed countries were trying to deal with 
rising expectations, demands and cost pressures (ageing populations and 
technological advancements).271 Such cost pressures were often cited by New Labour 
(and the subsequent coalition government) as reasons for reform.272 The emphasis 
on alleged cost pressures caused by ageing populations may be used to differentiate 
citizens (a strategy of the ideological mode of fragmentation) into older people, with 
allegedly expensive health needs, and others, with less expensive health needs, which 
may undermine solidarity, something which the World Economic Forum273 and 
McKinsey have envisaged.274 The alleged burden of an ageing population is a myth 
because, as Jennifer Gill and David Taylor note, as people live longer, they tend to 
stay fitter.275 Gill and Taylor calculated that the direct effects of an ageing population 
only increased costs by 0.2 percent per annum.276  
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Corinna Sorensen et al’s literature review determined that technology could increase 
or decrease healthcare costs or be cost neutral.277 There are different methodological 
approaches to evaluating the cost effect of technology: the residual approach, which 
assumes that technology is responsible for changes not accounted for by other 
quantifiable factors; the proxy approach, which involves using a proxy, such as 
research and development spending; and, case studies, which examine the costs of 
specific technologies.278 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) determined that, of the 3.8 percent increase in UK health 
spending between 1970 and 2002, 1.5 percent was attributable to residuals 
(technology and relative prices).279 However, the residual approach is an indirect 
measure, which may lead to overestimates.280 Sorensen et al note that the proxy 
approach is only as good as the proxy indicator and that case studies suffer from 
sampling and generalizability problems.281 Blair claimed that ‘‘greater competition 
between providers to improve both quality and efficiency’’ had changed a €3 billion 
deficit in Germany’s statutory health insurance funds in 2003 into a €4 billion surplus 
in 2004.282 However, such deficits arose despite competition between funds283 and 
                                                          
277 Sorensen, C. et al (2013) ‘Medical Technology as a key driver of rising health expenditure’. 
ClinicoEconomics and Outcome Research, Vol.5, pp223-234 at p226. 
278 Dybczak, K. and Pryzwara, B. (2010) The Role of Technology in Healthcare Expenditure in the EU. 
Brussels: European Commission, pp6-7. 
279 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006) Projecting OECD health 
and long-term care expenditures: What are the main drivers? OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper No.477. Paris: OECD, p33. 
280 Dybczak, K. and Pryzwara, B. (2010) The Role of Technology in Healthcare Expenditure in the EU, 
op cit., n.278 at p6. 
281 Sorensen, C. et al (2013) ‘Medical Technology as a key driver of rising health expenditure’, op cit., 
n.277 at p228. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Siadat, B. and Stolpe, M. (2005) ‘Reforming Healthcare Finance: What can Germany learn from 
other countries?’ Kiel Institute for World Economics, Policy Paper 5.  
197 
 
policies, such as limiting the range of benefits available, increasing co-payments and 
introducing charges for surgery visits, appear to explain the surplus.284  
 
In 2004, the ‘NHS Improvement Plan’ stated that, by 2008, patients referred by their 
GP would be able to choose any provider that met NHS standards and tariffs285 and 
predicted that the independent sector would ‘‘carry out up to fifteen percent of 
procedures per annum for NHS patients’’.286 The Department of Health rationalized 
that new market entrants would provide ‘‘additional new capacity’’ and act ‘‘as 
catalysts for innovation’’.287 It was subsequently announced that patients could choose 
between four to five hospitals, or suitable alternative providers, for numerous 
treatments, through Choose and Book (CAB), by December 2005.288 CAB was part of 
the National Programme for IT (NPFIT), introduced in 2002, to provide central direction 
for IT development.289 NPFIT sought to introduce an integrated care system, the NHS 
Care Records Service, consisting of a local detailed clinical record and a national 
summary clinical record.290 Following a procurement process, in 2003-04, the 
Department of Health awarded five contracts (ten years in length) to four suppliers 
(British Telecom (BT), Accenture, Fujitsu and Computer Sciences Corporation) to 
deliver local care record systems.291 NPFIT was beset by changing specifications, 
                                                          
284 Deutsche Bank (2014) Statutory Health Insurance Scheme: Past Developments and Future 
Challenges. Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank, p33. 
285 Department of Health (DOH) (2004) The NHS Improvement Plan: Putting People at the Heart of 
Public Services. London: DOH, p70. 
286 Ibid at p52. 
287 Ibid at p53.  
288 Department of Health (DOH) (2004) ‘‘Choose and Book’’-Patients Choice of Hospital and Booked 
Appointment: Policy Framework for Choice and Booking at the Point of Referral. London: DOH, p3.    
289 National Audit Office (NAO) (2006) Department of Health: The National Programme for IT in the 
NHS. London: NAO, p1. 
290 Committee of Public Accounts (2007) Department of Health: The National Programme for IT in the 
NHS, Twentieth Report, House of Commons Session 2006-07. London: Stationery Office, p9.  
291 National Audit Office (NAO) (2011) The National Programme for IT in the NHS: An update on the 
delivery of detailed care record systems. London: NAO, p4. 
198 
 
technical challenges and clashes with suppliers (Accenture and Fujitsu departed in 
2006 and 2008 respectively).292 By January 2008, CAB was almost fully deployed, but 
utilisation was lower than expected.293 The aim of a fully integrated electronic care 
records system was ultimately discarded.294  NPFIT (which is estimated to have cost 
over £12 billion) was dismantled by the coalition, but component parts remain.295 The 
Committee of Public Accounts determined that some of NPFIT’s expected benefits 
may never materialise.296   
 
In 2005 Labour stated that it wanted to continue to ‘‘encourage innovation and reform 
through the use of the independent sector’’ which, it rationalised, could ‘‘add capacity 
to, and drive contestability within, the NHS’’.297 As mentioned in chapter three, the 
arguments that the independent sector could encourage innovation and add capacity 
were undermined by the Health Committee’s report into ISTCs. The increased 
involvement of the independent sector was opposed by UNISON which passed a 
motion at the 2005 Labour party conference attacking its growing role and the 
fragmentation and marketization of the NHS.298 Nonetheless, Blair promised the NHS 
Partners Network (formed in 2005 to represent private healthcare companies299) more 
opportunities and predicted that private companies could provide up to forty percent 
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of NHS operations.300 Patient choices were widened, in May 2006, as, in addition to 
local options, patients could choose from a national menu, the Extended Choice 
Network (ECN).301 The NHS Choices website was launched, in June 2007, to inform 
choice.302 Although it allowed patients to compare hospitals in terms of distance, 
travel, parking arrangements and Healthcare Commission rating, it contained limited 
and varied information about facilities, patient support and feedback.303  
 
A Department of Health investigation, in 2007, revealed that ‘‘less than half of patients 
recall being offered a choice’’.304 Anna Dixon et al’s case study indicated that patients 
continued to rely on the advice and decisions of GPs305 and that where they did make 
choices, they mostly opted for local providers.306 Timothy Milewa argued that trends, 
such as levels of reported trust, complaints, litigation and collective mobilization, 
suggested an enhanced consumer consciousness.307 However, Clarke et al’s 
qualitative research revealed that ‘‘people understand that the figure of the consumer 
references the experiences and practices of shopping and observe that their 
relationships to public services are never like that’’.308 Rather respondents saw 
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themselves as patients or as members of the public or local communities.309 They 
perceived the term patient as one ‘‘which positively identified the process of 
developing and maintaining meaningful and productive relationships with health 
professionals’’.310 Consequently, they favoured what Annemarie Mol termed the ‘logic 
of care’ rather than the ‘logic of choice’.311 Nonetheless, Clarke et al contended that 
patients were not content or passive but desired better healthcare.312  
 
Dixon et al’s qualitative research indicated that patient choice did not significantly 
‘‘impact on either the volume or quality of services’’.313 Laura Brereton and James 
Gubb argued that the mimic-market was ‘‘being distorted and or stifled’’.314 In contrast, 
Martin Gaynor et al stated that the reforms ‘‘resulted in significant improvements in 
mortality and reductions in length of stay’’.315 However, Pollock et al contended that 
Gaynor et al’s research lacked ‘‘plausibility and strength of association’’, and noted 
that Gaynor et al relegated to a footnote the lack of a statistical association with other 
outcomes.316 Cooper et al contended that Labour’s patient choice policies helped 
reduce acute myocardial infarction (AMI) deaths.317 However, Pollock et al contended 
that Cooper et al exaggerated the effect of competition (because, as mentioned above, 
many patients did not exercise choice) and noted that AMI patients do not make 
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choices.318 Pollock et al concluded that Cooper et al mistook a statistical association 
for causation.319 Nicholas Bloom et al contended that mortality rates improved due to 
increases in management quality resulting from the patient choice policies.320 
However, as Paton notes, hospitals are ‘‘notorious for their uneven performance 
across departments’’.321 Mays and Dixon doubted whether hospital management 
could have responded so swiftly to market policies and noted that the increasing NHS 
budget took ‘‘the edge off competitive pressures’’.322 Nonetheless, there is evidence 
that the mimic-market became an end in itself to the detriment of patient needs. 
Greener and Mannion’s ethnographic research at an NHS trust in Northern England 
indicates that the market reduced inter-organisational co-operation and introduced 
perverse incentives to put financial probity before local people’s needs.323  
 
Although Brown was sceptical about using markets in the NHS,324 once he became 
Prime Minister, in 2007, the reforms continued. Brown informed the Liaison Committee 
that his government had ‘‘been asking in people from the private sector to review what 
we can do to give them a better chance to compete for contracts’’.325 The PRCC, 
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applicable from April 2008, stated that ‘‘commissioners and providers should foster 
patient choice’’,326 in acute elective services, of any willing provider.327 However, in 
September 2009, Andy Burnham (Secretary of State for Health between 2009 and 
2010) appeared to have announced a policy change by stating that ‘‘the NHS is our 
preferred provider’’.328 Subsequently, some PCTs determined that they could only 
accept bids from NHS organisations, prompting the NHS Partners Network to 
complain that this breached EU public procurement rules.329 A CCP investigation was 
halted as the contentious procurements were suspended.330 PCT procurement 
guidance, published in March 2010, clarified that ‘‘procurement should be non-
discriminatory and transparent at all times, neither including nor favouring nor 
excluding any particular provider’’.331 Labour’s 2010 general election manifesto stated 
that patients would be given ‘‘the right in law to choose from any provider who meets 
NHS standards of quality at NHS costs when booking a hospital appointment’’.332 The 
preferred provider notion was thus indicative of the ideological mode of 
dissimulation,333 as it sought to obscure the competition that had been emplaced in 
the NHS. 
 
Polyclinics 
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New Labour also sought to facilitate opportunities for the private sector within primary 
care. The HSC Act (2003) ended the GP monopoly of primary care services.334 The 
national contract for GPs was replaced by general medical services (GMS) contracts 
(between practices and trusts), alternative provider of medical services (APMS) 
contracts, locally negotiated personal medical services contracts and PCT medical 
services contracts.335 Primary care services were unbundled (divided into saleable 
commodities)336 into essential services, additional services and enhanced services, 
meaning that GPs were no longer required to provide patients with integrated and 
comprehensive services.337 By March 2007, around thirty ‘‘companies had commercial 
contracts to provide primary care services in England through their ownership of 
seventy-four health centres and general practices’’.338  As the new GP contracts made 
out-of-hours cover optional, ninety percent of GPs opted out, consistent with the 
Department of Health’s expectations.339 Stewart Player contends that this was 
desired, partly to encourage private provision.340 The creation of polyclinics (also 
known as GP-led health centres and Darzi centres) also afforded opportunities for the 
private sector. As mentioned in chapter three, Virgin had recommended the creation 
of polyclinics. Ian Smith had also recommended the creation of larger health 
centres.341  
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The government announced its ‘‘intention to shift resources from acute to local 
settings’’.342 This shift was reaffirmed in the interim report343 of a national review 
undertaken by Lord Darzi, a leading surgeon. Darzi’s involvement is indicative of Bob 
Jessop’s notion of attempted depoliticalization through the use of an ostensibly non-
political figure to make recommendations.344 However, this attempt was unsuccessful 
as Darzi’s proposals generated controversy. The national review followed Darzi’s 
review of healthcare in London. Darzi recommended the establishment of polyclinics 
within the capital.345 Such polyclinics were to be the ‘‘main stop for health and well-
being support’’ with a range of available services far exceeding ‘‘that of most existing 
GP practices’’.346 They would be open between eighteen and twenty-four hours a day 
and be staffed (typically) by twenty-five GPs, and other health professionals.347 
Polyclinics were portrayed as being in everyone’s interests as it was stated that they 
would be ‘‘more accessible and less medicalised than hospitals’’.348 Virginia Berridge 
noted that polyclinics were not a new idea as they had been proposed by both the 
Dawson report in 1920 and by Labour in 1945.349 Darzi’s proposals were inspired by 
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international examples of polyclinics.350 In contrast, many states with polyclinics, such 
as Russia, were replacing them with GPs.351 McKinsey also influenced Darzi’s 
programme.352 Darzi’s report anticipated that some GP practices would remain 
separate from polyclinics, but could be networked, thereby enabling patients to use 
the extended facilities.353 This hub-and-spoke model has been described as 
polysystems. Peckham et al stated that it was clear at the outset that the level of 
investment required meant that Darzi’s ideal-type polyclinic was unlikely to 
materialise.354 There was ultimately a shift from polyclinics to polysystems.355 This is 
evident in a subsequent report published by NHS London.356   
 
Darzi was made a peer, following the London review, and appointed Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State at the Department of Health. In the interim report of Darzi’s 
national review, it was stated that at least 100 new practices were required and that 
resources should be invested ‘‘to enable PCTs to develop 150 GP-led health 
centres’’.357 The final report stated that such centres would help tackle health 
inequalities.358 In addition, it announced pilots of personal health budgets359 and the 
development of an NHS constitution.360 The adopted constitution was criticised for not 
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creating any legal rights361 and containing vague commitments (for example, to make 
decisions in ‘‘a clear and transparent way’’).362 The term polyclinic was replaced by 
GP-led health centre (indicative of the euphemization strategy of the ideological mode 
of dissimulation), in both the interim and final report for the national review, due to 
fears ‘‘that its very mention had become damaging’’.363 Ministers denied that 
polyclinics and GP-led health centres were identical, but opponents saw little 
difference.364 In February 2008, it was confirmed that polyclinics were to be built 
throughout England.365 Every PCT was required to establish one by April 2009.366 The 
first seven polyclinics opened in London in April 2009367 and ‘‘by mid-2010, 140 [PCTs 
nationwide]...had managed to establish something that answered to the name’’.368 
PCTs which decided not to procure polyclinics were forced to acquiesce,369 despite 
Darzi’s claim that they were not being imposed.370 The Health Committee was 
unconvinced that all PCTs needed one.371  
 
The Kings Fund described Darzi’s final report for the national review ‘‘as good news 
for patients’’.372 Player criticised the Kings Fund’s response for failing to mention 
commercialisation, an omission which he attributed to its close collaboration with the 
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private sector.373 Player stated that the approval of the apparently independent Kings 
Fund was ‘‘a crucial source of legitimation for government policy’’.374 Nonetheless, a 
Kings Fund report, written by Candace Imison et al, undermined many of the 
justifications for polyclinics. While the government claimed that polyclinics would 
provide more accessible care, Imison et al noted that although access to some 
services (such as out-of-hours care) might improve,375 there were risks to access to, 
and continuity of, care.376 Research indicated that patients in small practices rated 
their access and continuity of care more highly,377 and that although the quality of 
small practices varied, on average, they achieved slightly higher levels of clinical 
quality than larger practices in the quality and outcomes framework (QOF).378 
Londonwide Local Medical Committees (LMCs) contended that moving specialist 
outpatient services and investigative procedures from hospitals to polyclinics could 
lead to diseconomies of scale and increase demand.379 Imison et al noted that there 
was little evidence that moving hospital services to community settings would be 
cheaper380 and that evidence indicated that moving services from hospitals could 
decrease quality.381 The Health Committee determined that evidence concerning 
                                                          
373 Player, S. (2008) ‘Darzi and Co: Corporate Capture in the NHS’, op cit., n.339 at p30. 
374 Ibid. 
375 Imison, C. et al (2008) Under One Roof, op cit., n.350 at p2. 
376 Ibid at p39. 
377 Roland, M., ‘Assessing the Options Available to Lord Darzi’. British Medical Journal 2008; 336: 
625/Campbell, J. et al (2001) ‘Practice Size: Impact on Consultation Length, Workload and Patient 
Assessment of Care’. British Journal of General Practice. Vol.51(469) pp644-650 at p648. 
378 Roland, M. (2008) ‘Assessing the Options Available to Lord Darzi’, op cit., n.377/Doran, T. et al 
(2006) ‘Pay for Performance Programs in Family Practices in the United Kingdom’. New England 
Journal of Medicine, Vol.355, pp375-384 at p383. 
379 Londonwide LMCs (2008) Listening to the Capital’s GPs: Londonwide LMC’s response to 
Healthcare for London’s ‘Consulting the Capital. London: Londonwide LMCs, p13.     
380 Imison, C. et al (2008) Under One Roof, op cit., n.350 at p34. 
381 Ibid at p2. 
208 
 
quality and value for money at similar centres in Germany and the United States (US) 
was mixed.382  
 
Many PCTs did not consult their local populations about developing polyclinics383 or 
were not clear that they could be run by private providers.384 The opposition to 
polyclinics satisfied Colin Barker’s moral economy criteria.385  Polyclinics threatened 
people’s needs and opponents expressed a non-monetary counter-ethic emphasising 
the value of accessibility and continuity of care, something which was already known, 
practiced and valued. A Save Our Surgeries campaign opposing polyclinics was 
initiated by Pulse (a general practice magazine) and supported by the Conservatives, 
the Liberal Democrats, the British Medical Association (BMA) and the Patients 
Association.386 In June 2008, there were protests outside more than 100 surgeries.387 
The BMA organised a petition, as part of its Support Your Surgery campaign, which 
attracted over a million signatures and was delivered to Downing Street.388 Johnson 
dismissed the petition, asserting that patients had been ‘‘dragooned into signing’’ it.389 
A large alliance of GPs considered launching a legal challenge, but abandoned such 
plans as they feared that they could not afford to contest the policy.390 Ministers were 
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reportedly aware of the potential for legal challenges.391  Camden KONP organised 
meetings, a march through Camden and a judicial review392 following NHS Camden’s 
decision to award a GP-led health centre contract to a private company before a public 
consultation had ended.393 Subsequently, the relevant PCT conceded that it had acted 
unlawfully and agreed to consult on whether it should establish such a centre.394  
 
During a debate concerning polyclinics, in the House of Commons, Johnson sought to 
portray opposition as inconsistent. Johnson argued that the government had been 
accused of trying to nationalise (by making GPs state employees) and privatise 
primary care.395 Johnson claimed that the government expected that many contracts 
would ‘‘go to GP-led consortiums not private companies’’.396 However, this is indicative 
of the ideological mode of dissimulation, as it was belied by the fact that, in 2008, 
senior figures from private health providers, such as Assura Group, Care UK, General 
Healthcare Group and HCA, were invited to regular off-the-record briefings, held by 
NHS London, to provide advice on the tendering and procurement of London's 
polyclinics.397 Such meetings were intended to ‘‘reassure the private sector about the 
government's commitment to opening up the market’’.398 In addition, ministers advised 
PCTs to get value for money by setting up bulk deals with private providers.399 George 
                                                          
391 Ibid. 
392 Walker, T., ‘Camden NHS campaign stops private GPs threat’. Socialist Worker, 24 November 
2009. 
393 Pulse., ‘PCT Faces High Court over Contract Award’. 21 October 2009. 
394 Iacobucci, G. (2009) ‘Case Puts Legality of Darzi rollout in doubt’. Pulse, 18 November 2009. 
395 H.C. Deb. 17 June 2008, Vol.477, at Col.819. 
396 Ibid at Col.829. 
397 Nowottny, S., ‘Revealed’, op cit., n.3. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Iacobucci, G., ‘Trusts told to offer firms bulk deals on Darzi Centres’, op cit., n.4. 
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Monbiot noted that although GPs could club together to tender to run polyclinics, 
corporations would have the advantage in the tendering process.400 
 
Of the fifty-four polyclinic contracts concluded in January 2009, fourteen ‘‘had been 
won by private companies or groups led by the independent sector’’.401 Between then 
and April 2010, forty percent of the contracts awarded went to private sector 
companies.402 Although Darzi claimed polyclinics would save money,403 their funding 
per patient was almost three times as high on average as GMS practices.404 Some 
NHS managers blamed polyclinics for deficits.405 For example, NHS Bromley blamed 
its entire primary care deficit, in 2011, on its GP-led health centre contract, which had 
created artificial demand for services,406 as per Londonwide LMC’s predictions. One 
company running a polyclinic in Suffolk agreed to alter its contract after accepting that 
it was hugely overpaid for consultations.407 At the 2010 general election, Labour 
proposed creating a second wave of polyclinics.408 The coalition formed following the 
election halted their development.409 In 2011, it was reported that twenty-six percent 
of Darzi centres had ‘‘registered fewer than 500 patients’’ and that thirty-five percent 
had ‘‘registered fewer than 1,000 patients’’.410 Additionally, while ‘‘Darzi centres were 
set up to offer access to a GP seven days a week, from 8am to 8pm,...six PCTs said 
                                                          
400 Monbiot, G., ‘The Great Consolidation’, Guardian, 29 April 2008. 
401 Kirby, J. (2009) ‘Quarter of Polyclinics Privately Run’, Independent, 20 January 2009.  
402 Iacobucci, G., ‘Firms Overtake GPs in Darzi bids’. Pulse, 28 April 2010.  
403 Darzi, A. (2007) Healthcare for London, op cit., n.345 at p12. 
404 Iacobucci, G., ‘Darzi Centre Funding Dwarfs GMS Cash’. Pulse, 1 July 2009. 
405 Pulse., ‘Darzi Centres Fuelling PCT Deficits’. 26 January 2011. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Iacobucci, G., ‘Darzi Centre Becomes First to agree Pay Cut’. Pulse, 3 March 2010. 
408 Stirling, A., ‘Labour pledges to push through second wave of Darzi centres’, Pulse, 21 April 2010, 
p4.  
409 Quinn, I., ‘Lansley orders halt to all Darzi plans nationwide’. Pulse, 21 May 2010.  
410 Sell, S. (2011) ‘Exclusive–Patients Shun Wasteful Darzi Centres’. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.gponline.com/News/article/1078318/exclusive-patients-shun-wasteful-darzi-centres/ 
[Accessed 20 December 2013]. 
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their centre did not fulfil these criteria’’.411 Ultimately, polyclinics were scrapped in 
2011.412 The nationwide network of polyclinics was dismantled before the contracts 
expired.413 Leys and Player assert that the credit drought following the Great 
Recession (2008-2009) meant that there were no funds to meet the substantial cost 
of polyclinics414 and that their termination was pragmatic, as they were wasting money 
and unpopular.415  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examined the influences on, justifications for, opposition to, and 
effects of, New Labour’s creation of FTs, polyclinics and a mimic-market in secondary 
care. New Labour claimed that FTs would lead to high standards, could reduce health 
inequalities and provide genuine local ownership. However, FTs do not appear to have 
outperformed NHS trusts, the links between FTs and health inequalities were not clear 
to clinicians and managers416 and scope for public influence is limited. FTs were 
somewhat successful in depoliticising healthcare, although ministers intervened, 
despite the law, in response to scandals. New Labour’s reforms facilitated a mimic-
market in secondary care, which became an end in itself to the detriment of patients. 
Nonetheless, New Labour’s interpellation of patients as consumers faced 
                                                          
411 Ibid. 
412 Broad, M. (2011) ‘Government signals an end to Darzi centres’. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.hospitaldr.co.uk/blogs/our-news/department-of-health-signals-the-end-of-darzi-centres 
[Accessed: 26 January 2014]. 
413 Pulse., ‘Writing on the wall for Darzi Centres’. 16 February 2011. 
414 Leys, C. and Player, S. (2011) The Plot Against the NHS, op cit., n.366 at p48. 
415 Ibid at p49. 
416 Powell, M. et al (2011) Comparative Case Studies of Health Reform in England, op cit., n.1 at 
p266. 
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recalcitrance.417 As the NHS was increasingly marketized, EU public procurement and 
competition law (which could have locked in such reforms) became increasingly 
applicable, although scope existed for exceptions. Polyclinics threatened access to, 
and continuity of, care. Although New Labour claimed that it expected many polyclinic 
contracts to go to GP consortiums, it liaised with the private sector about their 
procurement418 and advised PCTs to agree bulk deals with private providers.419 The 
reforms faced opposition and led to groups of citizens forming to resist further 
developments.  
 
 
                                                          
417 Clarke, J. (2007) ‘‘It’s not like Shopping’’, op cit., n.2 at pp114-115. 
418 Nowottny, S., ‘Revealed’, op cit., n.3. 
419 Iacobucci, G., ‘Trusts told to offer firms bulk deals on Darzi Centres’, op cit., n.4. 
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Chapter Five: NHS Reforms since 2010 (Part One) 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter and the next, I examine NHS reforms since 2010. I contend that the 
NHS’ founding principles have been undermined by the Health and Social Care (HSC) 
Act (2012) and by insufficient funding. Governments since 2010 have used the deficit, 
which grew following the Great Recession (2008-09), to argue that there was no 
alternative to public sector cuts and reforms. Cuts to public health, social care and the 
NHS itself have put the service under pressure. I assess the influences on, 
justifications for and opposition to the HSC Act (2012) within this chapter. I analyse 
the impact of the legislation on the organisation of, and norms within, the NHS, and its 
potential reifying effects, in chapter six. I argue that private healthcare companies, and 
their representatives, exerted influence on the reforms through financial links, lobbying 
and direct advice. 
 
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, formed in 2010, rationalized that their 
reforms were necessary firstly, as NHS productivity had declined. However, more 
detailed research indicates that it had increased. Secondly, the coalition claimed that 
the UK had comparatively poor health outcomes. However, it selectively chose health 
outcomes to portray the NHS negatively. Thirdly, the coalition claimed that the NHS 
would become unsustainable without reform. In contrast, critics argued that the 
reforms were a political choice and not a financial necessity. The coalition also drew 
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selectively on contested research to argue that the competition and choice its reforms 
would engender would be beneficial. The coalition claimed to support the NHS’ 
founding principles, and that its reforms were in everyone’s interests as they would 
empower patients and General Practitioners (GPs) and reduce costs. It also claimed 
that there was no alternative to increasing the diversity of health care provision to meet 
needs and reduce health inequalities. I refute such claims in chapter six. Several 
factors meant that the HSC Act (2012) was passed, despite opposition. The coalition 
undermined opposition through a listening exercise, after which it stated it was 
committed to integration (which its legislation made more difficult) and by falsely 
claiming that it’s legislation had been substantially altered. 
 
Cameron’s Conservatives 
 
David Cameron became Conservative party leader following its third successive 
general election defeat in 2005. Tim Bale contends that the party never really 
modernized under William Hague (Conservative leader between 1997 and 2001), Iain 
Duncan Smith (Conservative leader between 2001 and 2003) or Michael Howard 
(Conservative leader between 2003 and 2005).1 In contrast, Peter Kerr stated that 
Cameron’s leadership campaign sought to ‘‘emulate Blair’s success in providing the 
Labour party with its modernised, coherent and electorally presentable image’’.2 Kerr 
et al contend that Cameron borrowed from Blair to a remarkable extent, for example 
                                                          
1 Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron. Cambridge: Polity Press, p20. 
2 Kerr, P. (2007) ‘Cameron Chameleon and the current state of Britain’s ‘consensus’’. Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol.60(1), pp46-65 at p47. 
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in presenting himself as a ‘‘moderniser’’ and a ‘‘pragmatist’’.3 Cameron and George 
Osborne4 were influenced by Philip Gould’s argument, in ‘The Unfinished Revolution’, 
that a political party could not be a hostage to its extremes if it wanted to gain power 
in modern Britain.5 According to Mike Finn, by 2005, the Conservatives had suffered 
enough electoral trauma to modernise.6 Cameron utilised the discourse of 
modernisation to legitimate a movement towards the purported centre ground.7 
However, Bale contends that Cameron only restyled (rather than re-engineered) his 
party.8 While Cameron initially focused on areas such as the environment, the Great 
Recession influenced a return towards a more traditional Thatcherite or neo-liberal 
agenda.9 Bale argues that Cameron did not lurch like other politicians, rather he 
calibrated.10 For example, Cameron’s Conservative party presented itself as a 
progressive party.11 Richard Seymour contends that without New Labour, which had 
captured terms such as ‘‘progressive’’ and ‘‘radical’’ for a right-wing agenda, ‘‘the 
grammar of progressive Toryism would not even be intelligible’’.12 
 
                                                          
3 Kerr, P. et al (2011) ‘Theorising Cameronism’. Political Studies Review, Vol.9(2), pp193-207 at p199. 
4 Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer between 2005 and 2010 and Chancellor of the Exchequer 
between 2010 and 2016. 
5 Finn, M. (2015) ‘The Coming of the Coalition and the Coalition Agreement’ in Seldon, A. and Finn, 
M. (eds) The Coalition Effect 2010-2015. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp31-58 at p35. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Byrne, C, et al (2012) ‘Understanding Conservative Modernisation’ in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. 
(eds) Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition government. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, pp16-31 at p17. 
8 Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party, op cit., n.1 at p21. 
9 Kerr, P. and Hayton, R. (2015) ‘Whatever Happened to Conservative Party Modernisation?’ British 
Politics, Vol.10(2), pp114-130 at p115. 
10 Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party, op cit., n.1 at p382. 
11 Buckler, S. and Dolowitz, D. (2012) ‘Ideology Matters: Party Competition, Ideological Positioning 
and the Case of the Conservative party under David Cameron’. British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Vol.14(4), pp576-594 at p589. 
12 Seymour, R. (2010) The Meaning of David Cameron. Ropley: Zero Books, pp3-5. 
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The Conservative’s commitment to the NHS was queried during the premierships of 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major (Prime Minister between 1990 and 1997) and 
during its period in opposition. Oliver Letwin (Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer 
between 2003 and 2005) reportedly stated, in 2004, that the NHS would not exist 
within five years of a Conservative government.13 In 2005 the party stated that, if 
elected, it would provide a contribution ‘‘based on half the cost of the NHS operation’’, 
to the estimated 220,000 people a year, without health insurance, who paid for 
important operations (the patient passport policy).14 Following the general election 
defeat in 2005, many Conservatives, including future ministers, such as Michael Gove 
and Jeremy Hunt (Secretary of State for Health from 2012 onwards), argued that the 
state should no longer be a monopoly provider but a ‘‘funder and regulator to 
guarantee access to services’’.15 However, once he became leader, Cameron ‘‘made 
strenuous efforts to demonstrate that’’ the Conservatives fully supported the NHS.16 
For example, the Conservatives named Aneurin Bevan as one of twelve great people 
who schoolchildren should study.17  
 
Cameron stated that he knew ‘‘from personal experience just how important the NHS 
is to everyone’’.18 Cameron’s first son, Ivan, born in 2002, suffered from cerebral palsy 
                                                          
13 McSmith, A., ‘Letwin: ‘NHS will not exist under Tories’, Independent, 5 June 2004. 
14 Conservative Party (2005) Are you thinking what we’re thinking? It’s time for action, election 
manifesto for the 2005 general election. London: Conservative Party, p12. 
15 Carswell, D. et al (2005) Direct Democracy: An Agenda for a new model party. London: direct-
democracy.co.uk, p77. 
16 Page, R. (2011) ‘The Emerging blue (and orange) health strategy: Continuity or Change?’ in Lee, S. 
and Beech, M. (eds) The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an age of Austerity. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp89-104 at p90. 
17 Jones, G. and Martin, N., ‘Tories Name the 12 who shaped our nation’, Telegraph, 26 December 
2006. 
18 Cameron, D. (2006) ‘Speech to Kings Fund’. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2006/jan/04/health.conservativeparty [Accessed: 25 May 2016]. 
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and Ohtahara syndrome (a progressive epileptic encephalopathy) and died in 2009.19 
Cameron used such experience to decontest the Conservative’s commitment to the 
NHS, regarding which he stated there should be no question mark.20 Bale states that 
Cameron’s personal experience enabled him to garner ‘‘sympathy and credibility’’.21 
Finn notes that it was therefore difficult for opponents to ‘‘question his personal 
investment in the NHS’’.22 Cameron averred that the NHS had suffered, historically, 
from an ‘‘overdose of ideology’’ with the left and right trying to get the private sector 
out and in respectively.23 Cameron promised that he would not transform the NHS 
‘‘into a system based on medical insurance’’, but remarked that Labour had ‘‘not gone 
far enough in giving a wide range of health providers the right to supply services to the 
NHS’’.24 In 2007, the Conservatives published ‘NHS Autonomy and Accountability: 
Proposals for Legislation’ (‘NAAA’), which influenced the coalition’s legislation and is 
considered below.  
 
The Coalition 
 
The 2010 general election resulted in a hung parliament, following which the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed a coalition with a majority of eighty-
                                                          
19 BBC., ‘Cameron’s ‘beautiful boy’ dies’, 25 February 2009. 
20 Cameron, D. (2006) ‘Speech to Kings Fund’, op cit., n.18. 
21 Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party, op cit., n.1 at p316. 
22 Finn, M. (2015) ‘The Coming of the Coalition and the Coalition Agreement’, op cit., n.5 at p40. 
23 Cameron, D. (2006) ‘Speech to Kings Fund’, op cit., n.18. 
24 Ibid. 
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three.25 It was Britain’s first peacetime coalition since the 1930s.26 Finn argues that 
Cameron and Clegg, who became Deputy Prime Minister, were ‘‘happier working 
together than they were with the right and left of their parties respectively’’.27 Simon 
Lee notes the resonance between Cameron’s liberal Conservatism and the economic 
liberalism of the Liberal Democrats ‘Orange Book’.28 The ‘Orange Book’ moved away 
from the state centred social democracy developed under Charles Kennedy’s 
leadership (between 1999 and 2006).29 For example, David Laws advocated replacing 
the NHS with a social insurance system.30 Clegg also recommended breaking up the 
NHS.31 Lee states that the ‘Orange Book’ signalled the Liberal Democrats potential to 
work with a modern Conservative party which subscribed more to the economic 
liberalism of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman than the one nation Conservatism 
of Benjamin Disraeli or Harold Macmillan.32 Many contributors to the ‘Orange Book’ 
played a leading role in the coalition negotiations and the staffing of its inaugural 
cabinet.33 Matt Beech states that ‘‘at the core of the Liberal Conservatives and the 
supporters of Clegg’’ was:  
 
                                                          
25 Stuart, M. (2011) ‘The Formation of the Coalition’ in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) The Cameron-
Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an age of Austerity. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp38-58 at p41. 
26 Bale, T. and Sanderson-Nash, E. (2011) ‘A Leap of Faith and a Leap in the Dark: The Impact of 
Coalition on the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats’ in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) The Cameron-
Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an age of Austerity. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp237-250 at 
p237. 
27 Finn, M. (2015) ‘Conclusion: The Net Coalition Effect’ in Seldon, A. and Finn, M. (eds) The Coalition 
Effect 2010-2015. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp601-607 at p601. 
28 Lee, S. (2011) ‘‘We are all in this together’: The Coalition agenda for British modernization’ in Lee, 
S. and Beech, M. (eds) The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an age of Austerity. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp3-23 at p4.  
29 Bale, T. and Sanderson-Nash, E. (2011) ‘A Leap of Faith and a Leap in the Dark’, op cit., n.26 at 
p238. 
30 Laws, D. (2004) ‘UK health services: A Liberal agenda for reform and renewal’ in Marshall, P. and 
Laws, D. (eds) The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism. London: Profile Books, pp191-210. 
31 Woolf, M., ‘Frontbencher calls for NHS to be broken up’, Independent, 18 September 2005. 
32 Lee, S. (2011) ‘‘We are all in this together’, op cit., n.28 at p8. 
33 Ibid. 
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‘‘more or less a [Keith] Joseph-Thatcher economic perspective which declares 
the primacy of the market over the welfare state, champions the private 
government of individuals over public government and reduces the efficacy of 
public administration to mere cost-benefit analysis’’.34  
 
The politics of the coalition was therefore a right-wing liberalism,35 evincing ‘‘a 
continuity with the Thatcher and Major governments’’.36 The coalition lasted until the 
2015 general election, at which the Conservatives won a majority of twelve in the 
House of Commons and were thus able to govern without the Liberal Democrats (who 
lost forty-nine of their fifty-seven seats). Cameron resigned after a majority of the 
electorate opted to leave the EU, in a referendum in June 2016, and was replaced by 
Theresa May. The 2017 general election also resulted in a hung parliament, following 
which the Conservatives governed with the support of the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP). 
 
Austerity 
 
                                                          
34 Beech, M. (2011) ‘A Tale of Two Liberalisms’ in in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) The Cameron-Clegg 
Government: Coalition Politics in an age of Austerity. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp267-280 at p278. 
35 Beech, M. (2015) ‘The Ideology of the Coalition: More Liberal than Conservative’ in Beech, M. and 
Lees, S. (eds) The Conservative-Liberal Coalition: Examining the Cameron-Clegg government. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp1-15 at p4. 
36 Beech, M. (2015) ‘The Coalition: A Transformative Government?’ in Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds) 
The Conservative-Liberal Coalition: Examining the Cameron-Clegg government. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, pp259-269 at p264. 
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The coalition stated that its primary mission was to clear the deficit, which had arisen, 
by the end of the parliament.37 This was to be achieved through austerity, which 
involved a programme of public spending cuts (accounting for seventy-eight percent 
of deficit reduction38), tax increases and a ‘‘far reaching restructuring of state services 
involving significant transfers of responsibility from the state to the private sector and 
to the citizen’’.39 Kerr et al state that public sector cuts were a tactic of preference 
shaping depoliticisation,40 as the narrative of the coalition was that the debt crisis was 
the result of the profligacy (in respect of public sector spending) of the Blair and Brown 
governments.41 Mark Blyth contends that the notion that the sovereign debt crisis 
arose because states overspent was a misrepresentation of the facts.42 The coalition 
thus transformed a crisis of capitalism43 into a crisis of state overspending.44 The 
notion that overspending was the problem was undermined by the fact that, prior to 
the recession, the Conservatives had pledged to match Labour’s public spending.45 
The coalition’s austerity policies were influenced by research46 which has been 
                                                          
37 Beech, M. (2015) ‘The Ideology of the Coalition’, op cit., n.35 at p7.  
38 Gamble, A. (2012) ‘Economic Policy’ in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds) Cameron and the 
Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition government. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp59-73 at p68. 
39 Taylor-Gooby, P. and Stoker, G. (2011) ‘The Coalition Programme: A New Vision for Britain or 
politics as usual’. Political Quarterly, Vol.82(1), pp4-15 at p4. 
40 Kerr, P. et al (2011) ‘Theorising Cameronism’, op cit., n.3 at p201. 
41 Tailby, S. (2012) ‘Public Service Restructuring in the UK: The Case of the English National Health 
Service’. Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.43(5), pp448-464 at p455. 
42 Blyth, M. (2013) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p5. 
43 The Great Recession has been variously attributed, in Marxist literature, to increased financialisation 
(see: Albo, G., et al (2010) In and out of Crisis: The Global Financial Meltdown and Left Alternatives. 
Oakland, CA: PM Press), overaccumulation (see: Foster, J. and Magdoff, F. (2009) The Great Financial 
Crisis: Causes and Consequences. New York: Monthly Review Press) and to a rise in the organic 
composition of capital (see: Kliman, A. (2011) The Failure of Capitalist Production: Underlying Causes 
of the Great Recession. London: Pluto). 
44 Seymour, R. (2014) Against Austerity: How we can fix the crisis they made. London: Pluto, p113. 
45 Tailby, S. (2012) ‘Public Service Restructuring in the UK’, op cit., n.41 at p455. 
46 Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2010) ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’. American Economic Review, 
Vol.100(2), pp573-578/Alesina, A. and Ardagna, S. (2009) ‘Legal Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes 
versus Spending’. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.15438. 
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discredited.47 Blyth avers that austerity has not succeeded historically in promoting 
growth or reducing debts48 and is an ideology ‘‘immune to facts and basic empirical 
refutation’’.49  
 
Jane Jones and Cathy McCormack identified the forging of a new morality, in 
government discourse, which misrepresented the cause of the Great Recession and 
stigmatised benefit recipients.50 The latter involved the government employing a false 
distinction between strivers and skivers,51 indicative of the ideological mode of 
fragmentation, to justify welfare cuts. David Stuckler and Sanjay Basu note that 
austerity has ‘‘severe and often deadly’’ side effects.52 Similarly, Clare Bambra averred 
that the coalition’s austerity policies were likely to increase inequalities in mortality and 
morbidity.53 In 2016, the British Medical Association (BMA) noted that household 
income had fallen, while food insecurity, mental health conditions and homelessness 
had risen.54 It concluded that austerity had hampered progress in reducing poverty 
and inequality.55 Lucinda Hiam et al noted that deaths in 2015 were substantially 
greater than in 2014 and that the increase had continued in 2016.56 There was a spike 
                                                          
47 Brodie, J. (2015) ‘Income Inequality and the Future of Global Governance’ in Gill, S. (ed) Critical 
Perspectives on the Crisis in Global Governance: Reimagining the Future. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
pp45-68 at p59. 
48 Blyth, M. (2013) Austerity, op cit., n.42 at pp4-5. 
49 Ibid at p226. 
50 Jones, J. and McCormack, C. (2016) ‘Socio-structural violence against the poor’ in Smith, K., et al 
(eds) Health Inequalities: Critical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp238-251 at p245. 
51 Coote, A. and Lyall, S., ‘Strivers v Skivers: real life’s not like that at all’, Guardian, 11 April 2013. 
52 Stuckler, D. and Basu, S. (2013) The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills. New York: Basic Books, 
p140. 
53 Bambra, C. (2013) ‘All in it Together? Health Inequalities, Austerity and the Great Recession’ in 
Wood, C. (ed) Health in Austerity. London: Demos, pp49-57 at p51. 
54 British Medical Association (BMA) (2016) Health in all policies: Health, Austerity and Welfare 
reform: A Briefing from the board of science. London: BMA, p1. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Hiam, L. et al (2017) ‘Why has mortality in England and Wales been increasing? An Iterative 
Demographic Analysis’. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol.110(4), pp153-162 at p153. 
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in deaths in January 2015. Hiam et al state that the evidence points to a ‘‘major failure 
of the health system, possibly exacerbated by failings in social care’’.57 The coalition 
asserted that there was no alternative to fiscal retrenchment and that public 
expectations of ‘‘the future collective provision of welfare by the state should be 
reduced’’.58 However, as Lee argues, the choices about public spending were 
‘‘quintessentially political choices, and not an unavoidable economic necessity’’.59 Lee 
highlighted that debt as a percentage of national income had rarely been lower in the 
past two centuries.60  Andrew Gamble states that Western states are currently richer 
than when welfare states were introduced and could choose to spend more on them.61 
The BMA noted that, in contrast to England, other countries, such as Iceland, Canada, 
Sweden and Norway, had maintained high levels of public spending on social welfare 
and health to improve health outcomes and narrow health inequalities.62 The cuts 
provoked much opposition and protest, for example, by groups such as UK Uncut, 
which argued that if unpaid taxes had been collected, they would have been 
unnecessary.63  
 
Lee avers that from September 2013 onwards, Cameron and Osborne spoke of their 
‘‘long-term economic plan’’ which recognised their failure to clear the deficit rhetorically 
and justified their ‘‘ambition to roll back the frontiers of the state further than had 
                                                          
57 Hiam, L. et al (2017) ‘What caused the spike in mortality in England and Wales in January 2015?’ 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol..110(4), pp131-137 at p135. 
58 Lee, S. (2011) ‘No Plan B: The Coalition agenda for cutting the deficit and rebalancing the 
economy’ in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an 
age of Austerity. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp59-74 at p64. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Gamble, A. (2016) Can the Welfare State Survive? Cambridge: Policy Press, p59. 
62 British Medical Association (2016) Health in all policies, op cit., n.54 at p1. 
63 Graeber, D. (2013) The Democracy Project. New York: Spiegel and Grau, p22. 
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previously been envisaged’’.64 Public spending is predicted to fall to 35.2 percent of 
GDP in 2019/20, the lowest level in eighty years.65 John Appleby stated in 2014 that, 
taking inflation into account, NHS spending had increased by an average of 0.7 
percent per year for six years, the lowest amount since the 1950s.66 The NHS had 
thus not been adequately funded to maintain performance and grow services.67 In 
addition, the quality, innovation, productivity and prevention (QIPP) efficiency plan 
identified £20bn worth of savings to be made within the NHS, by 2014,68 through pay 
freezes, savings in back office functions and purchasing69 and tariff reductions.70 The 
plan was formulated by McKinsey on PowerPoint slides, which Allyson Pollock and 
David Price describe as ‘‘the electronic equivalent of the back of a cigarette packet’’.71 
Appleby states that significant savings were delivered in the two years following 
2010/1172 but that performance subsequently deteriorated, evidenced by high waiting 
times, declining patient satisfaction and many hospitals reporting deficits.73 The 
Centre for Health and the Public Interest (CHPI) notes that provider deficits are a 
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measure of the shortfall of resources in relation to patient need and not of management 
shortcomings.74  
 
The pressures on the NHS were compounded by spending constraints and cuts in 
other areas, such as social care, housing and social security.75 Although NHS England 
(NHSE) stated, in 2014, that there was a need for a radical upgrade in prevention and 
public health,76 Osborne announced, in June 2015, a £200 million reduction in public 
health spending.77 This has been described as a false economy.78 David Hunter 
contended, in 2016, that ‘‘without new money in the form of raised taxes…it is 
inconceivable that the NHS can survive in its current state’’.79 Public spending on 
health, as a proportion of GDP, is expected to fall to 6.7 percent by 2020/2180 leaving 
the UK behind many other advanced nations.81 Jacky Davis et al note that Noam 
Chomsky stated that ‘‘the standard technique of privatisation’’ is to ‘‘defund, make sure 
things don’t work, people get angry, you hand it over to private capital’’.82 Similarly, 
John Lister states that the government’s ‘‘aim is to scale down public providers, 
downgrade and discredit public services and strengthen the position of private 
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companies such as Serco and Virgin’’.83 This explains government efforts to shift 
blame (examined in chapter six). Prior to the 2015 general election many senior 
doctors signed a letter criticising the coalition’s broken promises regarding the NHS, 
which, they contended, was ‘‘withering away’’, as its core infrastructure was being 
eroded (through hospital and bed closures).84 Colin Leys attributed such erosion to 
debt (especially in hospitals with PFI85), efficiency savings and new regulations 
(examined in chapter six).86 More than 650 GP surgeries were closed, merged or 
taken over after 2010 and the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) warned 
that a further 600 surgeries face closure by 2020.87 In 2016, it was reported that as 
pressure on the NHS was increasing, private activity outside of the NHS had also 
increased (hence the exchange principle, indicative of identity thinking, has been 
extended) resulting in the profits of some companies doubling.88  
 
Public Service Reforms 
 
Stuart Hall argued that the coalition was ‘‘arguably the best prepared, most wide 
ranging, radical and ambitious of the three regimes which since the 1970s have been 
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maturing the neoliberal project’’.89 He stated that ideology was in the ‘‘driving seat’’ of 
the coalition’s policies, although this is ‘‘vigorously denied’’, with the front-bench being 
populated by ideologues, such as Osborne, Gove and Andrew Lansley (Health 
Secretary between 2010 and 2012), who were ‘‘saturated in neoliberal ideas and 
determined to give them legislative effect’’.90 Christopher Byrne et al contend that 
Cameronite neo-liberalism91 consisted of: the big society, the notion of giving power 
to the people92 (which critics saw as a ruse to disguise spending cuts and 
privatisation93); freedom of information,94 as a vehicle for cutting public spending by 
allowing citizens to scrutinise government finances;95 and, depoliticisation (for 
example, the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) was established to provide 
independent economic forecasts).96 Gus O’Donnell (Cabinet Secretary between 2005 
and 2011) believed that Cameron’s team imbibed the message of Blair’s memoir, ‘A 
Journey’, not to squander time in a government’s first term when political capital is 
high.97 Consequently, unlike New Labour’s cautious approach, the coalition ‘‘pressed 
ahead with its reform agenda in areas such as education, housing and social security 
(welfare) at breakneck speed’’.98 Nicholas Timmins opined that the coalition ‘‘launched 
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easily the most ambitious programme for government since the Attlee administration 
of 1945’’.99 
 
Rajiv Prabhakar argues that the coalition arguably extended Blair’s approach to public 
service reform.100 The coalition saw its healthcare reforms as a logical extension of 
those introduced under Blair’s premiership.101 Many saw the reforms as evolutionary, 
as they extended the internal market reforms of the 1990s and New Labour’s 
reforms,102 with continuity in a number of principles, such as competition, choice and 
provider plurality.103 However, the coalition was perceived to be moving faster and 
further than previous governments.104 Lansley entered office with a grand reform 
agenda developed in opposition.105 Former Conservative minister Michael Portillo 
stated on the BBCs ‘This Week’ programme that his party ‘‘did not believe that they 
could win the election if they told you what they were going to do’’.106 However, 
Timmins contends that Lansley’s opposition speeches, which ‘‘attracted relatively little 
                                                          
99 Timmins, N. (2012) Never Again? The Story of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. London: Kings 
Fund and Institute for Government, p54. 
100 Prabhaker, R. (2011) ‘What is the Legacy of New Labour?’ in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) The 
Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an age of Austerity. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp24-
37 at p25. 
101 Department of Health (DOH) (2010) Liberating the NHS: Legislative Framework and Next Steps. 
London: DOH, p163. 
102 Miller, R. et al (2011) Liberating the NHS: Orders of change? Health Services Management Centre 
University of Birmingham Policy Paper 11, p16. 
103 Klein, R. (2015) ‘England’s National Health Service-broke but not broken’, op cit., n.73 at 
p455/Vizard, P. and Obolenskaya, P. (2015) The Coalition’s Record on Health: Policy, Spending and 
Outcomes 2010-2015 Working Paper 16. London: LSE, p106. 
104 Jarman, H. and Greer, S. (2015) ‘The big bang’ op cit., n.75 at p51/Hunter, D. (2011) ‘Change of 
government: One more big bang healthcare reform in England’s National Health Service. International 
Journal of Health Services, Vol.41(1), pp159-174 at p160/Stevens, S., ‘NHS reform is a risk worth 
taking’, Financial Times, 15 July 2010/Devlin, N. (2010) ‘The economics of a liberated NHS’. 
Pharmaeconomics, Vol.28(12), pp1075-1078 at p1075/Klein, R. (2016) ‘Foreword’ in Exworthy, M. et 
al (eds) Dismantling the NHS? Evaluating the Impact of Health Reforms. Bristol: Policy Press, ppxix-
xx at pxix. 
105 Jarman, H. and Greer, S. (2015) ‘The big bang’, op cit., n.75 at p51. 
106 Wrigley, D. (2013) ‘Parliamentary Bombshell’ in Davis, J. and Tallis, R. (eds) NHS SOS: How the 
NHS was betrayed – and how we can save it.  London: Oneworld, pp62-87 at p68. 
228 
 
media attention’’, made his intentions clear.107 The democratic mandate for the 
reforms was questioned as Cameron had promised that, if elected, there would ‘‘be 
no more of the tiresome, meddlesome, top-down re-structures that have dominated 
the last decade of the NHS’’, one of a number of commitments which the 
Conservatives subsequently sought to erase from the internet.108 Davis et al described 
the reforms as the ‘‘biggest top-down reorganisation in the history of the NHS’’.109 
Similarly, David Nicholson (NHS Chief Executive and Chief Executive of NHSE 
between 2006 and 2014) described the reorganisation as ‘‘such a big change…you 
could probably see it from space’’.110 The Conservative manifesto did not clearly set 
out the intended reforms, although it contained a commitment to ‘‘decentralise power’’ 
within the NHS.111  
 
Equity and Excellence 
 
In the coalition’s programme for government, Cameron and Clegg stated that the days 
of big government were over as ‘‘centralisation and top-down control’’ had failed.112 In 
respect of the NHS, they stated that Conservative ‘‘thinking on markets, choice and 
competition’’ would be added to the Liberal Democrats ‘‘belief in advancing democracy 
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at a much more local level’’ to produce a ‘‘radical’’ and ‘‘united vision’’.113 Although the 
coalition’s NHS reforms did not require legislation, Lansley wanted to use legislation 
to entrench them114 and to ensure that a future health secretary could not dilute or 
modify them by administrative fiat.115 The white paper ‘Equity and Excellence: 
Liberating the NHS’ (‘EAE’), which was heavily influenced by the aforementioned 
‘NAAA’ proposals, was compiled soon after the coalition’s formation and published 
along with four consultation documents.116 The notion that the NHS needed to be 
liberated stemmed from the Thatcherite conception that it was a ‘‘bureaucratic 
monster’’.117 Although the word ‘equity’ appeared in the title of the white paper, it was 
only mentioned twice in the document itself, which, Alan Maynard contended, 
indicated that the coalition was ‘‘not interested in equity’’.118 In contrast, Alex Mold 
notes that the word ‘choice’ appeared eighty-four times in ‘EAE’.119 I contend, in 
chapter six, that the coalition’s reforms have had inequitable effects and that rather 
than liberating the NHS, they have centralised power and increased legal regulation. 
Following the responses to the consultation documents, ‘Liberating the NHS: 
Legislative Framework and Next Steps’ was published.  
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The Conservatives had proposed to make the NHS ‘‘more accountable’’,120 in ‘NAAA’, 
by creating an NHS board, independent of the daily interference of ministers.121 The 
notion of running the NHS through a board had often been advocated,122 and 
rejected,123 previously. The coalition programme stated that the aim was to free staff 
from ‘‘political micromanagement’’.124 ‘EAE’ proposed to ‘‘limit the power of ministers 
over day-to-day NHS decisions’’125 and create ‘‘more autonomous NHS institutions, 
with greater freedoms, clear duties and transparency in their responsibilities to patients 
and their accountabilities’’.126 It stated that an ‘‘independent and accountable NHS 
Commissioning Board’’ (later renamed NHSE) would be created.127 It would be 
accountable to the Secretary of State through an outcomes framework.128 ‘EAE’ stated 
that the board would ‘‘allocate and account for NHS resources’’, lead on quality 
improvement, promote patient involvement and choice.129 It would also commission 
specialised, primary care and family health services.130 Scott Greer et al state that the 
intention of the ‘‘white paper appeared to be to establish the same type of relationship 
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between the Secretary of State and the health service which the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer has with the independent Bank of England’’.131  
 
‘NAAA’ proposed that Monitor be empowered as an economic regulator.132 ‘EAE’ 
stated that Monitor would ‘‘become an economic regulator, to promote effective and 
efficient providers of health and care, to promote competition, regulate prices and 
safeguard the continuity of services’’.133 In response, the BMA contended that rather 
than promoting competition, Monitor should focus on ensuring quality.134 While ‘NAAA’ 
proposed extending FT freedoms,135 ‘EAE’ stated that all trusts would have FT status 
‘‘within 3 years’’.136 The coalition stated that it aimed to ‘‘create the largest social 
enterprise sector in the world’’ by increasing FT freedoms and enabling NHS staff ‘‘the 
opportunity to have a greater say in the future of their organisations, including as 
employee-led social enterprises’’.137 The coalition advocated mutualisation as a 
means of empowering healthcare professionals, but there were concerns that without 
legal safeguards, this could be a stepping stone to corporatisation.138 ‘EAE’ 
announced that the ‘‘arbitrary [private patient] cap’’ for FTs would be removed.139 
Many respondents to ‘EAE’ were concerned that abolishing the cap could result in a 
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multi-tiered service.140 ‘EAE’ stated that best practice tariffs would be introduced to 
pay providers for efficient care.141 Although the Health and Social Care (HSC) Bill 
originally allowed for some price-based competition, it was noted, for example by the 
Royal College of Surgeons (RCS)142 and Julian Le Grand,143 that there is no evidence 
that this improves quality, hence the government relented. Nonetheless, Lucy 
Reynolds and Martin McKee noted that ‘‘only services paid for according to tariff will 
be protected from price-based competition’’.144   
 
‘NAAA’ proposed furnishing primary care commissioners with responsibility for the 
majority of the NHS budget.145 This proposal also appeared in the coalition 
programme146 and ‘EAE’.147 The coalition stated that GPs working in consortia would 
commission services in order ‘‘to make decisions more sensitive and responsive to the 
needs and wishes of patients and the public’’.148 Ian Greener notes that the coalition’s 
narrative located GPs as shoppers on behalf of patients, but concealed the rationing 
that would result.149 ‘NAAA’ proposed to extend patient choice.150 The coalition 
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programme stated that patients would be able to choose their GP151 and any 
healthcare provider that meets NHS standards, within NHS prices.152 ‘EAE’ claimed 
that individual patients would be empowered through shared decision making (‘‘no 
decision about me without me’’), control over their care records and choices of 
provider, consultant-led team, GP practice and treatment.153 ‘EAE’ also stated that the 
collective voice of patients would be strengthened ‘‘through a powerful new consumer 
champion, Healthwatch England,154 located in the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC)’’.155  
 
Lansley stated that the process targets, introduced by New Labour, had ‘‘had a 
distorting effect on clinical priorities, disempowered healthcare professionals and 
stifled innovation’’.156 Consequently, the coalition stated that it would remove ‘‘targets 
with no clinical justification’’.157 It stated that it would move away ‘‘from centrally driven 
process targets’’ to ‘‘a relentless focus on outcomes and quality standards’’,158 with 
greater use of patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) and patient experience 
surveys.159 However, process targets have persisted since 2010.160 The coalition 
programme stated that the government was committed to the ‘‘continuous 
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improvement of the quality of services’’, which, similarly to New Labour, it sought to 
achieve ‘‘through much greater involvement of independent and voluntary 
providers’’.161 The coalition claimed that its reforms would make the NHS ‘‘more 
economical with lower transaction costs’’.162 However, both the BMA and RCS stated 
that competition could lead to waste and inefficiencies.163 Clare Gerada (RCGP Chair 
between 2010 and 2013) noted that tendering services was expensive and that money 
would be lost to patient care.164 
 
The Justifications for the Reforms 
 
At the second reading of the HSC Bill in January 2011, Lansley sought to present the 
reforms as being in everyone’s interests (indicative of the universalization strategy of 
the ideological mode of legitimation) as they aimed to ‘‘empower’’ health professionals 
and patients, reduce costs and extend choice.165 I contend, in chapter six, that such 
justifications have not been borne out. As mentioned in chapter four, New Labour used 
words, such as ‘‘modernisation’’, to present its reforms as ‘‘technical and value-free 
updatings’’,166 which is indicative of the euphemization strategy of the ideological 
mode of dissimulation. Similarly, Cameron and Lansley stated that their reforms would 
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modernise the NHS.167 The coalition outlined five principles underpinning their 
‘‘modernisation’’ of public services: increasing choice (wherever possible); 
decentralising to the lowest appropriate level; openness to a range of providers; fair 
access; and, accountability to users and taxpayers.168 The coalition’s discourse 
contained residual and emergent norms. For example, Cameron and Clegg asserted 
that ‘‘the promise of care based on need and not ability to pay is inviolable’’169 and that 
‘‘inequalities in access to…decent healthcare…leaves our society less free, less fair 
and less united’’.170 However, I contend, in chapter six, that the coalition’s reforms 
undermine such norms. The coalition sought to naturalise (a strategy of the ideological 
mode of reification) diversity of provision by claiming that ‘‘there is no other way that 
we can hope to meet…needs and increasing expectations or ensure that services are 
appropriately tailored to meet the gap between the rich and the poor’’.171 However, 
diversity of provision may exacerbate health inequalities by undermining risk pooling 
and cross subsidy within the NHS. 
 
The coalition rationalised that its reforms were needed to address declining NHS 
productivity. Lansley noted that, according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
NHS productivity had fallen in every one of the past ten years.172 Many of Lansley’s 
Conservative colleagues, such as Simon Burns,173 Mark Simmonds,174 Sarah 
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Wollaston,175 Nick de Bois176 and Earl Howe177 repeated the notion as the HSC Bill 
went through parliament. However, as mentioned in chapter four, more detailed 
evidence indicates that productivity actually increased. Andrew Street and Padraic 
Ward utilised more comprehensive data than the ONS and reported, in 2009, that 
output growth had matched input growth between 2003/04 and 2004/05 and had 
exceeded it following 2004/05, due to increases in the number of patients being treated 
and improvements in the quality of care.178 Subsequent research indicated that 
productivity had risen by eight percent between 2004/05 and 2010/11.179 The ONS 
revised the analysis that Lansley had relied upon (on the basis of previously 
unmeasured activity and improved data sources) and estimated that productivity 
growth increased by 0.4 percent per year (rather than decreased by 0.2 percent) 
between 1995 and 2010.180 Street notes that the media reported the ONS’ statement 
that productivity was declining but that the revised figures ‘‘received virtually no 
attention’’.181  
 
The coalition also rationalised that reform was necessary as it claimed that the NHS 
compared poorly with other health systems regarding outcomes. The Conservatives 
stated, in their 2010 manifesto, that deaths due to cancer, per 100,000 people, were 
higher in the UK than in other countries, such as Australia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
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Spain and Sweden.182 The Conservatives asserted that ‘‘someone in the UK is twice 
as likely to die from a heart attack [acute myocardial infarction (AMI)] as someone in 
France’’, ‘‘survival rates for cervical, colorectal and breast cancer are amongst the 
worst in the OECD’’ and premature mortality rates from respiratory disease are worse 
than the EU fifteen average.183 Cameron and Lansley claimed that if UK survival rates 
were at the EU average, there would be fewer deaths from cancer, respiratory disease 
and liver disease.184 However, writing in the British Medical Journal (BMJ), Appleby 
noted that the Conservatives had compared AMI deaths with France for just one 
year.185 Appleby stated that the UK had had the largest fall, of any European country, 
in death rates from AMI between 1980 and 2006 and that, if trends continued, the UK 
would have lower death rates than France for AMI, by 2012, and for breast cancer, 
soon thereafter.186 Appleby noted that differences in survival rates may reflect 
variations in how early diagnoses are made rather than the state of healthcare.187 
Davis et al state that Lansley and Cameron cherry picked statistics regarding clinical 
outcomes to present the NHS as a failing service.188 Although Appleby undermined 
their claims, Davis et al noted that ‘‘few members of the public read’’ the BMJ, hence 
many believed that the NHS was failing and that the coalition’s reforms were 
necessary.189  
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The coalition also rationalised that their reforms were necessary due to the increasing 
costs of technology, drugs and an ageing population. Lansley asserted that these 
meant that ‘‘doing nothing is not an option’’.190 He claimed that ‘‘if things carry on 
unchanged’’, by 2030 real terms health spending would more than double to £230 
billion.191 Lansley’s opinion was that this amount was ‘‘something we simply cannot 
afford’’.192 Similarly, Jamie Fletcher and Jane Marriott described the unaffordability of 
the NHS as an ‘‘empirical fact’’.193 However, Appleby queried such logic, noting that 
£230 billion would be eighteen percent of current GDP while the economy is likely to 
grow in value over next twenty years, hence it is likely to be a smaller amount of GDP 
by then.194 Pollock and Price remarked that those who question the affordability of free 
healthcare ‘‘are unable to explain why universal healthcare was instituted when the 
world’s economy was much smaller than it is today’’.195 They noted that the NHS was 
created when the UK was ‘‘literally bankrupt’’ and was being sustained in Scotland 
and Wales, hence arguments that it could not be sustained in England were ‘‘political 
not financial’’.196  
 
The coalition narrativized that the choice and competition that its reforms would 
engender would be beneficial. It claimed, contrary to the Health Committee’s 
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evaluation, mentioned in chapter four, that the purchaser/provider split brought a ‘‘host 
of benefits’’, such as encouraging ‘‘new innovative providers to compete for 
contracts’’.197 Hunter contends that ideologies and beliefs ‘‘draw selectively on 
…evidence for support’’.198 In this regard, Cameron stated that ‘‘competition is one 
way we can make things work better for patients’’ and that this was not ‘‘ideological 
theory’’ as a London School of Economics study ‘‘found [that] hospitals in areas with 
more choice had lower death rates’’.199 The study cited by Cameron was the Zack 
Cooper et al study examined in chapter four.200 Others, such as the Nuffield Trust,201 
Le Grand,202 Lord Warner,203 the NHS Future Forum (NHSFF),204 Simon Stevens205 
and the Department of Health,206 cited this study (and in some cases, the studies of 
Nicholas Bloom et al207 and Martin Gaynor et al208) to justify their support for increased 
competition within the NHS. Greener et al argue that even if Cooper et al’s research 
is taken at face value, not all the structures in place after 2010 are the same as New 
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Labour’s market, which was the subject of the study, hence it is unrealistic to assume 
that research translates from one period to another in a straightforward way.209  
 
Opposition 
 
Rudolf Klein divided opponents of the HSC Bill into the indigent (those outraged at 
competition, choice and diversity of provider)210 and the incredulous (those appalled 
by the scope, scale and demanding timetable of the changes),211 although some critics 
fit both categories. Hunter notes that many opponents believed that competition, 
choice and provider diversity would erode the public service ethos of the NHS and 
reduce equity.212 There were also concerns that it could fragment the workforce.213 
Kieran Walshe argued that there was little evidence that the reorganisation the 
legislation would engender would be beneficial, that the transitional costs could be 
between £2billion and £53billion at a time of unprecedented financial austerity and that 
structural change adversely affects service performance as it ‘‘absorbs a massive 
amount of time and clinical effort’’.214 
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Sally Ruane states that the overall aim of the opposition to the HSC Bill was 
‘‘essentially a defensive one: to maintain the status quo as a minimum and to halt the 
passage of the legislation’’.215 Ruane states that opposition strategies included 
campaigners attempting to create a cleavage between the coalition parties, the forging 
of alliances with other opponents, persuading Labour to vigorously oppose the bill and 
exposing ‘‘the dangers of the bill in order to widen public opposition and persuade 
wavering organisations to oppose’’.216  Ruane notes that many actions and techniques 
(formal and creative) were employed in the opposition campaign.217 For example, 
Keep Our NHS Public (KONP) produced numerous ‘‘critiques, public letters, leaflets, 
[and] briefing papers’’ to raise public awareness.218 In addition, UK Uncut occupied 
banks, 38 Degrees organised petitions and raised money to commission legal advice 
regarding the HSC Bill and some opponents performed songs and dances outside of 
the Department of Health.219  
 
Ruane states that there were numerous contributory factors to the success of the 
legislation despite opposition.220 One factor was Labour’s ambiguous position given 
its own record of NHS marketization and privatisation.221 Greener states that Labour 
lacked ‘‘an alternative plan other than the status quo’’.222 Since the statute received 
royal assent, in March 2012, several private members bills, including the NHS 
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(Reinstatement) Bill, drafted by Roderick and Pollock,223 have been introduced in 
parliament to amend it, but none have progressed. Another factor was the ‘‘excessive 
focus on the parliamentary process at the expense of building up distributed grass 
roots activity across the country’’.224 A third factor was that trade unions decided not 
to prioritise opposition to the bill in a context of multiple and simultaneous assaults on 
the welfare state and labour rights or to forge closer links with non-union campaigning 
groups, ‘‘preventing the wider dispersal of the campaign’s message’’.225  Davis et al 
aver that the unions were too ‘‘slow to develop any real campaign’’.226 Although a 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) rally was organised at Westminster Central Hall in 
March 2012, Davis et al contend that this ‘‘was too little too late’’.227 Ruane avers that 
there was a ‘‘hesitancy on the part of professional organisations to engage in open 
political conflict with government’’.228 Although the HSC Bill was opposed by most 
professional medical organisations,229 Raymond Tallis contends that ‘‘the medical 
profession and other healthcare unions failed to mount…effective opposition’’.230 In 
addition, ‘‘the engagement of an enthusiastic minority’’, such as the National 
Association of Primary Care (NAPC)’s chair Charles Alessi, enabled the government 
to claim that doctors supported the bill.231 Davis et al argue that the BMA’s leaders 
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were frightened that opposition would ‘‘drag the BMA out of the corridors of power’’.232 
In contrast, they note that RCGP’s leader, Gerada, was ‘‘not afraid to oppose 
the…reforms’’.233  
 
An Ipsos MORI survey in 2012 found that forty-two percent of respondents had not 
heard of the changes or did not know what they involved.234 This may be because, as 
Tallis notes, apart from a few exceptions, the broadcast and print media failed to 
comprehend and communicate the proposed changes.235 Similarly, Hunter argues that 
media coverage ‘‘failed to get to grips with the key issues’’.236 Oliver Huitson contends 
that the BBC, and other media, routinely regurgitated government press releases.237 
Some newspapers were biased in favour of the reforms. For example, David Worskett 
(Chief Executive of the NHS Partners Network between 2007 and 2013), orchestrated 
the publication of several articles within The Telegraph advising the government not 
to mollify their reforms.238 Timmins concluded that, despite some protests and 
petitions, ‘‘the issue had not cut through deep to the British public’’.239 However, there 
was a  ‘‘proliferation of local NHS campaigns and action groups’’ in opposition to the 
changes, which, Davis et al state, indicates that many people believed ‘‘that legitimate 
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avenues of inquiry have been closed to them, leaving little option but to take to the 
streets in order to be heard’’.240  
 
The HSC Bill was rejected at the Liberal Democrats Spring Conference in 2011.241 As 
a result, Clegg informed Cameron that he could not get his party to support the bill.242 
Clegg also reportedly accused Lansley of putting ‘‘the ideological cart before the 
political horse’’,243 which, David Owen notes, implies that Clegg’s opposition was 
tactical rather than ideological.244 Cameron and Clegg were averse to the micro-
management which they associated with New Labour.245 Consequently, Anthony 
Seldon contends that some ministers, such as Lansley, were given ‘‘too much 
leeway’’, and that Cameron failed ‘‘to understand precisely what Lansley was 
planning’’.246 Cameron reportedly admitted that he did not know what the legislation 
entailed.247 Cameron’s response to Clegg’s concerns was a legislative pause, during 
which the government would consult on the bill.248 Howard Glennerster describes the 
consultation as ‘‘a face-saving measure designed to placate a coalition partner’’.249 
The listening exercise was led by NHSFF, a committee of ‘‘compliant health 
professionals’’,250 led by Steve Field (a former RCGP chairman).251 NHSFF’s 
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involvement is indicative of attempted depoliticalization through the recommendations 
of ostensibly non-political figures.252  
 
Despite the aforementioned opposition to the HSC Bill, Jason Glynos et al contend 
that the debate over alternative visions was marginalised by the notion of integration 
(which they describe as an empty signifier and master political logic), allowing the 
statute to proceed with its principal objectives largely intact.253 Glynos et al state that 
the elevation of competition and choice to the status of a regulatory principle meant 
that the appeal to integration was required to legitimise the reforms.254 Such appeals 
to integration are thus indicative of the euphemization strategy of the ideological mode 
of dissimulation. Glynos et al contend that the task of rendering competition and 
integration compatible, ‘‘whether knowingly or not, fell to NHSFF’’.255 NHSFF 
determined that the opposition to the legislation was ‘‘not merely political’’ as it 
stemmed from genuine fears concerning job prospects and the breaking up of the 
NHS.256 NHSFF deemed that some concerns were misplaced and stemmed from the 
government’s failure to explain how the legislation would ‘‘help the NHS improve’’.257 
NHSFF stated that some concerns were justified, such as insufficient safeguards 
against cherry-picking and a lack of clarity regarding whether competition would only 
exist when it served patients.258 NHSFF commissioned a joint report with the Kings 
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Fund and the Nuffield Trust concerning integration, which was already a key concept 
in the work of both think tanks.259 Glynos et al note that while both think tanks are not 
wholly uncritical of government policy, they accept the narrative that healthcare reform 
requires the creation of opportunities ‘‘for a wide range of organisations to provide 
services under conditions of formal equality’’.260 Such provider blind pluralism is silent 
on numerous dimensions, such as whether the NHS’ capacity to pool risk is protected 
from selective cherry-picking tendencies.261 NHSFF concluded that the notion that 
competition and integration were opposing forces was a ‘‘false dichotomy’’.262 Glynos 
et al state that the concepts of competition and integration were rendered compatible 
by situating both within a regime of choice.263 However, Bob Hudson noted that while 
collaboration through the market was not impossible, it was unlikely and that the most 
probable outcome as providers proliferated would be that integration was rendered 
more difficult.264   
 
Glennerster contends that none of NHSFF’s recommendations, which were almost 
wholly accepted, ‘‘changed the fundamentals’’.265 Lansley was reportedly clear that no 
real ground had been conceded.266 Some saw the listening exercise as a sham, as 
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groups opposing the reforms (such as RCGP, RCN and the BMA) were excluded,267 
while ‘‘the private health lobby worked with Downing Street behind the scenes to 
ensure that the new legislation went ahead’’.268 As a result of NHSFF’s 
recommendations, consortia were renamed CCGs to ‘‘reflect the important 
involvement of a range of health professionals’’269 and Monitor’s core duty was 
altered.270 However, Polly Toynbee noted that there was only a grammatical change 
to Monitor’s role, ‘‘from ‘promoting competition’ to ‘preventing anti-competitive 
practices’, the same thing said backwards’’.271 The Department of Health also 
announced new safeguards against price competition, cherry-picking and 
privatisation.272 In response to fears concerning privatisation, the Department stated 
that ‘‘any policy to increase or maintain the market share of any particular sector or 
provider’’ would be outlawed273 and that NHSE would ‘‘promote innovative ways of 
demonstrating how care can be made more integrated for patients’’.274 The 
Department also announced that all trusts would be required to become FTs ‘‘as soon 
as clinically feasible’’275 and that the transitional period where Monitor retains specific 
oversight powers over FTs would be extended to 2016.276 
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Some senior Liberal Democrats claimed that the legislation had been substantially 
changed in an effort to diminish opposition. Such claims are indicative of the 
ideological mode of dissimulation as they sought to conceal, obscure and deny that 
the legislation had not been substantially altered. The Liberal Democrat peer Baroness 
Williams demanded, at the second reading of the bill in the House of Lords, in October 
2011, that ‘‘major changes…be made’’.277 However, the following February, Williams 
stated in a letter (co-written by Clegg) to Liberal Democrat MPs and Lords that the 
party’s influence had led to amendments resulting in an ‘‘undoubtedly…better bill’’.278 
Clegg and Williams claimed that ‘‘elements of Labour’s 2006 Health Act’’ such as ‘‘gold 
plated contracts for the private sector’’ had been changed (the ISTC contracts to which 
this refers had nothing to do with the Health Act) and that there were safeguards in 
the bill to prevent cherry-picking and to ensure that ‘‘private providers can only offer 
their services where patients say they want them’’.279 It has been argued that the 
Liberal Democrats had an ameliorating influence on the legislation.280 However, many 
of Clegg’s and Williams’s assurances, such as the notion that the statute prevents 
cherry-picking, were rebutted by other Liberal Democrats, such as Charles West (a 
retired GP and Liberal Democrat candidate for Shrewsbury in 2010)281 and Evan 
Harris (MP for Oxford West and Abingdon between 1997 and 2010).282 The coalition 
dropped its commitment (made in November 2011) to pay providers at a reduced rate 
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to prevent cherry-picking within a year.283 Toynbee expressed shock and surprise at 
witnessing Williams and her fellow Liberal Democrats giving respectable cover to the 
Conservatives for extreme policies.284   
 
Corporate Influence 
 
Many opponents of the bill were critical of the ‘‘massive lobbying effort’’ that private 
healthcare companies engaged in ‘‘to fundamentally change the NHS in their own 
interests’’.285 Colin Leys and Stewart Player state that there was a revolving door 
between government and businesses, with the Department of Health employing more 
people from private health companies and former ministers (including Alan Milburn 
and Patricia Hewitt) becoming paid advisers to businesses.286 In 2014, Simon 
Stevens, previously a policy adviser to Blair and a senior executive at United Health, 
was appointed NHSE Chief Executive.287 Whilst at United Health, Stevens was 
involved in a campaign, in the US, against a proposed public option of Obamacare, 
implemented via the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010).288 The public 
option was withdrawn due to pressure from the insurance industry which wanted to 
                                                          
283 Gainsbury, S., ‘Proposals to block patient ‘cherry-picking’ dropped’. Financial Times, 2 October 
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284 Toynbee, P., ‘The Failure to stop the Health Bill will come to define the Lib Dems’, Guardian, 8 
March 2012. 
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avoid government competition.289 Stevens was also a founder member of the Alliance 
for Healthcare Competitiveness (AHC), which sought to force NHS privatisation 
through a proposed trade deal between the US and the EU (considered further in 
chapter six).290 Private companies also hired lobbying agencies containing 
government insiders and paid think tanks close to the Conservatives.291 Leys and 
Player state that there was ‘‘a policy-making community’’ within think tanks and 
internal institutions, such as the NHS Partners Network, ‘‘with increasing confidence 
and common understanding to convert the NHS into a market’’.292 In contrast, they 
contend that ‘‘the public has not been honestly informed of the motivations behind 
various’’ NHS reforms.293 Similarly, Hunter states that those dismantling the NHS have 
operated by stealth.294 This appears to be because governments perceive overt 
challenges to residual norms as being politically self-injurious.  
 
As mentioned in chapter two, I posit that there is a micro-ideology of private health 
companies, proponents of which recommend enhancing opportunities for such 
companies in English healthcare as it is in the material interests of such companies. 
This micro-ideology exerted influence on policymakers through several mechanisms. 
For example, some private healthcare companies established financial links with 
politicians. Before the bill was passed, the Daily Mirror reported that forty peers had a 
                                                          
289 Waitzkin, H. and Hellander, I. (2016) ‘The History and future of neo-liberal health reform: 
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290 Hughes, S., ‘The NHS money boss who used to be a lobbyist trying to privatise your healthcare’, 
Vice, 21 November 2014.  
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financial interest in NHS privatisation.295 Social Investigations ascertained that 147 
Lords and seventy-three MPs had financial links to companies involved in 
healthcare.296 In 2014, Unite found that private companies with links to twenty-four 
Conservative MPs and peers, who voted for the legislation, had won contracts worth 
£1.5bn in the past two years.297  Unite subsequently reported that there were sixty-five 
Conservative MPs and six Liberal Democrat MPs, who had previous or current 
financial links to companies attempting to profit from the reforms.298 The Department 
of Health paid McKinsey for consultancy services relating to the reforms.299 According 
to official documents, released under the Freedom of Information Act (2000), many of 
the HSC Bill’s ‘‘proposals were drawn up by McKinsey’’,300 some of whose clients are 
benefiting from the reforms.301 In addition, emails obtained by Spinwatch, revealed 
that McKinsey ‘‘offered to share information gained from its work on privatisation for 
the Department of Health with private health companies’’.302 Many former employees 
of McKinsey have acquired important jobs relating to the reforms.303 For example, 
David Bennett (a former senior adviser at McKinsey) was appointed Chief Executive 
of Monitor.304  
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Agents of the private sector have continued to advocate reforms since the legislation 
was passed. In April 2014, Lord Warner (Minister of State at the Department of Health 
between 2005 and 2007) co-authored a report for the think tank, Reform, suggesting 
a £10.00 monthly membership fee for the NHS and a charge of £20.00 a night for in-
patient stays.305 Warner has been a paid spokesperson for, and Reform is funded by, 
private healthcare companies.306 Maynard notes that pharmaceutical companies have 
also funded think tanks, such as Reform, as the co-payments that they advocate would 
dissolve expenditure controls.307 Davis et al state that introducing fees would be 
expensive to means test and may deter people from seeking treatment.308 Davis et al 
describe introducing fees as a zombie idea, a policy which refuses to die despite being 
killed by evidence and which is kept alive by right-wing politicians and think tanks.309 
The coalition did introduce charges for non-EU nationals.310  
 
Conclusion 
 
The coalition used the deficit which arose, following the Great Recession, to argue 
that there was no alternative to austerity and public service reforms. NHS spending 
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increased marginally and cuts in other areas have increased pressures on the service. 
The coalition’s NHS reforms were influenced by private healthcare companies, and 
their representatives, via financial links, lobbying and direct advice. The coalition 
claimed that the HSC Act (2012) would empower patients and GPs and reduce costs 
(which I refute in chapter six). The coalition rationalized that its reforms were 
necessary by cherry-picking clinical outcomes to misrepresent the NHS as a failing 
service, by erroneously claiming that NHS productivity had declined and by claiming 
that the political choice of reform was a financial necessity. The coalition cited 
contested research to justify increased choice and competition and claimed that there 
was no alternative to diversity of provision to reduce health inequalities. The coalition 
claimed that it supported the founding principles of the NHS, which Cameron used his 
own personal experience in an effort to decontest. I demonstrate, within chapter six, 
that the HSC Act (2012) undermines such principles. Several factors meant that the 
coalition’s legislation succeeded despite opposition. The coalition sought to undermine 
opposition by misleadingly claiming that its legislation had been substantially altered 
and by expressing its commitment to integration.   
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Chapter Six: NHS Reforms since 2010 (Part Two) 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I examine the impact of the Health and Social Care (HSC) Act (2012) 
on the norms within, and organisation of, the NHS, and its potential reifying effects. I 
contend that although the coalition claimed to support the founding principles of the 
NHS (residual norms), these have been undermined by the HSC Act (2012). The 
statute facilitated the reduction of the comprehensiveness of the NHS and facilities its 
further reduction as it removed the duty of the Secretary of State for Health to provide 
a comprehensive health service. The statute undermines equality of access, as it 
enables foundation trusts (FTs) to earn up to forty-nine percent of their income from 
fee paying patients. The statute also undermines universality, as it introduced eligibility 
criteria into the NHS. The statute extends the ambit of neo-liberal norms within the 
NHS, which is evident in the duties stipulated within it and in the competition effected 
by regulations passed pursuant to it. The statute also contains emerging norms, which 
are evident in the duties to reduce health inequalities stipulated within it and in its 
creation of Healthwatch to empower patients. However, the duties to reduce health 
inequalities are undermined by austerity and Healthwatch is perceived as toothless.1 
I argue that as public experience increasingly diverges from residual and emergent 
norms, a crisis of legitimacy may arise. 
 
                                                          
1 Davis, J., et al (2015) NHS for Sale: Myths, Lies & Deception. London: Merlin Press, p123. 
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The statute has rendered the NHS more opaque by making accountability more 
arcane and by facilitating increased private sector involvement in clinical service 
delivery. There is evidence that the market emplaced by the statute has become an 
end in itself, to the detriment of patients. If the lifestyle drift, which has coloured 
government discourse, colonises common sense, it may justify the tightening of 
eligibility criteria. However, attempts by commissioners to restrict access to services 
have faced resistance. Although the government attempted to pass responsibility to 
patients via the policy of patient choice, this has taken a backseat.2 Government efforts 
to shift blame, for example by creating NHS England (NHSE), are unlikely to succeed 
as it retains important powers over the NHS (such as deciding its funding). Healthcare 
has been juridified as law increasingly regulates matters (such as privatisation) within 
the NHS. However, campaigners have kept the NHS highly politicised.  
 
The Impact of the HSC Act (2012) on norms within the NHS 
 
Residual Norms 
 
The HSC Act (2012) undermines the principle of equality of access, as it permits FTs 
to obtain up to forty-nine percent of their income from fee paying patients.3 The 
previous cap had ranged from two to ten percent, with only five FTs with caps over 
                                                          
2 Ham, C. et al (2015) The NHS under the Coalition government part one: NHS Reform. London: 
Kings Fund, p18. 
3 National Health Service (NHS) Act (2006), S.43(2A) as amended by Health and Social Care (HSC) 
Act (2012), S.164(1). 
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five percent.4 Half of the members of the Board of Governors of an FT must agree to 
proposals to increase by five percent, or more, the proportion of income attributable to 
non-NHS services.5 Allyson Pollock notes that the forty-nine percent rule is 
ambiguous, as there is no clear definition of income from non-NHS services.6 Paul 
Burstow (Minister of State for Care Services between 2010 and 2012) claimed that the 
change would allow FTs to ‘‘earn more income to improve, expand or support NHS 
services’’.7 However, the provision has created a two-tier health service in which 
patients are offered the opportunity to self-fund their treatment ‘‘to jump the queue’’.8 
The private patient income of many leading hospitals has risen by up to forty percent, 
resulting in declining standards for NHS patients.9 In 2016, it was reported that the 
income received by FTs, from private patients, had risen by twenty-three percent in 
the last four years as waiting lists for non-paying patients had soared.10  
 
The principle of universality has been undermined, as the statute introduced eligibility 
criteria into the NHS. It requires licence holders to set transparent eligibility and 
selection criteria,11 and to apply them transparently.12 Pollock predicted that this would 
                                                          
4 Curtis, P. (2012) ‘Will the Health Bill increase private activity in the NHS?’ [On-line] Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check-with-polly-curtis/2012/jan/19/health-bill-private-
patients[Accessed: 1 March 2016]. 
5 NHS Act (2006), S.43(3D) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.164(3). 
6 Pollock, A. (2014) ‘Submission to Health Committee Enquiry: Public Expenditure on Health and 
Social Care’. [On-line] Available:http://www.allysonpollock.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/AP_2014_Pollock_HealthCommitteePublicExpenditure.pdf [Accessed: 26 
May 2016], p4. 
7 Health and Social Care Bill Deb. 24 March 2011, Col.1076. 
8 McTague, T., ‘NHS reforms Scandal: Hospitals charging patients for treatment that used to be free’, 
Daily Mirror, 26 September 2013.  
9 Peate, I. (2014) ‘Privatisation by Stealth: Fragmentation of the NHS’. British Journal of Nursing, 
Vol.23(18), p971. 
10 Boffey, D., ‘NHS Cashes in on private payers as waiting lists soar’, Observer, 18 December 2016. 
11 HSC Act (2012), S.103(1)(A). 
12 Ibid at S.103(1)(B). 
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result in providers picking and choosing their patients and treatments.13 Monitor was 
empowered to set and publish licence criteria,14 revoke licences15 and determine 
standard conditions.16 The mandatory services under the FT authorisation system 
were re-designated as commissioner requested services (CRS). Monitor required 
commissioners to identify location specific services (LSS). These are services which 
would need to be maintained, due to the absence of alternative providers and the 
adverse impact on inequalities, if FTs were unable to pay their debts.17 Pollock and 
Roderick argue that Monitor may have acted unlawfully by expecting CRS and LSS to 
converge, thereby reducing the core set of services provided by FTs.18 In April 2016, 
Monitor was merged with the NHS Trust Development Authority to create NHS 
Improvement (NHSI). 
 
The HSC Act (2012) facilitated the reduction of the comprehensiveness of the NHS. It 
abolished strategic health authorities (SHAs)19 and primary care trusts (PCTs)20 and 
replaced them with NHSE21 and CCGs.22 NHSE commissions primary care and 
specialist services. CCGs commission secondary care services, but have been able 
to apply for joint or delegated responsibility for some primary care commissioning 
                                                          
13 Pollock, A. (2015) ‘Morality and Values in Support of Universal Healthcare must be Enshrined in 
Law’. International Journal of Health Policy Management, Vol.4(6), pp399-402 at p400. 
14 HSC Act (2012), S.86(1). 
15 Ibid at S.89. 
16 Ibid at S.94(1). 
17 Roderick, P. and Pollock, A., ‘A Wolf in Sheep’s clothing: How Monitor is using licencing powers to 
reduce hospital and community services in England under the guise of continuity’. British Medical 
Journal 2014;349:g5603. 
18 Ibid/Monitor (2013) Guidance for Commissioners on ensuring the continuity of health care services: 
Designating Commissioner Requested Services and Location Specific Services. London: Monitor, p4. 
19 HSC Act (2012), S.33(1). 
20 Ibid at S.34(1). 
21 NHS Act (2006), S.1H as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.9. 
22 NHS Act (2006), S1I as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.10. 
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since April 2015.23 PCTs were required to provide or secure certain services (such as 
services concerning drug and alcohol misuse) on behalf of everyone in a defined 
geographical area.24 CCGs are not legally required to secure such services.25 CCGs 
are not obligated ‘‘to ensure provision to residents within an area except for a very 
limited range of services’’.26 The coalition transferred funding for public health from the 
NHS to local authorities27 and established Public Health England (PHE), to improve 
health and well-being and reduce health inequalities, on a non-statutory basis.28 Local 
authorities can make and recover charges (extending the exchange principle) in 
exercising their functions to improve public health.29 The HSC Act (2012) facilitates 
the further reduction of the comprehensiveness of the NHS as it only requires the 
Secretary of State for Health to promote (not provide) a comprehensive health 
service.30 It thus amended the duty in the NHS Act (2006) which had originally stated 
that they must provide or secure the provision of services in accordance with this Act 
(in S.1) and outlined such services (in S.3).  
 
In an effort to obscure the change (indicative of the ideological mode of dissimulation), 
Andrew Lansley stated that the minister had ‘‘never had a duty to provide a 
comprehensive health service’’.31 Simon Burns (Minister of State for Health Services 
                                                          
23 Holder, H. et al (2015) Risk or Reward? The Changing role of CCGs in general practice. London: 
Kings Fund and Nuffield Trust, p4. 
24 National Health Service (functions of strategic health authorities and primary care trusts and 
administration arrangements) (England) Regulations, SI 2002/2548. 
25 Pollock, A. et al., ‘Health and Social Care Bill 2011: a legal basis for charging and providing fewer 
services to people in England’. British Medical Journal 2012;344:e1729. 
26 Pollock, A. and Price, D. (2013) Duty to Care: In Defence of Universal Healthcare. London: Centre 
for Labour and Social Studies, p13. 
27 Ham, C. et al (2015) The NHS under the Coalition government part one, op cit., n.2 at p12. 
28 Health and Social Care Bill Deb. 1 March 2011, Col.390. 
29 Local Authority (Public Health Functions and entry to premises by Local Healthwatch 
Representatives) Regulations, SI 2013/351, R.9. 
30 NHS Act (2006), S.1(1) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.1. 
31 H.C. Deb. 06 September 2011, Vol.532, Col.192. 
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between 2010 and 2012) stated that the duty to promote was the same as 1946 Act.32 
However, the 1946 statute required the Minister to ‘‘promote the establishment…of a 
comprehensive health service’’, and to ‘‘provide or secure the effective provision of 
services’’ for that purpose.33 Lansley also claimed that in respect of the duty to provide, 
which had been delegated to PCTs, ‘‘the situation will be legally unchanged’’ as the 
bill in ‘‘exactly the same way’’ passes the duty to NHSE and CCGs.34 However, the 
legislation did not pass the duty ‘‘in exactly the same way’’35 as it decoupled S.1 and 
S.3 of the NHS Act (2006), which had previously been read alongside each other in 
the courts.36 Unlike the Secretary of State and NHSE,37 CCGs do not have a duty to 
promote a comprehensive health service38 (although they must act consistently with 
the minister’s duty to do so39) and they are not accountable to the public for the way 
they spend money.40 Viscount Hanworth contended that the amended clause allowed 
Jeremy Hunt to shift blame.41 Nonetheless, Polly Toynbee and David Walker state that 
Hunt was told to muzzle his criticisms of the NHS, before the 2015 general election, 
after polling data indicated that it was rebounding on the government.42 
                                                          
32 Health and Social Care Bill Deb. 15 February 2011, Col.178. 
33 National Health Service (NHS) Act (1946), S.1(1). 
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40 Leys, C. and Player, S. (2011) The Plot Against the NHS. Pontypool: Merlin, p137.  
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The Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to parliament for the provision 
of the English health service.43 However, as Grahame Morris noted, many of their 
functions have been given to other bodies.44 The HSC Act (2012) furnished both 
NHSE and CCGs with the power to impose charges under S.7(2)(H) of the Health and 
Medicines Act (1988).45 They are thus able ‘‘to determine which health care services 
will be provided and free, and which will not’’.46 Consequently, Pollock and Price note 
that parliament would ‘‘not be able to hold the Secretary of State to account for failures 
in the provision of health services’’.47 The statute also confers on the Secretary of 
State a duty to promote the autonomy of persons exercising functions in relation to the 
health service.48 NHSE has a similar duty.49 Such persons are free to exercise their 
functions, or provide services, in the manner they consider most appropriate,50 and 
the Secretary of State must not place unnecessary burdens on any such person.51 
Stephen Cragg states that this means that they only have the power to intervene when 
it is ‘‘really needed’’ or ‘‘essential’’.52  
 
                                                          
43 NHS Act (2006), S.1(3) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.1. 
44 H.C. Deb. 20 March 2012, Vol. 542, Col. 701. 
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47 Pollock, A. and Price, D. (2013) Duty to Care, op cit., n.26 at p16. 
48 NHS Act (2006), S.1D as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.5. 
49 NHS Act (2006), S.13F(1) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.23. 
50 NHS Act (2006), S.1D(1)(A) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.5. 
51 NHS Act (2006), S.1D(1)(B) as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.5. 
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In effectuating more competition within the NHS (examined below), the reforms alter 
the provision of healthcare within England (increasing private provision). In this 
respect, Mark Britnell (Global Head of Health at KPMG) told a meeting of hedge fund 
managers in New York, in 2010, that the NHS was in the process of becoming a ‘‘state 
insurer, not a state deliverer of care and that the reforms would show no mercy on the 
NHS’’.53 It has been argued that the statute may also lead to changes in funding. 
Pollock contends that the Secretary of State’s legal duty to provide an NHS throughout 
the UK enshrined social solidarity and was required to make universal health care a 
reality.54 She argues that the only reason for removing the duty is that alternative 
funding (from private health insurance, charges or co-payments) will become 
necessary.55 In this respect, personal health budgets (PHBs), which enable patients 
to agree with NHS bodies how money will be spent to address their individual needs, 
have been extended to around 10,000 patients.56 NHSE wants to increase this to 
between 50,000 and 100,000 by 2020.57 The Conservatives stated that they wanted 
to expand PHB use in their 2017 general election manifesto.58 PHBs generated 
controversy after it was reported that some patients used them to purchase 
aromatherapy, singing lessons and games consoles.59 The Netherlands, which 
introduced PHBs in 1997, was restricting them due to problems, such as increasing 
                                                          
53 Timmins, N. (2012) Never Again? The Story of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. London: Kings 
Fund and Institute for Government, p101. 
54 Pollock, A. (2015) ‘Morality and Values in Support of Universal Healthcare must be Enshrined in 
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55 Pollock, A. (2014) ‘Submission to Health Committee Enquiry’, op cit., n.6 at p8. 
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British Medical Journal 2016;352:i552. 
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59 Price, C. and Madsen, M., ‘Investigation: The Luxury Goods purchased with NHS money’, Pulse, 1 
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cost and fraud.60 Peter Beresford argues that personal budgets have not worked in 
social care and that their use in the NHS is questionable, unless policymakers aim to 
use them as a stalking horse for a different kind of health service ‘‘based on charging, 
rationing and much more privatisation’’.61 Youssef El-Gingihy argues that PHBs are 
the logical end-point of turning patients into consumers as they will enable insurance 
for top-ups.62 In this regard, John Spiers advocated health savings accounts to enable 
individuals to top-up spending.63 Nonetheless, the HSC Act (2012) may not confer the 
diminution of the comprehensiveness of the NHS, or moves to an insurance type 
system with legitimacy, as such changes conflict with the moral economy concerning 
residual norms, identified in chapter two.  
 
Neo-liberal Norms 
 
The statute extends the ambit of neo-liberal norms in the NHS. This is evident in the 
duties stipulated within it. For example, both NHSE and CCGs are required to exercise 
their functions ‘‘effectively, efficiently and economically’’64 and with a view to enabling 
patients to make choices.65 NHSI is also required to promote the provision of health 
care services which are economic, efficient and effective.66 This is indicative of 
depoliticisation through embedding normative values into the institutional structure of 
                                                          
60 Van Ginneken, E. et al., ‘Personal healthcare budgets: What can England learn from the 
Netherlands’, British Medical Journal 2012;344:E1383.  
61 Beresford, P., ‘Personal budgets don’t work: So why are we ignoring the evidence?’ Guardian, 25 
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62 El-Gingihy, Y. (2015) How to Dismantle the NHS in 10 Easy Steps. Winchester: Zero Books, p64. 
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64 NHS Act (2006), S.13D and S.14Q as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.23 and S.25. 
65 NHS Act (2006), S.13I and S.14V as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.23 and S.25. 
66 HSC Act (2012), S.62(1)(A). 
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organisations.67 Both NHSE and CCGs are required to ensure that their expenditures 
do not exceed the amount allotted to them.68 The Secretary of State for Health,69 
NHSI,70 NHSE and CCGs71 are all required to improve, or have regard to the need to 
improve, the quality of services. As mentioned in chapter five, the coalition, like New 
Labour, sought to link quality with private sector involvement. Neo-liberal norms are 
also evident in the competition effected by the regulations passed pursuant to the 
statute. I examine the impact of the statute on both competition and choice within the 
following paragraphs. 
 
The HSC Act (2012) requires NHSI to act with a view to preventing anti-competitive 
behaviour in the provision of health care services.72 It conferred it concurrent functions 
(in relation to healthcare services in England) with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT),73 
namely those under part 1 of the Competition Act (1998)74 (concerning anti-
competitive practices as mentioned within S.2(1) of the Competition Act75 or Article 
101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)76 and abuse of dominant 
position as mentioned within S.18 of the Competition Act77 or Article 102 TFEU78) and 
those under part 4 of the Enterprise Act (2002)79 (concerning market investigations). 
                                                          
67 Flinders, M. (2004) ‘Distributed Public Governance in Britain’. Public Administration, Vol.82(4), 
pp883-909 at p902. 
68 NHS Act (2006), S.223C and S.223H as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.24 and S.27. 
69 NHS Act (2006), S.1A as amended by the HSC Act (2012), S.2. 
70 HSC Act (2012), S.62(1)(B). 
71 NHS Act (2006), S.13E(1) and S.14R as amended by HSC Act (2012), S.23 and S.25. 
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Commission (S.26) and replaced them with the Competition and Markets Authority (S.25). 
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75 HSC Act (2012), S.72(2)(A). 
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An investigation, by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and HM Treasury, 
into concurrent competition powers in 2006, concluded that sectoral regulation 
enabled markets to mature to the point where sector-specific regulation could be fully 
or partially withdrawn.80 NHS commissioners are required to comply with the 
regulations which were passed pursuant to S.75 of the HSC Act (2012).81 The 
regulations that were initially published pursuant to S.75 were amended due to 
opposition from campaigners and parliamentarians.82 The Public Contract Regulations 
(PCR) (2004) apply to contracts prior to the 18th of April 2016. The Public Contract 
Regulations (PCR) (2015),83 which implemented the 2014 EU directive on public 
procurement,84 applies to contracts following that date. The directive removed the 
distinction between part A and part B services, hence contracting authorities are 
required to advertise all invitations to tender for health service contracts above 
specified thresholds in the Official Journal of the EU (OJEU) and to follow a specified 
procurement process.85 The PCR (2015) contains exceptions. For example, it codified 
and modified the Teckal exemption.86 In addition, services which can only be supplied 
by a particular economic operator are exempt.87 However, Simon Taylor notes that 
this may have limited scope as recent evidence indicates that many providers are able 
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and willing to bid for various clinical services.88 Contracting authorities with exclusive 
rights to protect services of general economic interest (SGEI) are also exempt89. 
Taylor notes that this may protect essential healthcare services, such as A&E.90 The 
Procurement Lawyers Association (PLA) note that the government has not provided 
guidance on how the S.75 regulations and PCR (2015) interrelate.91 PLA surmise that 
inconsistencies are likely to be resolved in favour of EU law due to its supremacy.92  
 
It has been argued that the reforms ‘‘juridified’’ the NHS.93 Anne Davies states that the 
second (increasing regulation of different activities) and fourth dimensions (the 
increased power of the legal system and legal professionals) of juridification, identified 
by Lars Blichner and Anders Molander,94 are applicable to the HSC Act (2012) as it 
‘‘involves much greater use of law to structure and regulate the NHS, in place of 
traditional mechanisms like ministerial direction’’.95 Davies avers that the reforms are 
also indicative of a further sense of juridification, identified by Scott Veitch et al, in 
which decisions that were previously a matter for government policy become shaped 
and governed by legal rules.96 For example, Davies notes that the use of private firms 
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93 Den Exter, A. and Guy, M. (2014) ‘Market Competition in Health Care Markets in the Netherlands: 
Some Lessons for England? Medical Law Review, Vol.22(2), pp255-273 at p259/Davies, A. (2013) 
‘This Time It’s for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012’. Modern Law Review, Vol. 76(3), 
pp564-588 at p567. 
94 Blichner, L. and Molander, A. (2008) ‘Mapping Juridification’. European Law Journal, Vol.14(1), 
pp36-54 at pp38-39. 
95 Davies, A. (2013) ‘This Time It’s for Real’, op cit., n.93 at p567. 
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within the NHS (which she contends is controversial and should be open to public 
debate) has now become a technical legal matter.97 Davies examined three areas of 
juridification: ‘‘mergers between providers, other competition law requirements for 
providers [abuse of a dominant position and agreements to restrict competition], and 
the rules applicable to commissioners’’.98 I examine these areas in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Davies states that, prior to the HSC Act (2012), mergers, abuse of a dominant position 
and agreements to restrict competition were dealt with via the ‘PRCC’.99 According to 
Davies, the HSC Act (2012) changed the position by accepting (implicitly) that 
competition law was already applicable to at least some aspects of NHS activity, by 
empowering Monitor as the sector regulator and by requiring providers to refrain from 
anti-competitive behaviour in licences.100 Nonetheless, as EU competition law already 
applied to the NHS, the change in position was not a legal change but rather 
government acceptance that such law was applicable. Davies states that the CCP 
determined whether to approve mergers following a cost-benefit analysis.101 In 
contrast, Davies notes that the HSC Act (2012) makes mergers involving FTs subject 
to the general law under Part 2 of the Enterprise Act (2002).102 The result, according 
to Davies, would be ‘‘potentially serious consequences if a merger is found to be in 
breach of the rules’’.103 In 2013, a proposed merger between Royal Bournemouth and 
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Christchurch Hospitals and Poole Hospital Trusts failed as it was determined that it 
would reduce competition in Dorset. Polly Toynbee contends that this deterred other 
potential mergers which may have been in patient’s interests.104 However, Marie 
Sanderson et al state that following the decision, the NHS has avoided entanglement 
with competition law.105 Monitor adopted the role of a translator between the NHS and 
competition authorities to prevent mergers ‘‘falling foul of the competition 
authorities’’.106  
 
Davies notes that competition and public procurement law are mutually exclusive 
hence a body cannot be subject to both.107 However, Davies states that this distinction 
was blurred by the ‘PRCC’ and the HSC Act (2012).108 The S.75 regulations forbid 
commissioners from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour.109 The PLA aver that it is 
arguable that NHS commissioners may be undertakings in some circumstances.110 
PLA note that the S.75 regulations arguably conflict with each other.111 As a result, the 
amount of discretion that such regulations afford to commissioners, regarding the use 
of competition, is contested. Lock argues that the narrow test in R.5 (which states that 
commissioners may award contracts to a single provider where they are satisfied that 
only they are capable of providing the services112), emasculates R.2 (which states that 
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commissioners must act to secure service-user’s needs113 and improve service 
quality114 and efficiency115) and R.10116 (which permits commissioners to engage in 
anti-competitive behaviour if it is in patient’s interests for services to be provided in an 
integrated way117 or for co-operation between providers to improve the quality of 
services118). Lock concluded that if more than one provider is capable of delivering the 
contract, commissioners must hold a competitive tender even if it is not in patient’s 
interests.119 In contrast, Albert Sanchez-Graells and Erika Szyszczak argued that the 
regulations may be incompatible with EU law by allowing patient interests to ‘‘trump 
pro-competitive requirements’’120. PLA argue that Monitor’s guidance121 suggests that 
the starting point for commissioners, in determining whether or not to use competition, 
are R.2 and R.3 (which requires commissioners to procure services from one or more 
providers that are most capable of delivering the objectives outlined in R.2122 and 
provide best value for money in doing so123) rather than R.5.124  
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Ham et al state that, despite Monitor’s guidance, ‘‘there remains uncertainty…on when 
services need to go out to tender’’.125 Dorota Osipovic et al found that commissioners 
have interpreted the rules differently.126 There is evidence that the market established 
by the HSC Act (2012) has become an end in itself to the detriment of patients. A HSJ 
poll found that forty-six percent of respondents (103 respondents across ninety-three 
CCGs) stated that CCGs had not been able to change services as desired due to the 
regulations, or concerns about them, and twenty-nine percent stated that they had 
invited competition for services where they would not have done if not for the rules.127 
Thus although the amount of discretion that commissioners have is contested, it 
appears that, in practice, they have acted as though their discretion was curtailed. This 
may be because of the fear of legal challenges. A fifth of HSJ’s respondents stated 
that their CCG had been legally challenged.128  
 
Nonetheless, there are countervailing factors to the use of competition. Firstly, 
Osipovic et al state that CCGs do not have sufficient resources to carry out numerous 
competitive procurement processes even if they wanted to.129 Secondly, Nick Krachler 
and Ian Greer note that there has been a vigorous defence of the NHS by 
campaigners, such as Keep Our NHS Public (KONP), which has ‘‘kept healthcare 
policy highly politicised’’.130 The number of local KONP groups more than doubled 
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following the HSC Act (2012). KONP collaborated with other groups to create Health 
Campaigns Together, which organised a march against cuts and privatisation, in 
London, in March 2017. Such groups have influenced commissioner’s decisions. For 
example, campaigners prevented Virgin taking over children’s health services in 
Bristol.131 Thirdly, Krachler and Greer note that profitability for private companies is 
affected by uncertainty and a squeeze on prices due to austerity and limited 
budgets.132 Colin Leys states that flat real terms health budgets from 2010 onwards 
put pressure on CCGs to award contracts to providers which make the lowest bids 
(which are not attractive to private companies).133 Consequently, Leys states that 
there was relatively little protest from private companies when Monitor relaxed 
pressure on CCGs to tender all contracts in 2013.134 Fourthly, some have interpreted 
the emphasis on integration in NHSE’s ‘Five Year Forward View’ (‘FYFV’), which is 
examined further below, as a move away from competition. Commissioners in Pauline 
Allen et al’s case study believed that it afforded them greater latitude in deciding 
whether to tender services.135 The Select Committee on the Long-Term Sustainability 
of the NHS determined that the HSC Act (2012) was frustrating efforts to achieve 
further integration and the service transformation aims of ‘FYFV’136 and recommended 
a public consultation concerning legislative modifications.137 The Conservative party 
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states that it is open to both legislative and non-legislative changes to remove barriers 
to integrating care.138  
 
An increased awareness of potential external constitutional constraints is evident since 
2010. For example, Ed Miliband (Labour party leader from 2010 to 2015) asked David 
Cameron, at a session of Prime Ministers Questions, to confirm whether the HSC bill 
would make ‘‘health care subject to EU competition law for the first time in history?’’139 
Miliband’s belief that the bill would lead to a change indicates a lack of awareness of 
the impact of Labour’s reforms, in the 2000s, regarding the increasing applicability 
(and potentially constraining effect of) EU law. Lansley argued that the bill was not 
extending either EU or domestic competition law.140 He stated that ‘‘literally, our 
legislation cannot affect the extent of EU competition law’’.141 In contrast, his 
ministerial colleague Burns stated that ‘‘as NHS providers develop and begin to 
compete actively with other NHS providers and with private and voluntary providers, 
UK and EU competition laws will increasingly become applicable’’.142 Lansley’s 
statements implied a passive role for the UK government (indicative of the 
passivization strategy of the ideological mode of reification), when, in reality, the 
increased competition in the NHS which the coalition’s reforms would effectuate 
would, in turn, extend the application of EU competition law to the NHS. 
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Under Miliband’s leadership, Labour stated that it wanted to ensure full exemption for 
the NHS from EU public procurement and competition law.143 Andy Burnham (Shadow 
Secretary of State for Health between 2011 and 2015) stated that the European 
Commission had confirmed that this could be done.144 This conflicts with academic 
views (mentioned in chapter four) that such laws cannot be unapplied once they have 
become applicable. Nonetheless, as the UK electorate voted to leave the EU, in a 
referendum in June 2016,145 the potential constraints that the EU placed on NHS 
policymaking may no longer apply. Whether Brexit will allow the UK to modify the 
arrangements relating to procurement and competition may depend on any agreement 
the UK reaches with the EU regarding their future trading relationship.146 The UK is 
currently a party to the WTO government procurement agreement (GPA) through the 
EU, but will be required to apply for membership in its own right.147  
 
The potential of EU laws to restrict NHS policymaking did not feature prominently in 
the referendum campaign in 2016, although it was noted by some leave campaigners, 
such as David Owen.148 Nonetheless, there was concern prior to and during the 
referendum campaign that a potential trade deal between the US and the EU, known 
as the trans-Atlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP), could restrict 
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policymaking concerning the NHS. This is evident in the issue being raised in several 
newspaper articles149 and numerous times within parliament.150 In addition, 38 
Degrees organised a petition against TTIP and raised public awareness via 
advertisements and leaflets.151 There are similar concerns regarding the potential for 
post-Brexit trade deals to constrain NHS policymaking. Such concerns have been 
expressed by journalists, (such as George Monbiot152), trade union leaders, 
politicians,153 numerous health professionals154 and campaign groups, such as 38 
Degrees. This contrasts with the ostensible lack of awareness of external 
constitutional constraints pertaining to the NHS, outside of academia, prior to 2010. 
Such increasing awareness of such potential constrains means that any prospective 
restrictions on NHS policymaking are likely to be politically contested. Consequently, 
the strategies of juridification and new constitutionalism do not appear to have been, 
and are not likely to be, successful in depoliticising neo-liberal alterations to the NHS.  
 
If commissioners do utilise competition, this may involve contractors competing for a 
tender or a service being opened up to patient choice. The coalition stated that it 
wanted to phase in patient choice of any qualified provider (AQP), from 2012,155 to 
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empower patients and carers, improve outcomes, and enable service innovation.156 
The Department of Health outlined a list of potential services for priority 
implementation, including wheelchair services, podiatry services and musculoskeletal 
services for back and neck pain.157 Lorelei Jones and Nicholas Mays note that there 
was confusion about the degree of freedom CCGs had in respect of AQP which meant 
that its use was not always well matched to local needs.158 Only a minority of the 183 
CCGs that responded to the Health Services Journal (HSJ) had opened services to 
AQP in 2014/15.159 Although the Department of Health states that the policy has not 
changed, there have been no further mandatory requirements for commissioners to 
extend AQP since 2012/13.160 Ham et al therefore concluded that AQP has taken a 
backseat.161 Davis et al note that the reforms threaten many choices desired by 
patients, such as a good local hospital and a familiar GP.162  
 
Emergent Norms 
 
The HSC Act (2012) also contains the emergent norms of reducing health inequalities 
and empowering patients and the public. It requires the Secretary of State to have 
regard to the need to reduce inequalities in exercising their functions.163 NHSE and 
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CCGs are required to have regard to the need to reduce inequalities in access164 and 
outcomes.165 In addition, NHSE, CCGs and NHSI are required to exercise their powers 
with a view to ensuring that health services are provided in an integrated way where 
they consider that it would improve the quality (including outcomes) of such 
services,166 reduce inequalities in respect of access167 or reduce inequalities in 
outcomes.168 NHSE and CCGs must also act with a view to securing that the provision 
of health services is integrated with the provision of health related services or social 
care services where the same criteria are met.169 NHSI is required to have regard to 
NHSE’s and CCG’s duties to do the same.170 However, Lynsey Warwick-Giles found 
that such duties had no meaning for the CCGs within her case study (three CCGs in 
Northern England) due to problems conceptualising health inequalities.171 Martin 
Wenzl and Elias Mossialos aver that there has not been sufficient guidance on the 
equity duty and that it has not been implemented effectively.172 The articulation and 
implementation into law of this norm, by the coalition, is thus superficial and is 
undermined by austerity policies, which, as noted in chapter five, are likely to increase 
health inequalities. Nonetheless, the fact that reducing health inequalities is now a 
legal norm means that it could be a potential ground of judicial review of decisions of 
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statutorily obligated entities. It is also a means of critiquing government policy and 
thinking of alternatives.   
 
The HSC Act (2012) stipulates that NHSE and CCGs must include prospective 
patients, for example, in the planning of their commissioning arrangements173 and in 
the development and consideration of proposals which would affect the range, or 
manner of delivery, of services.174 NHSI is required to secure that health care users 
and the public are involved to an appropriate degree in decisions (not related to 
particular cases) it makes about the exercise of its functions.175 However, David 
Horton and Gary Lynch-Wood argue that whereas commissioners had previously been 
required to consult (and produce a report about their consultations) prior to making 
commissioning decisions, they now have the option of consulting, providing 
information, or using other ways to engage patients, which potentially weakens user 
engagement.176 In 2014, the High Court determined that NHSE was flouting its 
obligations by imposing charges in primary care services without consulting.177 
Although citizens can request a judicial review in cases where bodies have not 
complied with their obligations, the coalition made this harder by reducing the time 
limit to make an application and removing the right to a hearing in some cases.178 In 
2013, the High Court determined that Trust Special Administrators (TSAs)179 could not 
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draw up plans other than for the trust for which they have been appointed.180 In 
response, the coalition passed the Care Act (2014), which removed the obligation that 
the public must be consulted about TSA reports181 and enables TSAs to recommend 
changes across a whole local health economy.182 TSAs are required to ensure that 
trusts can pay their debts and have no complementary duty to plan health services for 
the population of an area on the basis of need.183 The governing body of each CCG 
must have two lay members184 and its meetings must be open to the public, except 
where this is not in the public interest.185 Alison O’Shea et al’s case study research 
found that public input at CCG board public meetings was tokenistic and that lay 
members did not constitute a powerful voice.186  
 
The HSC Act (2012) created Healthwatch England187 to enhance the collective voice 
of patients.188 However, Pam Carter and Graham Martin note that Healthwatch has 
also been described as a consumer champion, which suggests a market orientation.189 
Charles West notes that there is a potential conflict of interest as Healthwatch is a 
committee of the Care Quality Commission (CQC),190 which complaints may 
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implicate.191 Such lack of independence led Davis et al to describe Healthwatch as 
toothless.192 LINKs have been replaced by Local Healthwatch (LHW) organisations,193 
which are non-statutory bodies undertaking statutory functions.194 Each local authority 
contracts an organisation to provide LHW.195 Sally Ruane states that LHWs are under-
resourced and suffer from role confusion.196 Jonathan Tritter and Meri Koivusalo note 
that the voice of local communities has been stifled as LHWs are prohibited from 
advocating a change in law or policy.197 LHWs are often separate from independent 
advocacy services, limiting the information that they receive.198  
 
LHWs have seats on Health and Well Being Boards (HWBs), which each local 
authority must establish.199 HWBs are required to encourage integrated working200 
and bring together bodies from the NHS, public health and local government to plan 
how to meet local health and care needs.201 HWBs discharge the duties of local 
authorities and partner CCGs to undertake joint strategic needs assessments 
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(JSNAs)202 and to set out how identified needs will be addressed through joint health 
and well-being strategies (JHWSs).203 Helen Gilburt et al found that respondents from 
LHWs perceived HWBs as forums for approval, precluding the opportunity for 
influence.204 Richard Humphries and Amy Galea note that few HWBs have prioritised 
public engagement.205 The scrutiny power of Overview and Scrutiny Committees 
(OSCs) was transferred to local authorities,206 although they may choose to continue 
to operate OSCs.207 In respect of Lansley’s promise that patients would be central to 
clinical decisions, Anita Fatchett et al contend that it is unclear whether this was 
rhetoric or a serious promise and that much work is required to make it a reality.208 
Consequently, the new mechanisms have not enhanced the voice of patients or the 
public. Such norms are thus means of critiquing the coalition’s policies and of 
conceiving alternatives.  
 
The Impact of the HSC Act (2012) on the Organisation of the NHS 
 
As mentioned in chapter five, the coalition criticised Labour’s top-down prescription 
and centralisation and stated that it wanted to decentralise power within the NHS. 
Greer et al state that the old Department of Health was spun off into new organisations, 
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creating ‘‘the potential for incoherence, duplication and turf wars at the centre’’.209 In 
September 2016, Baroness Walmsley contended that it was still ‘‘unclear how the five 
national bodies [the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), CQC, 
PHE, NHSE and NHSI] interact with each other, and where the Secretary of State 
comes into the picture’’.210 According to Calum Paton, the law of NHS structural 
change is that ‘‘the more decentralisation is sought or advertised, the more centralism 
occurs’’.211 Both austerity212 and the government’s attempts to improve quality and 
safety following the Mid Staffordshire scandal213 have been cited as reasons for the 
reassertion of control by the centre. Greer et al state that although there was a 
reduction of staff within the Department of Health, ministers maintained a grip on NHS 
policy (and shaped the functions and priorities of national bodies) through levers, such 
as the power of patronage, the power to set budgets and the ability to legislate to 
achieve ministerial priorities.214 As the coalition’s reforms eliminated management 
below the central level and led to ‘‘much tighter central regulation of payers and 
providers’’, Greer and Matzke state that they are consistent with the centralisation that 
occurred under Labour.215 Collins argues that FTs have become increasingly micro-
managed, thereby eroding the distinction between them and trusts.216 Current NHS 
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governance has been described as being of the network form217 as the centre is 
fragmented.218 In the following paragraphs, I evaluate the creation of NHSE and 
CCGs, the use of indicators and privatisation in the NHS since 2010. 
 
NHS England 
 
Matthew Flinders and Matthew Wood note that NHSE was introduced on the basis of 
explicit arguments of the need to depoliticise healthcare policy.219 Much of NHSE’s 
activity flows through its local area teams, which are accountable only upwards.220 The 
Secretary of State is required to publish a mandate setting out objectives for NHSE,221 
keep under review the effectiveness of NHSE, and other national bodies222 and 
publish an annual report on NHS performance.223 Stephen Peckham notes that it is 
uncertain whether NHSE is accountable merely to its board or whether it also responds 
to political pressure from the public, the Department of Health and Parliament.224 The 
Public Administration Select Committee determined, in 2014, that the relationship 
between the Secretary of State and NHSE was ‘‘still evolving’’.225 As mentioned in 
chapter two, Flinders and Buller noted that where a principal-agent relationship is 
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established, the independence of the latter is questionable.226 In 2014, Simon Stevens 
(Chief Executive of NHSE from 2014 onwards) informed David Cameron that the NHS 
was facing an annual £30 billion shortfall by 2020 which required £15-16 billion to fill 
(with the rest met by efficiency savings). According to David Laws, Stevens was 
pressured to reduce the amount requested ‘‘to a more deliverable sum’’.227 Stevens 
subsequently asked for £8 billion. The articulation of the £8 billion figure by the 
ostensibly independent NHSE, served to depoliticise the resources required by the 
NHS, as the figure was widely accepted during the 2015 general election. However, 
the issue was repoliticised following Laws’ revelations and claims that the pledge will 
be unfulfilled.228 Stevens was less pliant at a Committee of Public Accounts hearing, 
in January 2017, where he described Theresa May’s claim that the NHS was receiving 
the money that it had requested as ‘‘stretching it’’.229 Subsequently, Downing Street 
aides briefed against him.230 It was reported that Stevens will continue outlining his 
views for NHS funding but will cease publicly advocating more money for social care, 
which had antagonised May.231 NHSE’s Chief Executive thus appears to have the 
potential to both politicise (evidenced by Stevens publicly contradicting May) and 
depoliticise (evidenced by Stevens’ articulation of the £8 billion figure) healthcare 
policy. 
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Timmins contends that Stevens is taking much of the heat in the current funding crisis 
and that depoliticisation has succeeded to the extent that Hunt ‘‘is apparently not 
responsible for what is happening on his watch’’, despite his involvement in running 
the NHS (such as demanding performance updates from various national bodies).232 
However, this was belied by the aforementioned march against cuts and privatisation, 
in March 2017, attended by an estimated 250,000 people,233 at which many of the 
demonstrator’s placards bore Hunt’s visage rather than Stevens’. In addition, Hunt has 
been at the centre of high-profile disputes, such as acrimonious negotiations regarding 
new contracts for junior doctors. Hunt sought to justify such contracts on the basis that 
they would address an alleged ‘weekend effect’ (a higher incidence of patients dying 
at the weekend), a notion which was based on flawed data.234 While the existence of 
NHSE may enable the government to attempt to shift blame, the public do not appear 
to have shifted from blaming the government to blaming NHSE for NHS problems. 
This may be because the government retains significant powers over the NHS, such 
as determining its funding, the recent lack of which the public appear to regard as the 
cause of its difficulties.235 Frank Dobson states that although, in law, the minister does 
not have direct responsibility ‘‘nobody believes it really, and he [Hunt] is clearly 
                                                          
232 Timmins, N., ‘‘Teflon’ Jeremy Hunt and the depoliticisation of the NHS’. [On-line] Available: 
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/blog/2017/02/teflon-jeremy-hunt-and-depoliticisation-of-nhs [Accessed: 
03 April 2017]. 
233 Pells, R., ‘Thousands march in protest over plans for ‘unprecedented’ NHS cuts’, Independent, 04 
March 2017.  
234 Li, L. and Rothwell, P., ‘Biases in detection of apparent “weekend effect” on outcome with 
administrative coding data: population based study of stroke’, British Medical Journal 2016;353:i2648/ 
McKee, M., ‘The weekend effect: now you see it, now you don’t’,  British Medical 
Journal 2016;353:i2750. 
235 The British Social Attitudes Survey, in 2015, found a widespread feeling that the NHS was facing a 
funding problem. See Appleby, J. et al (2015) ‘Health’ in Curtice, J. and Ormston, R. (eds) British 
Social Attitudes: the 32nd Report. London: NatCen Social Research, pp102-121 at p111. 
284 
 
interfering all the time’’.236 Thus despite the legislative changes, the government 
continues to be viewed as responsible for ‘‘the success or failure of health policy’’.237 
 
Clinical Commissioning Groups 
 
As mentioned in chapter five, CCGs were established to empower GPs to commission 
services on behalf of their patients. In April 2013, 211 CCGs became operational.238 
All NHS GPs must belong to a CCG, although their involvement varies.239 Kath 
Checkland et al note that CCGs differ in size, structure and the roles that GPs play.240 
Many GPs have conflicts of interest ‘‘ranging from directorships of local for-profit health 
care service companies to stock ownership in large national health care 
corporations’’.241 CCGs maintain registers of their members.242 Members must declare 
any actual or potential conflict of interest.243 Holly Holder et al note that such conflicts 
are often mitigated by conflicted GPs leaving the room and through the use non-
clinicians to provide external scrutiny.244 CCGs are regulated as market actors by 
NHSI, through a performance management regime run by NHSE245 and also respond 
to their co-located local authority.246 In 2016, twenty-six CCGs were deemed 
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inadequate and nine were placed in special measures.247 From 2016/17 onwards, 
CCGs will be rated in twenty-nine areas underpinned by sixty indicators, which are 
available on the MyNHS website.248 Rather than being empowered, as per the 
coalition’s justifications for the reforms, a Pulse survey indicated that GPs did not feel 
more involved in commissioning under CCGs than they did under PCTs.249 
 
Paton contends that empowering GPs to commission was contrary to the evidence, 
from GP fundholding, that GPs were not interested in, or good at, it.250 A survey of 
GPs in East Lancashire identified several barriers to clinical engagement, such as lack 
of time and resources, the pressure of competing occupational demands and 
insufficient skills.251 CCGs have various options regarding commissioning support, 
such as directly employing staff (which does not require tender) and contracting with 
support organisations.252 Christina Petsoulas et al state that lack of resources meant 
that outsourcing was often the only option.253 Initially many CCGs agreed temporary 
service level agreements (SLAs) with Commissioning Support Units (CSUs).254 As 
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public procurement law applies, once SLAs ended, CCGs had to secure such support 
openly and transparently.255 In February 2015, NHSE announced the organisations 
which had been approved to join the Commissioning Support Lead Provider 
Framework, including some CSUs, Capita and Optum (a subsidiary of United 
Health).256 The latter has a history of multi-million fines for fraud in the United States 
(US).257 Although the Department of Health stated that companies offering 
commissioning support are not permitted to work in areas where they also provide 
services, UNISON notes that there is nothing to stop them returning once a market 
has been created.258 Stewart Player contends that CCGs often merely rubberstamp 
decisions made at the level of commissioning support.259 Hence private companies 
may be making decisions for CCGs, which they can later exploit. The use of external 
support has negative effects in respect of efficiency (as it increases transaction costs) 
and accountability. Capita, operating as Primary Care Support England (PCSE), won 
the contract to provide primary care support services in 2015. From the outset, GPs 
and local medical committees (LMCs) identified serious issues with such support 
which have affected patient safety.260  
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CCGs are indicative of attempted depoliticisation through governmentalization.261 The 
status of CCG members as health professionals, and emphasis on the self-
responsibility of patients, could theoretically legitimise their decisions, for example, to 
restrict services. In practice, CCG decisions have generated opposition from 
professionals and the public. For example, North Eastern and Western Devon CCG 
abandoned plans to withhold surgery from smokers and obese patients following 
widespread professional criticism.262 Public outcry meant that St Helens CCG 
reversed its plans to suspend non-emergency surgery for four months in 2016.263 In 
2017, the Royal College of Surgeons (RCS) described some CCGs decisions to 
reduce eligibility for hip and knee operations as having ‘‘no clinical justification’’.264 
NHSE has advised CCGs that arbitrary rationing measures are not allowed and that 
NICE guidance should be followed.265 
 
Kailash Chand (Deputy Chair of the BMA) argues that developments, such as the 
devolution of health service functions266 to some English regions (such as Greater 
Manchester, London, Cornwall, Liverpool and the North East region) and the creation 
of integrated and accountable care organisations (ACOs), signal the demise of 
CCGs.267 In transferring health service functions to local authorities, the Secretary of 
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State must make provision about the standards and duties to be placed on that 
authority having regard to national standards and obligations.268 Greg Dropkin avers 
that this facilitates deregulation as ‘‘having regard to’’ does not mean implementing or 
ensuring adherence to.269 Although devolution has been justified on the basis of 
enhancing democracy, some argue that it has been adopted to shift blame.270 Lisa 
Nandy notes that, so far, in Greater Manchester ‘‘the people remain largely shut out 
of the conversation’’.271  
 
NHSE’s ‘FYFV’ outlined several models of integrating care, such as multi-speciality 
care providers (MCPs) and the primary and acute systems model (PACS). MCPs 
involve extended groups of practices forming either as federations, networks or single 
organisations.272 PACS involves single organisations providing NHS list based GP and 
hospital services together with mental health and community care services.273 NHSE 
stated that ‘‘at their most radical PACS would take accountability for the whole health 
needs of a registered list of patients, under a delegated capitated budget’’, similar to 
ACOs in Spain, Singapore and the US.274 ‘FYFV’ was influenced by Sir David Dalton’s 
review, in 2014, which identified several potential organisational forms, such as 
service level chains, multi-site trusts, integrated care organisations275 and privately 
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run public hospitals.276 Although members of the Dalton review’s advisory panel were 
purportedly advising in a personal capacity,277 documents obtained pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act (2000) indicate that Jim Easton was representing the NHS 
Partners Network,278 whose members may benefit from some of the proposed 
organisational forms. ‘FYFV’ was also influenced by two reports279 co-authored by the 
World Economic Forum and McKinsey, which advocated the reinvention of delivery 
systems through new models of care.280  
 
In 2015, it was announced that in order to implement ‘FYFV’, five year STPs would be 
developed.281 England was divided into forty-four STP footprints involving 
collaboration between statutory bodies to devise the plans.282 Hugh Alderwick et al 
state that STPs represent a shift from competition to place based planning.283 NHSE 
and NHSI defined the geographical boundaries of the footprints and identified STP 
leaders.284 As STP decision making is not governed by statutory rules, Leys notes it 
is unclear who will be accountable.285 Leys and John Lister both state that STPs are 
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attempting to address problems resulting from inadequate funding.286 The proposals 
include major service changes in hospitals, such as shifts of outpatient services, 
downgrading of some accident and emergency (A&E) departments and major 
reductions in bed numbers.287 Lister notes that STPs centre on achieving drastic 
efficiency savings288 but offer no convincing detail on reducing demand.289 For 
example, many rely on public health action to reduce demand (but public health 
programmes are being cut290) and on the largely evidence-free notion that large 
investments in digital solutions can generate savings.291 As demand for hospital care 
is rising,292 Ham et al state that any proposals to reduce hospital capacity should be 
tested, if necessary, to destruction.293 The development of STPs has been 
accompanied by controversy.294 STPs have faced opposition from the public and local 
councillors.295 The lack of public consultation, so far, has also been criticised.296 
 
Stevens states that ACOs will be developed in between six and ten STP areas 
‘‘effectively ending the purchaser/provider split’’.297 NHSE states that ACOs could 
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move beyond tariff payments.298 Several vanguards have been established within 
England.299 However, they could be challenged for evading competitive tendering 
processes.300 Caroline Molloy states that the creation of insurance resembling 
purchasers (CCGs with narrowed risk pools) was stage one, and that integrating them 
with providers into managed care organisations, to control costs, is stage two.301 
Molloy states that managed care organisations are attractive to private providers which 
have experienced difficulties providing unrestricted services.302 For example, Circle 
withdrew from a ten year contract to run Hinchingbrooke hospital in Cambridgeshire, 
after three years, stating that its franchise was not ‘‘viable under current terms’’.303 
NHSE’s Director of Strategy, Michael Macdonnell, has confirmed that STPs ‘‘offer 
private sector and third sector organisations an enormous amount of opportunity’’.304 
Private companies are reportedly interested in filling a projected gap in STP funding.305  
 
US ACOs have been described as the latest in a succession of unsuccessful fads 
aimed at containing costs.306 The development of ACOs, within England, does not 
necessarily portend the end of competition, as they are not being developed in all STP 
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areas. Where ACOs are developed, there may be competition between private 
companies to manage them and between ACOs themselves. Nonetheless, such 
competition may be limited. For example, Howard Waitzkin and Ida Hellander note 
that, historically, competition between managed care organisations, such as 
Colombian Entidad promotora de salud307 and US ACOs,308 was constrained by 
consolidation in the private insurance industry.309 In the US, managed care 
organisations have sought to exclude unprofitable patients.310 In Latin America, 
managed care has resulted in restricted access for vulnerable groups and reduced 
spending for clinical services (due to administrative costs and investor returns).311 
Managed care may have similar results in England. Nonetheless, the experience of 
CCGs indicates that attempts to restrict access are likely to face opposition.   
 
Indicators 
 
As mentioned in chapter five, the coalition stated that it wanted to move away from 
process targets and instead focus on outcomes.312 It introduced an annually refined 
NHS outcomes framework,313 expanded Labour’s never events framework314 and 
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empowered the NHS Information Centre315 to collect and publish data submitted via 
an NHS Safety Thermometer,316 which triggers payment under Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN).317 Appleby et al state that PROMs are also currently 
being used cautiously by commissioners as part of CQUIN payments.318 Lansley 
announced, in 2010, that the forty-eight hour GP target and the eighteen week hospital 
target would be abolished and that the four hour A&E target would be relaxed and 
removed.319 However, evidence that waiting times were increasing, meant that many 
targets were retained.320 Natalie Berry et al contend that this demonstrates that it is 
politically and operationally difficult to alter targets ‘‘without risking a drop in 
performance, a political backlash or both’’.321 Christopher Ham et al state that the 
‘‘difficulties of holding service providers to account against the high level outcomes 
framework’’ meant that process targets continued to be an important part of 
accountability.322 In addition, Ham contends that there ‘‘appears to be an irresistible 
tendency for ministers to be want to be seen to be leading the NHS’’ which is impelled 
by the ultimate accountability of the Secretary of State to parliament and intense media 
scrutiny.323 Stevens announced, in 2017, that the eighteen week requirement would 
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be significantly relaxed.324 Clare Marx (President of RCS) noted that delays could have 
serious consequences for some patients.325  
 
Hunt opined that while health ministers often wanted to foster local decision making, 
crises led them to ‘‘discover their inner Stalin’’.326 Hunt argued that intelligent 
transparency in respect of outcomes would make ‘‘true devolution of power’’ 
possible.327 More data is being produced within the NHS, partly to facilitate patient 
choice. The coalition’s ten year framework for transforming information for health and 
care stated that patients would be able, by 2015, to access their GP records,328 access 
clinical outcomes data329 and book and cancel GP appointments online.330 Since April 
2012, patients have had a legal right to choose the consultant specialist at their first 
outpatient appointment.331 NHSE announced that by the summer of 2013, consultant 
level quality and outcomes would be published for ten key specialities, to assist patient 
choice.332 Peter Radford et al note that there were concerns that the publication of 
surgeon specific mortality data (SSMD) could lead to gaming, the passing of difficult 
cases to colleagues and complex cases not being undertaken.333 In addition, they 
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questioned whether mortality (which is relatively infrequent) is the most appropriate 
outcome for measuring best practice and underperformance.334 The results are not 
the responsibility of surgeons alone but depend on the wider hospital team335 and 
resources.336 In 2015 a number of Heart Surgeons asked Stevens to rethink the policy 
as it was causing colleagues to avoid risky operations.337  
 
Choose and Book was replaced by a new electronic booking system. The MyNHS 
website presents data on seven key areas for each hospital in England, including the 
CQC inspection rating and staff338 and inpatient friends and family test (FFT) 
scores.339 A Nuffield Trust review, in 2013, found that many GPs thought that 
aggregate ratings for providers were of less value than more granular information.340 
Leys avers that it is not clear that such findings were taken into account, as in 2014 
the CQC began issuing aggregate ratings.341 Such aggregate ratings appear on the 
MyNHS website, although the CQC website also provides ratings for specific services. 
FFT, which was rolled out nationally from April 2013, enables patients to provide 
feedback.342 In addition, patients can rate and comment on NHS hospitals on the NHS 
choices website.343 FFT is based on a net promoter score (NPS) tool used in the 
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private sector344 and is intended to increase transparency and improve services.345 
The CQC received contrasting opinions regarding NPS. The Picker Institute advised 
that it was inappropriate for the NHS.346 In contrast, Toby Knightley-Day stated that it 
would be useful together with the reason for the score.347 However, participants in 
discussion groups, organised by Ipsos MORI, were concerned that comments could 
misrepresent or oversimplify what is occurring on wards.348 They were also concerned 
that the classification system, in which ‘likely to recommend’ responses were regarded 
as neutral and ‘neither nor likely to recommend’ responses were regarded as 
detractors, did not accurately represent patient’s views.349   
 
A review in 2014 found that some trusts were not asking the follow-up question.350 
Staff viewed scores without feedback as abstract, as it was not clear which aspects of 
patients experience informed their ratings.351 The review determined that FFT was a 
valuable tool for local improvement but was not fully succeeding in informing patient 
choice.352 The review noted that results were affected by response rates (only a 
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fraction of patients responded),353 differences in timing354 and could be gamed.355 A 
simpler scoring mechanism has been introduced which presents results as a 
percentage of respondents who would, or would not, recommend the service.356 The 
use of such measures is superficial because, as mentioned in chapter two, Theodor 
Adorno noted that the reduction of quality to quantity is a process of abstraction which 
‘‘distances itself from the objects’’.357 I contend that voice is preferable to choice (which 
relies on such superficial measures) as a means of empowering patients.  
 
Privatisation 
 
The coalition sought to decontest its reforms by vehemently denying accusations of 
NHS privatisation (indicative of the ideological mode of dissimulation). For example, 
Nick Clegg averred that ‘‘there will be no privatisation of the NHS’’358 and Lansley 
described accusations of privatisation as ‘‘ludicrous scaremongering’’.359 Rudolf Klein 
views privatisation as a matter of degree and states that, as the contracting out of 
services to private firms only increased from £6.6 billion in 2009 to £10 billion in 2014, 
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the charge of privatisation is a ‘‘misuse of language’’.360 Hunter accused Klein of 
nitpicking and ‘‘semantic posturing’’.361 Martin Powell and Robin Miller state that as 
privatisation is a multidimensional concept, accounts vary of its ‘‘occurrence, 
chronology and degree’’.362 Nonetheless, the reforms fall within the WHO’s definition 
of privatisation (mentioned in chapter one). In 2015, it was reported that of 5071 
contracts awarded by CCGs, forty percent went to private firms.363 The increased 
involvement of private companies within the NHS is inimical to accountability and 
quality and may detrimentally affect NHS providers. 
 
Privatisation renders healthcare more opaque, as private companies can use the NHS 
logo (hence patients may not know when they are providing services), hide their profits 
and outcomes behind commercial confidentiality364 and are not subject to freedom of 
information requests.365 Thus, as Ursula Pearce notes, ‘‘it will become increasingly 
difficult to know what exactly is being done with public money’’.366 Morris introduced 
the Freedom of Information (Private Healthcare Companies) Bill367 in parliament, in 
2013, to remedy this, but it did not progress. It also detrimentally affects accountability 
because the NHS is poorly equipped (for example, due to information asymmetry 
between commissioners and providers) to ensure that private providers deliver ‘‘safe, 
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high-quality care and good value for money’’.368 In this respect, the Centre for Health 
and the Public Interest (CHPI) found that of 15,000 contracts, only seven were 
terminated for poor performance, only 134 contract query notices had been issued 
and only sixteen CCGs had imposed financial sanctions on private providers.369 This 
may increase the scope for fraud. Mark Button and Leys note that many companies 
engaged in fraud in the US (which is estimated to cost between $80 and $98 billion 
annually) are operating in England370 but that policymakers neglected this issue.371 
 
As noted throughout this thesis, increased private sector provision is often justified on 
the basis of improving quality. However, it negatively affects quality as private 
providers, such as Virgin, maximise profits by cutting costs.372 Leys and Toft found 
that 6,000 NHS patients a year are admitted from private hospitals and that, between 
October 2010 and April 2014, there were 802 unexpected deaths and 921 serious 
injuries reported by private hospitals.373 They note that CQC reports often identify 
problems with facilities or equipment which pose risks to patient safety.374 The 
involvement of private providers negatively affects efficiency because, as Lister notes, 
market reforms ‘‘make the system more bureaucratic and more expensive to 
administer’’.375 Paton estimates the recurring annual costs of the current market as 
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approximately £4 billion.376 It also adversely affects the equity (as it leads to cherry-
picking) and efficacy (as it may lead to overtreatment and needless treatment, as 
occurs in the US377) components of quality identified by Avedis Donabedian.378 The 
increased amount of money going to private providers means that less is available for 
NHS providers, which may undermine cross subsidy. For example, Sarah Lafond et al 
found that relatively little of the £2bn for healthcare announced within George 
Osborne’s 2014 autumn statement went to NHS providers,379 while about forty-five 
percent went to non-NHS providers.380  
 
Kenneth Veitch avers that although the NHS is still based on social solidarity,381 it is 
now also a source ‘‘of economic growth for the private sector’’.382 The state has thus 
bound the social and economic fates and well-being of citizens to that of the private 
sector and market mechanisms.383 This is antagonistic to human need. Pollock notes 
that many private contracts are for community based services.384 She contends that 
cuts, closures and the ideology of competition have meant that someone with a serious 
mental illness may have to travel hundreds of miles to receive care.385 For example, 
many English patients with eating disorders have been sent to Scotland for 
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treatment.386 Private companies have become the principal providers of some 
services.387 Ian Greener states that it is ‘‘not clear what happens if’’ they ‘‘fail or decide 
to leave’’.388 Donald Longmore contends that it is highly unlikely that such services 
could revert to the NHS.389  
 
The End of the NHS? 
 
Margaret McCartney avers that the tragedy is that the undermining of the NHS, by 
insufficient funding and privatisation, ‘‘may not be noticed widely enough-never mind 
protested against-until the NHS has become a carcass’’.390 McCartney states that the 
public needs to ‘‘demand that our politicians love it like they say they do’’.391 The 
articulation of residual and emergent norms in government discourse indicates that 
neo-liberalism has not been entirely successful in respect of health or healthcare. The 
gap identified by McCartney is significant because, as public experience increasingly 
diverges from such norms, there may be a crisis of legitimacy.392 The government’s 
failure to adequately fund both the NHS and social care may become increasingly 
difficult politically.393 This is evidenced by the controversy generated after the British 
                                                          
386 Marsh, S. and Campbell, D., ‘NHS England sending anorexic patients to Scotland for treatment’, 
Guardian, 11 December 2016. 
387 Speed, E. and Gabe, J. (2013) ‘The Health and Social Care Act for England 2012: The extension 
of new professionalism’. Critical Social Policy, Vol.33(3), pp564-574 at p568. 
388 Greener, I. (2015) ‘Wolves and the big yellow taxis: How would we know if the NHS is at deaths 
door? Comment on ‘‘Who Killed the English National Health Service?’’ International Journal of Health 
Policy and Management, Vol.4(10), pp687-689 at p688. 
389 Longmore, D. (2012) A Witness Account of the rise and fall of the NHS. Aylesbury: Shieldcrest, 
p301. 
390 McCartney, M. (2016) The State of Medicine, op cit., n.377 at p26. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Benbow, D. (2017) ‘The sociology of health and the NHS’. The Sociological Review, Vol.65(2), 
pp416-422 at p418. 
393 Ibid. 
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Red Cross diagnosed a ‘‘humanitarian crisis’’, following the deaths of patients waiting 
on trolleys in hospital corridors.394 Insufficient funding is also perceived as obstructing 
the Conservative’s ‘‘truly seven day NHS’’ policy.395 Although, many primary care 
practices are collaborating to offer extended access, progress in relation to hospitals 
is unclear (due to the lack of publicly available data).396 Growing dissatisfaction with 
government policy may explain the Conservative’s failure to retain their majority at the 
2017 general election. 
 
During the 2017 general election campaign, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) stated 
that the next parliament would be challenging for the NHS, regardless of the result, as 
the Conservatives and Labour had promised average spending increases of 1.2 
percent and two percent a year, respectively, between 2016/17 and 2022/23.397 If 
Labour had been elected in 2015 or 2017 there may have been administrative savings 
as both Miliband and Jeremy Corbyn (Labour leader from 2015 onwards) pledged to 
repeal the HSC Act (2012) and designate the NHS as preferred provider.398 Although 
reforms have rendered the NHS more opaque, the solidarity that was important in its 
creation and maintenance persists. Nonetheless, I agree with Pollock that such 
solidarity must be enshrined in law. I support the NHS (Reinstatement) Bill, which 
                                                          
394 Campbell, D. et al., ‘NHS faces ‘humanitarian crisis’ as demand rises, British Red Cross warns’, 
Guardian, 6 January 2017. 
395 Conservative Party (2015) Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter more Secure 
Future. London: Conservative Party, p37. 
396 McKenna, H. (2017) ‘Did the government meet its pledge to deliver seven day services?’ [On-line] 
Available: https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/articles/government-pledge-seven-day-services 
[Accessed: 8 June 2017]. 
397 Crawford, R. and Stoye, G. (2017) ‘Challenging Times ahead for the NHS regardless of who wins 
the election’. [On-line] Available: https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9262 [Accessed: 7 June 2017]. 
398 Labour Party (2015) Britain can be better: The Labour Manifesto 2015. London: Labour Party, p34/ 
Labour Party (2017) For the many not the few. The Labour Party Manifesto 2017. London: Labour 
Party, p69. 
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would reinstate the Secretary of State’s duty to provide a comprehensive health 
service399 and repeal the competition provisions of the HSC Act (2012).400 However, 
it is also necessary to seek to realise emergent norms.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argued that the HSC Act (2012) undermines residual norms as it 
facilitated the reduction of the comprehensiveness of the NHS and facilitates its further 
abatement by changing the duty of the Secretary of State for Health, who is now only 
required to promote, not provide, a comprehensive health service. It also undermines 
universality, by introducing eligibility criteria, and equality of access, by enabling FTs 
to earn up to forty-nine percent of their income from fee paying patients. The statute 
extends the ambit of neo-liberal norms, which is evident in the duties it stipulates and 
in the competition it effectuates. The statute also incorporates emerging norms, such 
as reducing health inequalities (although this is undermined by austerity) and 
empowering patients (although the adopted mechanisms have been criticised). 
Although the coalition stated that it wanted to decentralise power within the NHS, it 
has been centralised, although the centre is fragmented. The use of targets has 
persisted and more superficial data is being produced. The NHS has been rendered 
more opaque and juridified and the costly market emplaced by the statute has become 
an end in itself. However, attempts to depoliticise healthcare have not succeeded, 
particularly because the government still determines NHS funding. The solidarity 
                                                          
399 National Health Service H.C. Bill (2016-17) [51], cl.1(1). 
400 Ibid at cl.18(3). 
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which was important in the creation and maintenance of the NHS endures. Although 
many citizens are unaware of the reforms, as public experience increasingly diverges 
from residual and emergent norms, a crisis of legitimacy may arise.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
I have undertaken a comprehensive ideology critique of NHS reforms in the neo-liberal 
era within this dissertation. This was intended to illuminate the contestation between 
dominant (neo-liberal), residual (including the NHS’ founding principles, which I aver 
constitute a moral economy) and emergent norms (which developed in recognition of 
the limits and problems of welfare states). I argued that misrepresentations and 
mystification may legitimate and obscure legal changes to social relations. However, I 
found that misrepresentations in respect of healthcare have been contested and that 
the solidarity that was important in the creation and maintenance of the English NHS 
endures. Although residual and emergent norms persist (for example, they continue 
to be articulated within government discourse) they are undermined by dominant neo-
liberal norms. As such norms are important components of legitimation, a crisis of 
legitimacy may arise as they are increasingly impeded. 
 
Reforms in the Neo-liberal Era 
 
Neo-liberal ideology is currently the hegemonic ideology. Neo-liberals fetishise the 
market as necessary for freedom and have favoured alterations to public sector 
governance through increasing audit and marketization (through legal forms, such as 
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contract). Marketization facilitates privatisation. The neo-liberal era signals what Scott 
Veitch et al identified as a fifth epoch of juridification, which is characterised by a re-
embedding of private law mechanisms in areas formerly considered public.1 The NHS’ 
founding principles are being undermined by market reforms which divert money away 
from the needs of patients to bureaucracies (required to administer quasi-markets) 
and the coffers of private companies, thereby impairing risk pooling and cross subsidy. 
Neo-liberals endeavour to turn citizens into entrepreneurs of their own health and their 
moral politics aims to exclude some from free health care. Reductions in the 
comprehensiveness of the NHS, and insufficient funding, mean that patients are 
increasingly paying for health care. Many fear that the reforms, and developments, 
such as the extension of personal health budgets (PHBs), may lead to health care 
increasingly being recommodified, which would exacerbate inequitable distribution.    
 
The analytical framework that I utilised within this dissertation has enabled me to 
develop new insights into reforms to the English NHS since the year 2000 which have 
marketized the NHS and provided private healthcare companies with more 
opportunities to deliver clinical services within the NHS. I argued that the reforms are 
indicative of what Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell identified as the third phase of neo-
liberalism, roll-out-neo-liberalism,2 in which states directly use social policy to support 
capital,3 although I noted important differences between the New Labour and 
Conservative-led governments within this era. The competition that the reforms have 
engendered has led to an increasing amount of the NHS budget going to private 
                                                          
1 Veitch, S. et al (2012) Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts 2nd edition. Abingdon: Routledge, p262. 
2 Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) ‘Neoliberalizing Space’. Antipode, Vol.34(3), pp380-404 at p389. 
3 Veitch, K. (2013) ‘Law, Social Policy, and the Constitution of Markets and Profit Making’. Journal of 
Law and Society, Vol. 40(1), pp137-154 at p138. 
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providers.4 This is antagonistic to human need as it undermines risk pooling and cross 
subsidy within the NHS, which underpin a service provided in response to need.5 I 
identified four main strands to my analytical framework within chapter two. The first 
strand involved assessing the influence of the dominant ideology of neo-liberalism and 
the posited micro-ideology of private healthcare companies on the healthcare reforms 
of successive governments. I assessed and summarised relevant political science 
literature to demonstrate how successive governments have adhered to neo-liberal 
economic policies and how their reforms have increasingly emplaced neo-liberal 
norms, such as efficiency, competition and choice, within public services, such as the 
NHS. I noted, in chapter three, that New Labour’s philosophy was described as 
‘‘socialised neo-liberalism’’,6 as it was akin to orthodox social democratic governments 
in respect of its substantial investment in health and education.7 In contrast, I 
explained, in chapter five, that the coalition’s austerity policies have meant that, since 
2010, the NHS has not been adequately funded to meet demand and grow services.8 
I mentioned, in chapter four, that Alan Cribb contended that New Labour were able to 
go further than their Conservative predecessors, in extending neo-liberal norms into 
the NHS, as they were perceived as ideological friends of the service.9 I remarked, in 
chapter five, that the coalition’s NHS reforms extended New Labour’s reforms (with 
                                                          
4 The total amount was recently calculated as £12.7 billion. See Lafond, S. et al (2017) A Year of 
Plenty? An Analysis of NHS Finances and Consultant Productivity. London: Health Foundation, p3. 
5 Doctors for the NHS (2015) ‘An NHS Beyond the Market’. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.doctorsforthenhs.org.uk/nhs-theats/privatisation/an-nhs-beyond-the-market/ [Accessed: 16 
October 2016]. 
6 Wilkinson, R. (2000) ‘New Labour and the Global Economy’ in Coates, D. and Lawler, P. (eds) New 
Labour in Power. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp136-148 at p138. 
7 Gamble, A. (2010) ‘New Labour and Political Change’. Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.63(4), pp639-652 
at p649. 
8 Davis, J., et al (2015) NHS for Sale: Myths, Lies & Deception. London: Merlin Press, p12. 
9 Cribb, A. (2008) ‘Organizational Reform and health care goods: Concerns about marketization in the 
UK NHS’. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Vol.33(3), pp221-240 at p225. 
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continuity in principles such as competition, choice and provider plurality10) but that 
the coalition went further and faster than New Labour.11 I chronicled how the agents 
of private healthcare companies, such as Virgin and General Healthcare Group 
(GHG), influenced successive reforms through various mechanisms, such as through 
direct advice (for example, Virgin’s advice to Labour in 2000, considered in chapter 
three, and McKinsey’s advice to the coalition regarding the Health and Social Care 
(HSC) Act (2012), considered in chapter five) and through establishing financial links 
with politicians (for example, I noted, in chapter five, that many parliamentarians had 
financial interests in NHS privatisation).  
 
The second strand involved employing the ideological modes and strategies 
delineated by John B. Thompson to determine the justifications that successive 
governments used for their reforms in relevant policy documents, articles and 
speeches. I assessed relevant academic literature to ascertain whether such 
justifications were contested and whether they were borne out in reality. Although 
successive governments claimed that their reforms would enhance quality and 
efficiency, such claims were contested, and evidence suggests that the reforms have 
worsened efficiency (as the markets emplaced within the NHS have increased 
transaction costs) and quality. Successive governments sought to interpellate patients 
as consumers. However, this faced recalcitrance12 and patient choice policies have 
                                                          
10 Klein, R. (2015) ‘England’s National Health Service-broke but not broken’. Millbank Quarterly, 
Vol.93(3), pp455-458 at p455/Vizard, P. and Obolenskaya, P. (2015) The Coalition’s Record on 
Health: Policy, Spending and Outcomes 2010-2015 Working Paper 16. London: LSE, p106. 
11 See, for example: Jarman, H. and Greer, S. (2015) ‘The big bang: Health and Social Care reform 
under the coalition’ in Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds) The Conservative-Liberal Coalition: Examining the 
Cameron-Clegg government. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp50-67 at p51. 
12 Clarke, J. (2007) ‘‘It’s not like Shopping’: Citizens, Consumers and the reform of public services’ in 
Bevir, M. and Trentmann, F. (eds) Governance, Consumers and Citizens: Agency and Resistance in 
Contemporary Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp97-118 at pp114-115. 
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taken a backseat.13 Successive governments sought to fragment patients by 
emphasising individual responsibility for health, but this has not successfully colonised 
common sense. Successive governments also sought to naturalise their reforms by 
arguing that there were no alternatives, but critics argued to the contrary. My utilisation 
of Williams’ method of authentic historical analysis revealed that successive 
governments articulated residual norms (in an effort to mask the fact that their reforms 
undermined such norms) and emergent norms within their discourse, alongside 
dominant neo-liberal norms. Consequently, there is a gap between ideals and lived 
realities, which my ideology critique has illuminated. Such gaps have been theorised 
as spurs to change.14 As public experience increasingly diverges from the residual 
and emergent norms articulated within government discourse there may be a 
legitimation crisis. I argued that residual and emergent norms are bases for conceiving 
alternatives (which I consider further below) to dominant neo-liberal norms. My work 
contributes to the challenging of government discourse concerning both health and 
healthcare and, in Gramscian terms, may strengthen good sense, based on people’s 
practical experiences, and inform political mobilization. My research affirms the 
continued relevance of the method of ideology critique, which other researchers may 
be able to utilise, in a similar fashion to me, to illuminate other policy areas and 
challenge dominant discourses.  
 
The third strand of my analytical framework involved assessing the translation of neo-
liberal political rationality into practice. In this respect, I determined that neo-liberal 
political rationality has not been perfectly translated into health and healthcare policies, 
                                                          
13 Ham, C. et al (2015) The NHS under the Coalition government part one: NHS Reform. London: 
Kings Fund, p18. 
14 Horkheimer, M. (2013) Eclipse of Reason. London: Bloomsbury, p126/Unger, R. (1977) Law in 
Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. New York: Free Press, p153. 
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legislation and governance. For example, I mentioned, in chapter one, that inequality 
is a neo-liberal norm. While Thatcher’s government assiduously avoided the term 
inequality (and attempted to bury the Black report on health inequalities),15 New 
Labour set itself the goal of reducing such inequalities and the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition created statutory duties in this respect, although they have not 
been implemented effectively16 and are undermined by austerity (which is likely to 
increase such inequalities17). In addition, successive governments validated the 
residual norm of equality of access (despite enacting reforms which undermine this 
norm). As mentioned above, while successive governments sought to extend patient 
choice within the NHS, this policy has currently taken a backseat,18 although both NHS 
England and the current government are desirous of extending the use of PHBs. While 
the internal market was emplaced in the NHS, in the 1990s, to engender competition 
among NHS providers, the mimic-market introduced by Labour, in the 2000s, 
generated competition between NHS and private providers for some clinical services. 
The HSC Act (2012) facilitates the current market within the NHS, in which NHS and 
private providers are increasingly competing to deliver many services. Although the 
amount of discretion afforded to commissioners by the regulations passed pursuant to 
S.75 of the HSC Act (2012) is contested, many commissioners have acted as though 
such discretion was curtailed in practice (resorting to competition in instances where 
they would not have done so if not for the rules)19 and private providers are 
                                                          
15 Williams, G. (2007) ‘Health inequalities in their place’ in Cropper, S. et al (eds) Community Health 
and Well-being: Action Research on Health Inequalities. Bristol: Policy Press, pp1-22 at p2. 
16 Wenzl, M. and Mossialos, E. (2016) ‘Achieving Equity in health service commissioning’ in Exworthy, 
M. et al (eds) Dismantling the NHS? Evaluating the Impact of Health Reforms. Bristol: Policy Press, 
pp233-254 at p248. 
17 Bambra, C. (2013) ‘All in it Together? Health Inequalities, Austerity and the Great Recession’ in 
Wood, C. (ed) Health in Austerity. London: Demos, pp49-57 at p51. 
18 Ham, C. et al (2015) The NHS under the Coalition government part one, op cit., n.13 at p18. 
19 West, D., ‘CCGs open services to competition out of fear of rules’. Health Services Journal, 4 April 
2014. 
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increasingly delivering NHS clinical services. Nonetheless, I identified countervailing 
forces to the current market, such as resource constraints,20 the opposition of 
campaign groups such as Keep Our NHS Public (KONP),21 and the recent emphasis 
on integration by NHS England (although the accountable care organisations that are 
being developed in some areas within England may furnish private companies with 
more opportunities).   
 
The fourth strand of my analytical framework involved assessing the potential reifying 
effects of the reforms. Reification may cause estrangement, which, as John Torrance 
noted, is the opposite of solidarity22 (which was important in the creation and 
maintenance of the NHS). I found evidence of philosophical reification, as the 
exchange principle has been extended (as the NHS’ comprehensiveness has 
diminished and inadequate funding has detrimentally affected NHS performance, 
causing many patients to go private) and more superficial measures (such as inpatient 
friends and family test (FFT) scores) are being used. I also found evidence of social 
reification, as some means employed in NHS governance, such as targets and 
markets, have become ends in themselves, to the detriment of patients. For example, 
I noted, in chapter three, that Michael Mandelstam argued that the target requiring 
waits not exceeding four hours for patients in accident and emergency (A&E) 
detrimentally affected other hospital departments.23 I argued that the potential for law 
                                                          
20 Osipovic, D. et al (2016) ‘Interrogating institutional change: Actors’ attitudes to competition and co-
operation in commissioning health services in England’. Public Administration, Vol.94(3), pp823-838 
at p830. 
21 Krachler, N. and Greer, I. (2015) ‘When does Marketization lead to Privatisation? Profit-making in 
English health services after the 2012 Health and Social Care Act’. Social Science and Medicine, 
Vol.124, pp215-223 at p220. 
22 Torrance, J. (1977) Estrangement, Alienation and Exploitation: A Sociological Approach to 
Historical Materialism. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p315. 
23 Mandelstam, M. (2011) How we Treat the Sick: Neglect and abuse in our Health Services. London: 
Jessica Kingsley, p231. 
312 
 
to legitimise reforms (by making them seem natural and unmediated by history and 
class dynamics24) is inhibited by the moral economy concerning the NHS’ founding 
principles. In this respect, increased campaigning activity (evidenced by the increased 
number of local KONP groups), protests (such as the largest rally in the NHS’ history 
in March 2017, organised by Health Campaigns Together) and an increase in the 
number of patients disagreeing with the sentiment that it does not matter who provides 
free services25 (which may indicate increased public concern with the burgeoning 
private sector) suggests that legal changes have not, and may not, legitimise market 
reforms to English healthcare.  
 
I also utilised the various strategies identified by Bob Jessop26 to assess whether 
reforms have reified health and healthcare through depoliticization. I determined, in 
chapter four, that institutional depoliticization had somewhat succeeded in respect of 
New Labour’s creation of Monitor to regulate foundation trusts (FTs), as many 
problems with such hospitals were dealt with without parliamentary or ministerial 
involvement, although some scandals (such as the Mid Staffordshire FT scandal) led 
to top-down accountability returning.27 I argued, in chapter six, that the coalition 
created NHS England in an effort to shift blame concerning healthcare (which is 
pertinent as the NHS is not currently being adequately funded), but that this was 
                                                          
24 Hedrick, T. (2014) ‘Reification in and Through Law: Elements of a Theory in Marx, Lukacs and 
Honneth’. European Journal of Political Theory, Vol.13(2), pp178-198 at p192. 
25 Appleby, J. et al (2015) ‘Health’ in Curtice, J. and Ormston, R. (eds) British Social Attitudes: the 32nd 
Report. London: NatCen Social Research, pp102-121 at p115/Ipsos MORI (2013) ‘NHS Poll Topline 
Results’ [On-line] Available: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/migrations/en-
uk/files/Assets/Docs/Polls/NHS_Questions_topline.pdf [Accessed: 24 June 2017]. 
26 Jessop, B. (2015) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation: theoretical preliminaries on some responses to the 
American fiscal and Eurozone debt crises’ in Flinders, M. and Wood, M. (eds) Tracing the Political: 
Depoliticisation, governance and the state. Bristol: Policy Press, pp95-116 at pp101-106. 
27 Moyes, W. et al (2011) Nothing to do with me? Modernising Ministerial Accountability for 
Decentralised Public Services. London: Institute for Government, pp32-37. 
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unlikely to succeed as the government retains important powers over the NHS (such 
as determining its funding) while the public do not, so far, appear to be directing their 
ire for healthcare problems to NHS England rather than the government. I argued, in 
chapter six, that although business norms and legal rules increasingly govern 
behaviour within the NHS, healthcare remains highly politicised (despite strategies of 
marketization and juridification) as is evidenced by the activities of campaign groups, 
such as KONP.28 I explicated that market reforms meant that the English NHS became 
subject to transnational legal rules, such as European Union (EU) public procurement 
and competition law. Nonetheless, I found that public awareness of the potential for 
external constitutional constraints to restrict NHS policy making appears to have 
increased (evident in the opposition to the proposed trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States (US) and the EU and 
potential post-Brexit trade deals) hence the strategy of new constitutionalism, 
identified by Gill,29 does not appear to have been, and is not likely to be, successful in 
depoliticising market reforms to the NHS.  
 
I found that the use of ostensibly non-political figures to make recommendations was 
unsuccessful in some instances (for example, I determined, in chapter four, that New 
Labour’s use of a leading surgeon, Lord Ara Darzi, to recommend polyclinics did not 
depoliticise the controversial policy) but successful in other instances (for example, I 
noted, in chapter five, that Jason Glynos et al argued that the NHS Future Forum, 
established by the coalition, marginalised alternative visions during the listening 
                                                          
28 Krachler, N. and Greer, I. (2015) ‘When does Marketization lead to Privatisation?’, op cit., n.21 at 
p220. 
29 Gill, S. (2008) Power and Resistance in the new world order: 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
p79. 
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exercise regarding the HSC Act (2012) by emphasising the concept of integration30). 
I mentioned, in chapter three, that John Clarke argued that the use of targets to self-
responsibilise NHS actors had not succeeded as governments continued to be 
deemed responsible for healthcare failures.31 I also noted that Clarke et al argued that 
New Labour’s efforts to self-responsibilise patients for their own health had not 
colonised common sense.32 Although lifestyle drift has coloured the discourse of 
successive governments, and others, I argued that opposition to the decisions of some 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) to restrict access for some patients (such as 
smokers and the obese), by both the public and professionals, demonstrates that this 
remains contested. Ultimately, while healthcare has been rendered more opaque, I 
determined that the ostensible lack of success of many reifying strategies indicates 
that the solidarity that was important in the creation and maintenance of the NHS 
appears to endure. Consequently, as the justifications for successive reforms have 
been contested and many strategies to reify healthcare have not succeeded, the 
undermining of the NHS through inadequate funding and privatisation may become 
increasingly difficult politically. My study has primarily focused on government 
discourse. Further qualitative research (for example, interviews with members of the 
public) may enhance understanding of the persistence of solidarity and the impact of 
government discourse on public attitudes.  
       
Alternatives 
                                                          
30 Glynos, J. et al (2014) ‘Logics of Marginalisation in health and social care reform: Integration, 
Choice and Provider Blind Provision’. Critical Social Policy, Vol.35(1), pp45-68 at p46. 
31 Clarke, J. (2004) ‘Dissolving the Public Realm? The Logics and Limits of Neo-liberalism’. Journal of 
Social Policy, Vol.33(1), pp27-48 at p38. 
32 Clarke, J. et al (2007) Creating Citizen-Consumers: Changing Publics and Changing Public 
Services. London: Sage, pp83-84. 
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Residual and emergent norms continue to inspire alternatives to recent market 
reforms. Alternatives are essential in challenging the naturalisation of neo-liberalism 
and may find a receptive audience if the post-capitalist interregnum has dawned.33 
Many of the provisions of the NHS (Reinstatement) Bill are necessary to prevent the 
covert undermining of the NHS, such as reinstating the Secretary of State’s duty to 
provide a comprehensive health service,34 removing competition35 and centralising 
and reducing PFI debt.36 Ultimately, the aim should be to completely decommodify 
healthcare and remove private companies. In addition, efforts should be made to 
realise emergent norms, such as empowering patients and the public and reducing 
health inequalities. NHS marketization was justified on the basis of empowering 
patients by increasing choice. However, as Alex Mold notes, ‘‘choice was an attractive 
way to package NHS reform: it was not always about giving the patient more to choose 
from’’.37 I aver that voice is preferable to choice. The NHS (Reinstatement) Bill 
proposes abolishing NHS Improvement (NHSI),38 NHSE39 and CCGs40 and replacing 
them with a National Health Service England Authority (NHSEA), with several regional 
offices,41 and Health Boards, to assess needs and plan services.42 It would re-
                                                          
33 Streeck, W. (2016) ‘The post-capitalist interregnum’. Juncture, Vol.23(2), pp68-77. 
34 National Health Service H.C. Bill (2016-17) [51], cl.1(1). 
35 Ibid at cl.18(3). 
36 Ibid at cl.21. 
37 Mold, A. (2015) Making the Patient Consumer: Patient Organisations and Health Consumerism in 
Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p170. 
38 National Health Service H.C. Bill (2016-17) [51], cl.18(1).  
39 Ibid at cl.8(1). 
40 Ibid at cl.13(1). 
41 Ibid at cl.8(2). 
42 Ibid at cl.9(1). 
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establish Community Health Councils (CHCs) for the area of each Health Board.43 
However, CHCs were ‘‘never intended as democratic control or accountability’’.44  
 
Diane Longley argued that politics is missing from the NHS’ structure.45 Although 
health service functions have been devolved to some regions, such as Greater 
Manchester, this has been a largely technocratic process so far.46 I argue that 
enhancing public participation in NHS decision-making may reduce alienation. In 
2000, a commission, established by the Association of Community Health Councils for 
England and Wales (ACHCEW), chaired by Will Hutton, recommended directly 
involving the public in running the NHS or in electing its decision makers47, as Fred 
Messer and the Campaign for a Democratic Health Service advocated. The 
commission noted that local and regional governments were involved in running 
healthcare in other countries, such as Finland, Norway and Sweden,48 and concluded 
that elections to Health Authorities would enhance knowledge of health issues.49 
Experiments with elections to health boards, in both Scotland50 and Canada, were 
abandoned due to low turnouts. Nonetheless, in Scotland elections enhanced the 
diversity of views within boards and increased the degree of challenge.51 Members of 
                                                          
43 Ibid at cl.17(1). 
44 Hogg, C. (1986) The Public and the NHS. London: Association of Community Health Councils for 
England and Wales, p33. 
45 Longley, D. (1993) Public Law and Health Service Accountability. Buckingham: Open University 
Press, p98. 
46 Harrop, A. and Phibbs, T. (2017) ‘Introduction: Time to Transform’ in Phibbs, T. (ed) Local and 
National: How the Public Wants the NHS to be both. London: Fabian Society, p4. 
47 Hutton, W. (2000) New Life for Health: The Commission on the NHS Chaired by Will Hutton. 
London: Vintage, p6. 
48 Ibid at p70. 
49 Ibid at p80. 
50 Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act (2009), S.4(1)/ Health Boards 
(Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act 2009 (Commencement No.1) Order, SSI 2009/242, R.2(A) 
and (B). 
51 Greer, S. et al (2012) Health Board Elections and Alternative Pilots: Final Report of the Statutory 
Evaluation. Edinburgh: Scottish Government Research, p49.  
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district health boards in Saskatchewan believed that elections increased local control 
over health services.52 In contrast, Robin Gauld’s research into elected boards in New 
Zealand suggests that other channels may be required to enhance public 
participation.53 Increased democratic deliberation in the NHS may enhance social 
learning54 and legitimacy. The experience of FT boards of governors demonstrates 
that efforts must be made to ensure that participants are representative and 
adequately informed or trained. If healthcare is decentralised to enhance democracy, 
strong solidarity mechanisms must also be emplaced to ensure that equity is not 
detrimentally affected.55 
 
As mentioned in chapter one, Lesley Doyal and Imogen Pennell argued that a socialist 
medical service would demystify medical knowledge.56 Successive reforms within 
England have focused on external stimuli (such as markets and targets). However, 
analysis suggests that successful healthcare institutions mobilize the intrinsic 
motivation of staff (providing them with the skills to review and change services)57 and 
engage patients in decision making.58 Successive governments stated that they 
wanted to enhance patient involvement, but a gap between rhetoric and reality 
persists. Ceri Butler and Trisha Greenhalgh note that there is ‘‘no easy formula’’ for 
                                                          
52 Lewis, S. et al (2001) ‘Devolution to democratic health authorities in Saskatchewan: an interim 
report’. Canadian Medical Association Journal, Vol.164(3), pp343-347 at p344.  
53 Gauld, R. (2010) ‘Are elected health boards an effective mechanism for public participation in 
health service governance?’ Health Expectations, Vol.13(4), pp369-378 at p371. 
54 Vincent-Jones, P. (2011) ‘Embedding Economic Relationships through social learning? The Limits 
of Patient and Public Involvement in Healthcare governance in England’. Journal of Law and Society, 
Vol.38(2), pp215-244 at p241. 
55 Alves, J. et al (2013) ‘Efficiency and Equity Consequences of Decentralisation in health: An 
Economic Perspective’. Revista Portuguesa de Saude Publica, Vol.31(1), pp74-83 at p80. 
56 Doyal, L. and Pennell, I. (1983) The Political Economy of Health. London: Pluto, p294. 
57 Timmins, N. and Ham, C. (2013) The Quest for integrated health and social care: A Case Study in 
Canterbury, New Zealand. London: Kings Fund, p46. 
58 Collins, B. (2015) Intentional Whole Health System Redesign: Southcentral Foundation’s ‘Nuka’ 
system of care. London: Kings Fund, p62. 
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successfully involving users.59 Rocco Palumbo argues that patient empowerment will 
require enhancing the health literacy of both individuals (the ability to access, 
understand, process and use health information to make adequate decisions) and 
organisations (encouraging patient engagement in the design and delivery of care).60 
 
The NHS is utopian in providing a partial solution (decommodifying health care) to 
capitalist social relations and their impact on health. Class inequalities in health persist 
despite its creation, indicating that further state intervention in capitalist production is 
necessary. The welfare state is contradictory as it has stabilised capitalism but also 
has the potential to undermine it, as it evinces a different logic to capitalist production 
(being organised on the basis of need rather than profit). The examined market 
reforms have neutered the NHS’ subversive character and threaten patient needs. 
Aneurin Bevan described the NHS as a first fruit.61 The market reforms should be 
reversed to prevent the fruit rotting before it has ripened. If the market reforms are 
reversed and the NHS is democratised it may inspire the blossoming of similar fruits.      
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, although ideology critique is eschewed by many contemporary critical 
theorists, my own particular use of the method, within this dissertation, indicates its 
                                                          
59 Butler, C. and Greenhalgh, T. (2011) ‘What is already known about involving users’ in Greenhalgh, 
T. et al (eds) User Involvement in Health Care. Oxford: Blackwell, pp10-27 at p23. 
60 Palumbo, R. (2017) The Bright Side and Dark Side of Patient Empowerment: Co-Creation or Co-
Destruction of Value in the Healthcare Environment. Cham: Springer, p65. 
61 Bevan, A. (1950) Democratic Values. London: Fabian Society, p14. 
319 
 
continued relevance in delineating the gap between ideals and lived realities. Although 
the norms of the dominant neo-liberal ideology, such as competition and choice, 
increasingly govern behaviour within the NHS, residual and emergent norms persist. 
Residual and emergent norms are undermined by dominant norms, but enable the 
critique of government policy and provide a basis for conceiving alternatives. As 
governments continue to give validity to such norms, a crisis of legitimacy may arise 
as public experience increasingly diverges from them. I argued that legislation which 
undermines residual norms should be amended, that the NHS should be democratised 
to empower patients and the public and that governments must increasingly intervene 
in capitalist production to address health inequalities.   
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